外文翻譯----網(wǎng)絡(luò)團(tuán)購中的不確定性需求細(xì)分

1、<p><b>　　中文3600字</b></p><p>　　畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計）外文翻譯</p><p>　　題　　目：　　 網(wǎng)絡(luò)團(tuán)購的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀與問題探究 　　　　　　 </p><p><b>　　一、外文原文</b></p><p>　　標(biāo)題：Segmenting uncerta

2、in demand in group-buying auctions</p><p>　　原文：Demand uncertainty is a key factor in a seller’s decision-making process for products sold through online auctions. We explore demand uncertainty in group-buyin

3、g auctions in terms of the extent of low-valuation demand and high-valuation demand. We focus on the analysis of a monopolistic group-buying retailer that sells products to consumers who express different product valuati

4、ons. We also examine the performance of a group-buying seller who faces competitive posted-price sellers in a market </p><p>　　Keywords: Consumer behavior, bidding strategy, demand uncertainty, economic anal

5、ysis, electronic markets, group-buying auctions, market mechanism, posted-price mechanism, simulation, uncertainty risk.</p><p>　　The development of advanced IT makes it possible to use novel business models

6、 to handle business problems in new and innovative ways. With the growth of the Internet, a number of new electronic auction mechanisms have emerged, and auctions are generally known to create higher expected seller reve

7、nue than posted-prices when the cost of running an auction is minimal or costless (Wang 1993). Some of the new mechanisms we have seen include the online Yankee and Dutch auctions, and the “name-yourown-</p><p

8、>　　This paper is the first to examine the impacts of demand uncertainty on the performance on online group-buying auctions. Based on a Nash equilibrium analysis of bidder strategies for a monopolist seller and a compe

9、titive seller, we are able to characterize the group-buying auction bidders’ symmetric and dominant strategies. We find that group-buying is likely to be more effective in settings where there is larger low-valuation dem

10、and than high-valuation demand. Thus, the structure of demand at d</p><p><b>　　THEORY</b></p><p>　　The model for the group-buying auction mechanism with uncertain bidder arrival that

11、 we will develop spans three streams of literature: demand uncertainty, consumer behavior and related mechanism design issues; auction economics and mechanism design theory; and current theoretical knowledge about the op

12、eration of group-buying auctions from the IS and electronic commerce literature.</p><p>　　Demand Uncertainty, Consumer Behavior and Mechanism Design</p><p>　　Demand uncertainties typically are c

13、omposed of consumer demand environment uncertainty (or uncertainty about the aggregate level of consumer demand) and randomness of demand in the marketplace (reflected in brief temporal changes and demand shocks that are

14、 not expected to persist). Consumer uncertainty about demand in the marketplace can occur based on the valuation of products, and whether consumers are willing to pay higher or lower prices. It may also occur on the basi

15、s of demand levels, espe</p><p>　　Dana (2001) pointed out that when a monopoly seller faces uncertainty about the consumer demand environment, it usually will not be in his best interest to set uniform price

16、s for all consumers. The author studied a scenario in which there were more buyers associated with high demand and fewer buyers associated with low demand. In the author’s proposed price mechanism, the seller sets a pric

17、e curve instead of a single price, so as to be able to offer different prices depending on the different de</p><p>　　Nocke and Peitz (2007) have studied rationing as a tool that a monopolist to optimize its

18、sales policy in the presence of uncertain demand. The authors examined three different selling policies that they argue are potentially optimal in their environment: uniform pricing, clearance sales, and introductory off

19、ers. A uniform pricing policy involves no seller price discrimination, though consumers are likely to exhibit different levels of willingness-to-pay when they are permitted to express themse</p><p>　　Nocke a

20、nd Peitz (2007) characterized a clearance sales policy as charging a high price initially, but then lowering the price and offering the remaining goods to low value consumers, as is often seen in department store sales p

21、olicy. Consumers with a high valuation for the sale goods may decide to buy at the high price, since the endogenous probability of rationing by the seller is higher at the lower price. Apropos to this, consumers who buy

22、late at low prices typically find that it is difficul</p><p>　　In uncertain markets, buyers will have private information. Che and Gale (2000) pointed out that when consumers have private information about t

23、heir budget constraints and their valuation of sales items, so a monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy is to offer a menu of lotteries on the likelihood of consumer purchases of its products at different prices. Another

24、approach is intertemporal price discrimination. By offering different prices with different probabilities for the consumer to obtain the</p><p>　　Even when the seller can effectively identify the consumer de

25、mand level in the marketplace, due to stochastic factors in the market environment, it still may be difficult for the seller to effectively predict demand. As a result, the seller may try to improve its demand forecast b

26、y utilizing market signals that may be observed when sales occur. However, there are likely to be some stochastic differences between the predicted demand by the seller and the realized demand in the marketplace (Kauffm&

27、lt;/p><p>　　2.2. Some Properties of Group-Buying Auction Mechanism</p><p>　　Some of the key characteristics associated with group-buying auction mechanism design are present in the literature. The

28、group-buying auction mechanism is fundamentally different from the typical quantity discount mechanism (Dolan 1987, Weng 1995, Corbett and DeGroote 2000) that is often used in consumer and business-to-business procuremen

29、t settings. </p><p>　　First, group-buying closing prices typically decline monotonically in the total purchase quantities of participating buyers, and not just based on an individual buyer’s purchase quan

30、tities. So a group-buying auction does not lead to price discrimination among different buyers and every buyer will be charged the same closing price.</p><p>　　Second, in group-buying auctions, imperfect inf

31、ormation may have an impact on performance and make the final auction price uncertain. Group-buying is not the same as what happens with corporate shopping clubs or affinity group-based buying though. With these other me

32、chanisms, consumers will be associated with one another in some way, and be able to obtain quantity discounts as a result. Another variant of the quantity discount mechanism occurs on the Internet with shopping clubs and

33、 “power-buyin</p><p>　　Third, in the quantity discount mechanism, to achieve a discount the buyer must order more than the threshold number of items required. In group-buying, the buyer can get the discount

34、by ordering more herself or persuading other bidders to order more, as we saw with the “Tell-a-Friend” link at Lets-Buy It.com for co-buying (and at the active group-donation site, Fundable.com, www.fundable.com).</p&

35、gt;<p>　　A final consideration in some group-buying auctions is that a buyer may be able to choose her own bidding price, which makes this kind of auction similar to an open outcry auction. In practice, many buyer

36、s will only be willing to state a low bid price, unless they can rely on the design of the mechanism to faithfully handle information about their actual reservation price. Group-buying auctions have a key, but paradoxica

37、l feature: to reach a lower price and higher sale quantity bucket, the consu</p><p>　　出處：J. Chen, R.J. Kauffman, Y. Liu, X. Song.Segmenting uncertain demand in group-buying auctions[R]. Electronic Commerce R

38、esearch and Applications 2009,3(001).</p><p><b>　　二、翻譯文章　</b></p><p>　　標(biāo)題：網(wǎng)絡(luò)團(tuán)購中的不確定性需求細(xì)分</p><p>　　譯文：不確定性需求，是賣家通過網(wǎng)絡(luò)拍賣形式銷售產(chǎn)品的決策過程中的一個關(guān)鍵因素。我們從低價需求和高價需求的角度出發(fā)，在團(tuán)購拍賣中探索不確定性需求

39、。我們關(guān)注于一個壟斷性團(tuán)購零售商的分析，即向那些需要不同產(chǎn)品價值的消費者銷售產(chǎn)品。同時，我們也檢測團(tuán)購買方在市場上會有何種表現(xiàn)，當(dāng)團(tuán)購買方面對具有競爭力標(biāo)價的賣方時，賣方在類似于不確定性需求的假設(shè)下銷售同種產(chǎn)品。以一個納什投標(biāo)者對這些賣方競爭結(jié)構(gòu)的均衡分析策略為依據(jù)，我們能夠描述出一種團(tuán)購拍賣出價者占優(yōu)策略。我們得到了許多有趣的發(fā)現(xiàn)。低價需求中的團(tuán)購很可能比在高價需求中的更有效。需求的結(jié)構(gòu)問題。這項發(fā)現(xiàn)和新型相機(jī)、下一代衛(wèi)星處理器、計算

40、機(jī)和其他那些看似不太可能在團(tuán)購市場上有效銷售的高價產(chǎn)品有關(guān)。我們?yōu)榱税咐倪B續(xù)需求能夠有額外結(jié)果，發(fā)現(xiàn)有一個以團(tuán)購拍賣有效價格為基礎(chǔ)的可以改善賣方收入的設(shè)計曲線。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞:消費者行為，投標(biāo)策略，需求不確定性，經(jīng)濟(jì)分析，電子市場，團(tuán)購拍賣，市場機(jī)制，價前機(jī)制，模擬，不確定風(fēng)險。</p><p>　　IT產(chǎn)業(yè)先進(jìn)的發(fā)展，令用創(chuàng)新商業(yè)模式處理業(yè)務(wù)問題成為可能。隨著網(wǎng)絡(luò)的日益發(fā)

41、展，許多新的電子拍賣機(jī)制出現(xiàn)了，當(dāng)一項拍賣的成本流失最小或無成本的時候，拍賣通常被理解為是為了設(shè)定比標(biāo)價更高的預(yù)期賣方收入(王1993)。我們見過的一些新機(jī)制包括美國在線、荷蘭式拍賣、自命名和“現(xiàn)在買”機(jī)制，有一個易趣的荷蘭式拍賣的例子——為銷售多個同類產(chǎn)品的描述。我們觀察了另一種電子市場機(jī)制：團(tuán)購拍賣，一個同質(zhì)多單位拍賣(米切爾2002，李等。2004)?；诰W(wǎng)絡(luò)的賣家和數(shù)字媒介已經(jīng)接受了這種市場機(jī)制例如“LetsBuyIt”(www

42、. letsbuyit.com) 和“eWinWin.com” (www.ewinwin.com)，這些網(wǎng)站提供不同于傳統(tǒng)拍賣的“轉(zhuǎn)換市場”機(jī)制。在傳統(tǒng)的拍賣中，競拍的人為了成為勝利者，彼此間進(jìn)行抗?fàn)?。然而，在團(tuán)購拍賣中，投標(biāo)者用一個誘因來集合他們的出標(biāo)，以至于賣方或數(shù)碼調(diào)解人提供一個更低的價格，使他們?nèi)寄苜I到自己想要的產(chǎn)品(赫恩以及其他人。2000)。麥長基以及其他人(1991)已經(jīng)在實驗研究探索了多數(shù)單位的成功拍賣。</p&

43、gt;<p>　　本篇論文是第一個探索不確定性需求在網(wǎng)絡(luò)團(tuán)購拍賣模式中的影響的論文。以一個納什投標(biāo)者為一個專營商賣方和一個競爭賣方的均衡分析戰(zhàn)略為依據(jù)，我們能描述一個團(tuán)購拍賣出價者對稱占優(yōu)的策略。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)網(wǎng)站上低價需求的團(tuán)購很可能比高價需求的更具有效果。從而，產(chǎn)生了不同的消費者愿付水平需求結(jié)構(gòu)問題。這和新型相機(jī)，下一代微處理器，計算機(jī)和其他高價值的產(chǎn)品市場有關(guān)系。我們?yōu)榱税咐倪B續(xù)需求能夠有額外結(jié)果，發(fā)現(xiàn)有一個以團(tuán)購拍賣有

44、效價格為基礎(chǔ)的可以改善賣方收入的設(shè)計曲線。</p><p><b>　　理論 </b></p><p>　　這個模型是有關(guān)于團(tuán)購拍賣機(jī)制中的需求不確定者的，我們將涉及到三方面的文獻(xiàn)跨度。不確定性需求，消費者行為和涉及到機(jī)制設(shè)計問題；拍賣經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和機(jī)制設(shè)計理論；當(dāng)前IS和電子商務(wù)文學(xué)中的團(tuán)購拍賣運(yùn)行理論知識。</p><p>　　需求不確定性，消費

45、者行為和機(jī)制設(shè)計</p><p>　　需求不確定性通常由消費需求環(huán)境的不確定性（或?qū)οM需求總體水平的不確定性）和市場隨機(jī)性需求（簡言之，就是反映典型的持續(xù)變動和需求震動）組成的。消費的不確定性是關(guān)于以產(chǎn)品計價為依據(jù)的的市場需求，主要看消費者是否愿意付出更高或更低的價格。它也可能發(fā)生在以需求水平為依據(jù)尤其是市場消費者數(shù)目上。最終，有消費者是否愿意現(xiàn)在購買的暫時性考慮，或他們在購買后的質(zhì)量和價格是否可抽樣的長期考慮

46、。我們在不同的需求水平環(huán)境中進(jìn)行區(qū)分。此外，這些消費需求環(huán)境很可能共存，正如工廠制定價格歧視策略也是常有的事情。這就使賣家考慮設(shè)定不止一個價格水平，正如我們經(jīng)常在現(xiàn)實中看到零售，和團(tuán)購拍賣一樣。</p><p>　　達(dá)納(2001)指出當(dāng)一個壟斷賣方不確定消費需求環(huán)境時，通常不會對所有消費者設(shè)定一個統(tǒng)一的價格來求自身利益最大化。作者研究了一種情形，這種情形中有和高需求相關(guān)的較多買家和低需求相關(guān)的較少買家。在作者提

47、出的價格機(jī)制中，賣方設(shè)定一個價格曲線而非單一價格，這樣能根據(jù)在市場中出現(xiàn)的不同需求情況來提供不同的價格。它可以在這種環(huán)境中利用一個自動覓價機(jī)制，相對于期望的利潤而言，需求不確定性已經(jīng)被論證了比一個統(tǒng)一價格機(jī)制需求更堅固。然而不像達(dá)納(2001)研究的那樣，我們將會在較高價的少量買家的展會需求、和在較低價的多數(shù)買家的展會需求的情況下進(jìn)行研究。這有一個有用的方式來描述團(tuán)購，多數(shù)參與的消費者對價格非常敏感，這是團(tuán)購拍賣讓他們感興趣的原因所在。

48、</p><p>　　諾奇和派茨(2007)研究了作為專營商不確定性需求的一種工具，限量供應(yīng)用以優(yōu)化其銷售政策。作者在銷售環(huán)境中考察了三個不同銷售政策，并試圖找出哪一種是最佳的選擇：統(tǒng)一定價，清倉減價銷售，廠家供應(yīng)。一個統(tǒng)一的定價策略不包括賣方價格歧視，雖然消費者在被允許通過不同價格水平購買表達(dá)自己的時候，很可能顯現(xiàn)出不同的愿意支付水平。當(dāng)前一個統(tǒng)一定價策略的例子就是蘋果公司開發(fā)的與iPod搭配的在電腦上使用的音

49、樂播放器和音樂管理器iTunes(www.itunes.com)，它就是一直提供每歌曲99￠的價格。消費者不得不在過程中處理非常小的不確定性，當(dāng)賣方想培養(yǎng)消費者開發(fā)具體的購買習(xí)慣時，這也許是一個好的途徑，（就是在過去的幾年中經(jīng)常見到的從網(wǎng)上下載音樂）。</p><p>　　諾奇和派茨(2007)闡述了一個清晰的銷售政策，最初是制定高價，但是之后又降低價格，給低價消費者提供剩余產(chǎn)品——經(jīng)常在百貨公司銷售政策中見到的

50、那樣。高價值的消費者可能決定在銷售產(chǎn)品高價時就購買，雖然賣家限量供應(yīng)內(nèi)在可能性的價格比低價稍稍高一些。就這點而言，稍后在低價上購買的消費者，通常發(fā)現(xiàn)找到自己想要的風(fēng)格、顏色和樣式比較困難，他們可能在協(xié)調(diào)匹配的收購商品上有更多的困難（例如：衣服的顏色搭配和樣式風(fēng)格）。導(dǎo)言的提供是由最初市場上低價的限量產(chǎn)品組成的，然后提高價格。當(dāng)賣方在初次購買產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)提供更低價格時，變化就發(fā)生了，這通常涉及到消費者的多重購買（例如：預(yù)定俱樂部會員資格和手

51、機(jī)服務(wù)）。 消費者在一個最初低價定量配給的規(guī)模產(chǎn)品上設(shè)定一個高價，發(fā)現(xiàn)這在高價購買產(chǎn)品上可能是理想的。引言的提供可能主導(dǎo)統(tǒng)一價格，但是如果賣家清晰地銷售，效果就絕對不會理想了。</p><p>　　在不確定的市場上，買方會有私人信息。澈和蓋爾(2000)指出消費者有關(guān)于他們的預(yù)算限制和他們的計價項目價值的私人信息。所以一個專營商的最佳價格策略是提供一個抽獎的名單，類似于消費者購買它的不同價位的產(chǎn)品。另一個方式涉及

52、到差別取價。通過為消費者提供不同概論的價格使其獲得益處，專營商有利地區(qū)分消費者，即使價值區(qū)分不僅僅是有利可圖的。</p><p>　　盡管當(dāng)賣家能夠在市場上有效地鑒定消費者需求水平，但是由于市場環(huán)境的隨機(jī)因素，有效預(yù)測需求對賣方而言可能仍舊是困難的。因此，賣方可能試圖通過利用市場信號來改善對消費者需求的預(yù)測，這樣在銷售的時候可能觀察被觀察到。然而，賣方有可能在一些隨機(jī)差異之間預(yù)測消費者需求，并在市場上實現(xiàn)這種需求

53、（考夫曼，莫泰迪，2004）。羅，吳(2003)指出一個典型的賣方面對不同類型的風(fēng)險，在這些風(fēng)險中，一個關(guān)鍵因素在于預(yù)測誤差，預(yù)測間的差異和需求的實際水平。德拉姆和朗德(2002)以一個策劃為依據(jù)來量化預(yù)測錯誤，估算預(yù)測</p><p>　　誤差的關(guān)聯(lián)性并隨著時間的推移建立起預(yù)測演化模型。</p><p>　　團(tuán)購拍賣機(jī)制的一些可能性</p><p>　　文獻(xiàn)中呈現(xiàn)

54、出了和團(tuán)購拍賣機(jī)制設(shè)計相關(guān)聯(lián)的一些關(guān)鍵性特征。團(tuán)購拍賣機(jī)制和典型數(shù)量折扣機(jī)制根本不同(多蘭1987，翁1995，科爾韋特，德格羅特2000)， 前者經(jīng)常在消費者和企業(yè)對企業(yè)電子商務(wù)采購環(huán)境中被使用。</p><p>　　首先，團(tuán)購結(jié)算價格通常在總共參與者的需求總量上單調(diào)地下降，而非單純地只依據(jù)買方的購買量。這么一個團(tuán)購拍賣不會在不同的消費者之間引發(fā)價格歧視，每一個消費者將會支付統(tǒng)一的最終價。</p>

55、<p>　　其次，在團(tuán)購拍賣中，不完全信息可能會在產(chǎn)品性能上有影響，并制作最終拍賣不確定價格。但是團(tuán)購和公司購物俱樂部或類似的團(tuán)體購買不同。同其他的一些機(jī)制，消費者將會在某種程度上相互關(guān)聯(lián)，并最終能夠獲得數(shù)量折扣。另一種數(shù)量折扣機(jī)制的變化發(fā)生在網(wǎng)絡(luò)上，例如：購物俱樂部、“購買力”網(wǎng)站、網(wǎng)絡(luò)營銷網(wǎng)站(www.netmarket.com)，買方優(yōu)勢(www.buyersadvan tage.com)和在線選擇 (www.onli

56、nechoice.com)，這些都是我們最近在市場上觀察的一些網(wǎng)站。同最終參與投標(biāo)的人數(shù)不確定性有關(guān)，感興趣的消費者可能不知道他們是否能夠得到產(chǎn)品，或者當(dāng)他們出標(biāo)時會是什么樣的臨界價格。這可能就可能發(fā)生在他們在團(tuán)購價格曲線的最低價格上出價的時候。</p><p>　　再者，在數(shù)量折扣機(jī)制上，為了獲得折扣，買方的數(shù)量必須超過要求團(tuán)購的最低限。在團(tuán)購中，買家能夠通過自己訂購更多產(chǎn)品或勸其他人訂購剛多產(chǎn)品來獲得折扣，正

57、如我們在“大家買”網(wǎng)站上看到的一個用“邀請好友”的鏈接來壯大買方團(tuán)體一樣（在團(tuán)購網(wǎng)站www.fundable.com上也有類似情況）。</p><p>　　在某些團(tuán)購拍賣中，最后要考慮的是一個買方可能選擇他自己報的價格——有些類似公開喊叫拍賣了。實際上，許多購買者不僅愿意規(guī)定一個低的價格，而且他們能依賴機(jī)制設(shè)計，詳實地掌握他們實際預(yù)定的價格信息。團(tuán)購拍賣有一個關(guān)鍵但自相矛盾的特征：即為了得到一個更低的價格和一個更