[雙語(yǔ)翻譯]農(nóng)民工就業(yè)外文翻譯--關(guān)于以色列建筑業(yè)外籍工人就業(yè)的法規(guī)

1、5200 英文單詞， 英文單詞，2.9 萬英文字符，中文 萬英文字符，中文 8700 字文獻(xiàn)出處： 文獻(xiàn)出處：Ida Y, Talit G. Regulation on Migrant Workers’ Employment in the Israeli Construction Sector[J]. International Migration, 2015, 53(6):111–124.Regulation on Migrant W

2、orkers’ Employment in the Israeli Construction SectorYoram Ida and Gal TalitABSTRACTThis article deals with a reform in the regulation on employment of migrant workers which was implemented in the Israeli construction in

3、dustry from 2005. This corporations-based arrangement replaced a restrictive employment arrangement which tied the employee to a spe- cific employer. The new regulation of work conditions and wages, coupled with a signif

4、icant reduction in the number of work permits issued to construction, has improved work conditions and wages paid to migrant workers, and made their employment less attractive to employers. The reform also included eleme

5、nts designed to reduce the illegal employment phenomenon and to encourage migrant workers to leave the country at the end of their contracts. However, the new arrangement still restricted the mobility of migrant workers

6、to some extent and had negative consequences such as a significant rise in the broker fees demanded of workers.INTRODUCTIONRegulation is at the heart of governmental activity in designing, implementing and evaluating pub

7、lic policy. Its components include several definitions and types, some of which expand and some of which reduce. Its most common denominator is that the state has a system of restrictions and allowances on one hand, and

8、authority to enforce them on the other, to safeguard public interest. Regulation is implemented using a variety of tools at the government’s disposal, such as laws, modulation, standardization and supervision, which perm

9、it one behaviour or forbid another (Arbel- Ganz, 2003; Black 2002; Goodship et al., 2004; Hood et al., 1999; Levi-Faur 2011; May, 2007).Regulation is justified from a normative standpoint. Many of the rationales for regu

10、lation can be described either as instances of market failures (economic regulation) or as ways to ensure the dissemination of justice (social regulation). In these cases government regulation can be justified, because o

11、therwise the uncontrolled market will fail to produce behaviour or results in accordance with public interest (Arbel-Ganz, 2003; Baldwin and Cave, 1999).One area where government regulation is considered necessary is tha

12、t of migrant workers’ employment, for two main reasons. First, it often has significant effects on the labour market in the host country (Borjas, 2006). Second, it affects the socio-economic composition of the host count

13、ry and threatens its ethno-national homogeneity (Canetti-Nisim and Pedahzur, 2003). Thus, changes in macroeconomic and/or political conditions may lead to changes in government regulation on the employment of migrant wor

14、kers (OECD, 2013).This article examines the impact of regulatory changes on the employment of migrant workers in the construction sector in Israel. Its main purpose is to augment the knowledge accumulated in the employme

15、nt of migrant workers, by presenting a case study of reforms in migrant worker employment, which were implemented in the Israeli construction industry from 2005 onwards.To examine the effects of these regulatory changes

16、on the employment conditions of migrant workers in the construction sector, a comparison will be made between the findings of the current study of 2005–2008 (after the regulatory change of the corporations’ arrangement)

17、and the continued investment in low-productivity activities sustainable only with low-cost migrant workers, or as a means of encouraging employers to hire local low-skilled workers. Singapore’s levy system stands out in

18、Asia for its complexity, and for the relatively steep level of employer fees. Singapore applies a “dependency ceiling” to employers according to the sector, the skill level of the worker, and the proportion of the workfo

19、rce comprising migrant workers. The levy can reach $350 per month for unskilled workers in services, representing at least 25% of salary costs, and is even higher for construction workers. Chinese Taipei imposes a monthl

20、y “employment stability fee” of $70–$80 as a levy on migrant workers, which represents about 15% of habitual wages, and also imposes a ceiling on the percentage of migrant workers in employers’ workforces. The ceiling va

21、ries according to the industry, from 10 to 35%. Malaysia also imposes a foreign worker monthly levy, which ranges from $10 (for domestic and agricultural workers) to $35 (for manufacturing, construction and tourism) and

22、$50 for other services (OECD, 2012).Research often uses a quantitative approach to represent work migrants’ decision-making process. These studies consider the economic investment involved in migration (Khwaja, 2002), th

23、e social networks and capital in both the place of residence and the place of destination (Alberts and Hazen, 2005; Haug, 2008), and the value of immobility (Fischer, Martin and Straubhaar, 1997) as impor- tant factors i

24、n explaining a migrant’s decision-making process.Regarding length of stay in the destination country, extending the period of stay in the host country is usually financially worthwhile to migrant workers (Dustmann and Ki

25、rchkamp, 2002). Receiving permanent status or citizenship also generally improves wages and employment condi- tions (Euwals, Dagevos, Gijsberts, and Roodenburg, 2010). Immigrants working on temporary visas usually experi

26、ence substantial wage gains upon receiving permanent resident status. The annual wage gain associated with an employment-based green card was almost $12,000 in the New Immigrant Survey (Mukhopadhyay and Oxborrow, 2012).

27、Another study suggests that getting a Green card raised workers’ wages by 18–25 per cent (Gass Kandilov, 2007). Both studies attribute the wage gains to enhanced job mobility.The Israeli experienceAt the end of 2013 in I

28、srael approximately 100,000 migrant workers entered with work permits (CBS, 2014). The bulk of legally recruited migrant workers were concentrated in three main sec- tors: construction, mainly from China, but also from R

29、omania and Bulgaria; agriculture, mainly from Thailand; and nursing care, mainly from the Philippines, but also from Sri Lanka, India and Bulgaria (Kemp and Raijman, 2014).The trend toward employing foreign workers gaine

30、d considerable momentum in Israel starting in the early 1990s. The Palestinian uprising in Judea, Samaria and Gaza – areas that had supplied the majority of workers in Israel’s construction industry – created a manpower

31、shortage in the sector. This shortage worsened during the great wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union, when quick housing solutions were needed for the new immigrants.One major reason why the State of Israel h

32、ad opposed the hiring of foreign workers until the early 1990s was the fear that some of them would not leave the country after their permit periods expired, and would settle in Israel permanently, demanding official sta

33、tus and recognition, and thereby threatening the Jewish character of the state. This concern was based on international experience, particularly the experience of Western Europe. Another important reason was the concern