[雙語翻譯]防火設(shè)計(jì)外文翻譯--高層建筑的消防安全設(shè)計(jì)（英文）

1、 Procedia Engineering 62 ( 2013 ) 169 – 181 Available online at www.sciencedirect.com1877-7058 © 2013 International Association for Fire Safety Science. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-N

2、D license. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Asian-Oceania Association of Fire Science and Technology doi: 10.1016/j.proeng.2013.08.053 ScienceDirectThe 9th Asia-Oceania Symposium on Fire Science and

3、 Technology Fire safety design for tall buildings Adam Cowlarda, Adam Bitterna,c, Cecilia Abecassis-Empisa, Jos? Toreroa,b,* aBRE Centre for Fire Safety Engineering, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, EH16 3JL, UK bScho

4、ol of Civil Engineering, University of Queensland, Queensland, 4072, Australia cAstute Fire Ltd., Bush House, Edinburgh Technopole, Edinburgh, EH26 0BB, UK Abstract In any subject area related to the provision of safety,

5、 failure is typically the most effective mechanism for evoking rapid reform and an introspective assessment of the accepted operating methods and standards within a professional body. In the realm of tall buildings the

6、 most notable failures in history, those of the WTC towers, widely accepted as fire induced failures, have not to any significant extent affected the way they are designed with respect to fire safety. This is clearly re

7、flected in the surge in numbers of Tall Buildings being constructed since 2001. The combination of the magnitude and time-scale of the WTC investigation coupled with the absence of meaningful guidance resulting from it

8、 strongly hints at the outdatedness of current fire engineering practice as a discipline in the context of such advanced infrastructure. This is further reflected in the continual shift from prescriptive to performance

9、based design in many parts of the world demonstrating an ever growing acceptance that these buildings are beyond the realm of applicability of prescriptive guidance. In order for true performance based engineering to o

10、ccur however, specific performance goals need to be established for these structures. This work seeks to highlight the critical elements of a fire safety strategy for tall buildings and thus attempt to highlight some s

11、pecific global performance objectives. A survey of tall building fire investigations is conducted in order to assess the effectiveness of current designs in meeting these objectives, and the current state-of-the-art of

12、fire safety design guidance for tall structures is also analysed on these terms. The correct definition of the design fire for open plan compartments is identified as the critical knowledge gap that must be addressed i

13、n order to achieve tall building performance objectives and to provide truly innovative, robust fire safety for these unique structures. ? 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibil

14、ity of the Asia-Oceania Association for Fire Science and Technology. Keywords: Tall Buildings; Fire safety strategies; Performance based design 1. Introduction The number of tall buildings constructed is increasingly ev

15、er more rapidly (Fig. 1). They are evolving in height, construction materials, use, and compartmental composition. The evolution of height is staggering when it is considered that until January of 2010, the tallest comp

16、leted building (Taipei 101) stood at 508 m, a mantle now held by the Burj Khalifa at 828 m. The increasing number of 600 m+ buildings being conceived has led to the recent coining of the term mega-tall. According to st

17、atistics from the Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat [1], 17 of the tallest 100 buildings in the world, as of the end of 2011, were completed within that year. The driving forces behind this progression are ine

18、vitably financial, political and environmental, but it is modern technological developments, both structural and material, which have truly enabled the continued evolution of these buildings. The tall building of today

19、 is a completely different entity to that of a decade ago with the propensity for change even greater in the immediate future. Advancements in structural engineering have arisen to make possible the increase in height,

20、 size and complexity, the reduction of cost and carbon footprint as well * Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 131 650 5723. E-mail address: j.torero@ed.ac.uk. © 2013 International Association for Fire Safety Science.

21、Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Asian-Oceania Association of Fire Science and Technology171Adam Cowlard et al. / Procedia Engineer

22、ing 62 ( 2013 ) 169 – 181 guidance [17]. This example is also typical of how social responsibility associated to fire safety has historically been translated into codes and standards establishing prescriptive requ

23、irements for buildings. Prescriptive requirements induce safety factors by constraining design output to pre-established bounds. A specific form has been studied, and its range of performance established. An acceptabl

24、e performance objective is identified thus so is the extent to which the form can be changed whilst still achieving the performance objective. This methodology forms the bounds that are then implied by prescriptive rul

25、es. If a designer follows these rules, they will fall within the bounds and the safety of the design will be implicit. The implemented solution will inherently carry a significant safety factor because it has to be rob

26、ust to the variations permitted within the bounds of the prescriptive rules. The magnitude of this safety factor is however, never explicitly defined. Critically, this system is founded on the initial form identified fo

27、r analysis; change the system drastically, and the safety factor can no longer be implied. There have been periods in which codes and standards had enough embedded knowledge that they could respond to all variants of i

28、nnovation in construction. In these periods infrastructure can be comprehensively classified into some group that is fully addressed by a specific set of rules. Few exceptions appear outside the codes and standards and

29、 require individualised solutions. The post WWII period was perhaps the most significant example of this. In periods of great urban or technological development, codes and standards do not envelop the evolution imposed

30、 by the drivers of the construction industry and performance based solutions are necessary. Performance based design allows practitioners to apply a rational engineering approach to provision of life safety and proper

31、ty protection goals. This is accomplished by identification of specific goals, functional objectives and performance requirements [18]. An engineer is then given license to demonstrate the required performance using an

32、acceptable solution, approved calculation method or performance based alternative design. Achievement of the specified goals is thus defined explicitly. The WTC epitomised innovation and most of the technical solutions

33、 involved were evaluated using the most sophisticated engineering tools of the time; a time when Fire Safety was still established in a purely prescriptive manner. In the aftermath of the WTC collapses, the Tall Buildi

34、ngs community turned towards the investigation to derive the necessary lessons that would enable an adequate performance based analyses. Nevertheless, extracting requisite knowledge from a failure and conveying that kn

35、owledge into the design process requires a minimum level of understanding of what went wrong and how it can be adequately guarded against in future designs. The unprecedented magnitude and novelty of the WTC failures c

36、aught the fire safety and structural communities unprepared for the investigation. Somewhat ominously, while it has taken the professional communities the better part of a decade to produce the science necessary to unve

37、il many of the phenomena, and while they are still to find the capability to transform the knowledge into relevant design methodologies and tools, this lack of capability has gone widely unnoticed by the wider construc

38、tion community, and the last decade has been a period of great all-round innovation for Tall Buildings with numbers soaring (Fig. 1). This strongly indicates the insignificance of fire safety engineering practice as a

39、n overall driver in the wider construction industry. Likewise, it reveals the practice?s inability to demonstrate the relevance of our solutions to that industry. As a consequence, new requirements have emerged, not al

40、ways because they were needed or because the community was ready to define them, but mainly because society demanded an answer in some form. Tall buildings are the optimal example of innovation outstripping prescribed

41、(implicit) safety. A one size fits all approach cannot be considered for scenarios so complex and unique. This is becoming an increasingly accepted fact in most facets of modern fire safety engineering, evidenced by th

42、e recent shift in many parts of the world towards a performance based framework. As tall buildings are such a unique scenario, it is essential that specific, tall building relevant performance objectives are defined bef

43、ore an attempt to perform such a design is made. Only then can practitioners understand what they are actually required to achieve, establish the goals of the performance based hierarchy [18], and assess the level of p

44、erformance of the system that they are proposing. To identify the critical tall building performance objectives, it is first essential to define the specific fire safety problems inherent in tall buildings. 3. Fire sa

45、fety strategies for tall buildings A holistic Fire Safety Strategy for a tall building is essentially a function of time. It contains two principle components; egress strategy and building performance. Building performa

46、nce can be further broken down into structural performance and fire spread mitigation e.g. compartmentation. The evacuation strategy is concerned with defining the time required to safely evacuate all building occupant

47、s. Building performance concerns the time that the structure can withstand the effects of the fire and the compartmentation remain in place and functional. In everyday design scenarios, the two components can usually b

48、e dealt with separately. Times associated to evacuation are typically of the order of minutes while structural / compartmentation times are more typically of the order of hours. It is thus usually inherent that the stru

49、cture and compartmentation will remain intact for a period that comfortably allows for the implementation of the egress strategy. This is not the case however for tall buildings. The ever exaggerated heights combined w