[雙語翻譯]財務報表舞弊外文翻譯--財務報表舞弊的檢測以法國公司為例（節(jié)選）

1、1中文 中文 7200 字， 字，4600 英文單詞， 英文單詞，24500 英文字符 英文字符文獻出處： 文獻出處：Amara I, Amar A B, Jarboui A. Detection of Fraud in Financial Statements: French Companies as a Case Study[J]. International Journal of Academic Research in Acco

2、unting, Finance and Management Sciences, 2013, 3(3): 40-51.Detection of Fraud in Financial Statements: French Companies as a Case StudyInes AMARA，Anis BEN AMAR，Anis JARBOUIAbstractThe objective of this research is to tes

3、t the impact of the “Fraud Triangle“ elements on the detection of fraud in the financial statements. The data used in our empirical research are related to a sample of 80 French companies in the SBF 250 over the period 2

4、001 to 2009. Using the method of logistic regression, this study shows that the performance issue exerted on the manager is a factor of pressure leading to commit fraud in the financial statements. However, factors relat

5、ed to financial difficulties (debt, liquidity) and the size of auditing firm are not associated with the detection of fraud.Keywords: Fraud, Fraud triangle, Pressure, Opportunity.1. IntroductionNowadays, the global econo

6、my considers a series of economic and financial crises caused a distrust of markets, investors and public opinion vis-à-vis the company accounts. Here, it suffices to highlight the fact that Enron corporation, a for

7、mer United States energy commodity and service company, has caused a loss of 70 Trillion dollars for all its social partners. Thus, the aforementioned loon has brought about ensuing economic crisis which has spread to al

8、l globally emerging plans. As a case in point, scandals that were widely publicized was cases of Worldcom, Parmalat, Ahold, etc. (Rezaee, 2005).Certainly, the financial scandals listed above are not the sole causes of th

9、e crisis of confidence prevailing in the business world. The real scourge that affects the economy is undoubtedly “Fraud“. All manipulations are inherently common to some extent: it consists of deceit committed in violat

10、ion of the act and regulations causing damage to community. As Rouff (2003) cited “Fraud is an intentional act and its author is a real offender.“In this research, we will focus our attention on the topic of “Fraud in Fi

11、nancial Statements“, which, as indicated by a range of researchers, seems growing internationally. This phenomenon has attracted the attention of several researchers in accounting who are striving to detect the underlyin

12、g logic and reasons (Goode and Lacey 2011; Sitorus et al. 2010; Wuerges and Borba 2010; Okoye et al. 2009). Perols and Lougee (2011); Dechow and Skinner (2000) highlight the difference between the concept of fraud and ea

13、rnings management. Some other authors seek the impact of audit quality on the detection of fraud in financial statements (Lennox and Pittman 2010; Dechow et al. 2011; Smaili et al. 2009; Choo and Tan 2007, etc.).To becom

14、e familiar with the phenomenon of “fraud in the financial statements“ and situate it in its context, a realization and understands of the reasons that can cause a person to violate the rules of accounting must be underst

15、ood. To do so, we have chosen to build on the work of the American sociologist Donald Cressey (1953), who highlighted the notion of “Fraud Triangle». This concept strongly influences the development of techniques fo

16、r detecting fraud in accounting. 32.1 Agency TheoryJensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship “as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform s

17、ome service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. “.This theory is based on the economic perspective that the relationship “principal / agent“ is characterized by a confli

18、ct of interest. This conflict is often referred to as the “agency problem“ (Donaldson and Davis 1991). Thus, this relationship reflects a transfer of trust and obligation to the agent’s opportunism.The agency theory is b

19、ased on two fundamental assumptions which are as follows:Leader’s opportunismThe manager, like any individual, is inherently clever, creative to the point that he seeking to maximize his personal interest in a selfish wa

20、y. He seeks profit as an agent and thus adopts an opportunistic behavior (Strong and Waterson 1987). Opportunism occurs through decisions and actions taken by leaders. These are, in most cases surprisingly unobservable b

21、y shareholders and therefore, in cases where the financial situation is poor, the leader would be tempted to make accounting fraud to hide the truth of the situation. The opportunism of the leadership is reinforced throu

22、gh a fraud in accounting by information asymmetry, which is postulate of agency relationship.Information asymmetryInformation asymmetry determines the opportunistic behavior of the leader. In fact, it uses all the inform

23、ation including earning managements using its discretion. By exploiting the flexibility of accounting principles, in order the leader would choose accounting methods that increase the result. Thus, he will make an irregu

24、lar “Fraud“ to cover poor performance and practice a policy of rooting translated into investment in activities where by officer has a comparative advantage in terms of personal or informational competence through accura

25、ls (Djama 2008). The leader can thus be financially favorable without disclosing the management process behind.The problem of information asymmetry is the basis of any problem of conflict of interest and consequently inc

26、reases the risk of fraud. This is the case for example of leaders who hide information that may be useful to shareholders in decision-making or evaluation of their securities. In this case, there is an informational disa

27、dvantage, the principal cannot access company information and is in a situation where he does not know if the manager is able to apply the terms of the contract or not.Moreover if the company is facing financial difficul

28、ties or deficiency in internal control, then the agency relationships in this case affect both shareholders and creditors while the leader carries out the fraud.2.2 Stewardship TheoryStewardship theory considers that lea

29、ders are like “stewards“ in their companies they promote the interests of shareholders their own interests, regardless of their personal motivations or incentives (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). So, the “stewardship“ isn’t

30、a theory that rejects agency theory but rather goes hand with it in the sense that the head can choose to be either an agent or stewards. This choice depends on both principles and leadership perceptions depending on the