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1、1850 英文單詞, 英文單詞,10500 英文單詞,中文 英文單詞,中文 3000 字文獻(xiàn)出處: 文獻(xiàn)出處:Sepasi S, Kazempour M, Mansourlakoraj R. Ownership Structure and Disclosure Quality: Case of Iran[J]. Procedia Economics and Finance, 2016, 36: 108-112.Ownership Str
2、ucture and Disclosure Quality: Case of IranSahar Sepasi, Morteza Kazempour, Roya MansourlakorajAbstractThe paper investigates the relationship between ownership structure and disclosure quality. The investigation has bee
3、n performed using panel data procedure for a sample of 80 Iranian listed companies on the Tehran Stock exchange during 2010-2014. The license of the firms’ disclosure quality which is published by Tehran Stock Exchange i
4、s used to measure the disclosure quality, and for better understanding of the ownership structure, this structure is divided into two classes of government and managerial ownership. The results of the study revealed that
5、 managerial ownership has a negative and significant effect on disclosure quality, but no significant relationship was observed between governmental ownership and disclosure quality. The results show that the governmenta
6、l ownership does not affect the quality of disclosure, meaning these companies have a low attention and concern on the quality of their disclosures. Adversely, private companies because of the need to absorb capital from
7、 market try to enhance the quality of their disclosures.Keywords: Ownership structure; Governmental ownership; Managerial ownership; Disclosure quality1. IntroductionAccounting disclosure is very important to all stakeho
8、lders; it provides them with the necessary information to reduce uncertainty and helps them to make suitable economic and financial decisions (Amer, et.al, 2013). The main core of Agency Theory is that managers, as the a
9、gents of shareholders, may act in a way that does not result in maximizing the wealth of shareholders. Based on this theory, enough mechanisms of control and supervision should be established to reduce the contrast betwe
10、en the managers and the owners in a firm. One of these mechanisms is firm domination. If the mechanisms of firm domination work well, they will result in the reduction of opportunistic and jobbery behaviours of the manag
11、er and this can increase the quality of disclosure. Ownership structure (Governmental and managerial ownership) can be mentioned as one of the most important mechanisms of firm ownership. Therefore, it is expected that g
12、overnmental investors will have more motivation to supervise the processes of firm’s disclosure. Therefore, firms can increase the expectations of state investors that are one of the most important beneficiaries in Irani
13、an firms through increasing their disclosure quality. On the other hand, it seems that the firms which have very high management ownerships have lower disclosure quality compared to other firms. The reason for this fact
14、could be that based on the Agency Theory, managers are trying to maximize their own expected desirability. Therefore, they need useful information which they can obtain it easily and will not be willing to disclose the i
15、nformation properly and comprehensively. Also, the firms which do not have main owner and their owners are scattered will seek to provide the information needs of users by disclosing high quality information.2. Literatur
16、e reviewThe amount of accuracy in information disclosure can affect decision making and prediction. is relatively low. At higher levels of family shareholding (more than 25%), the entrenchment effect dominates and is ass
17、ociated with higher voluntary disclosure. In addition, the results show that the appointment of an independent chairman is positively associated with the level of voluntary disclosure.Samaha et al. (2012), examined the i
18、mpact of a comprehensive set of corporate governance attributes on the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure in Egypt. Their results showed that the extent of governance disclosure is lower for companies wi
19、th duality in position and higher ownership concentration as measured by blockholder ownership and increases with the proportion of independent directors on the board and also firm size.Alves et al. (2012), examined the
20、relations between corporate governance variables and voluntary disclosure in Portugal and Spain. Their results indicated that the main determinants of voluntary disclosure are firm size, growth opportunities, organizatio
21、nal performance, board compensation and the presence of a large shareholder. Motavassel et al. (2013) concluded that there is not any meaningful relationship between the features of corporate governance and the quality o
22、f information disclosure.3. HypothesesHypothesis 1: There is a significant relationship between governmental ownership and disclosure quality. Hypothesis 2: There is a significant relationship between managerial ownershi
23、p and disclosure quality.4. Research MethodologyThe statistical population of this research included firms accepted and operating in the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) over the period 2010-2014. The data was collected from
24、the TSE database available. The research sample is 80 companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange.VDISi, t = βO +β1 GOWNi,t +β2 MOWNi,t +β3SIZEi,t (1)·GOWNi,t: Government ownership will be measure by percentage of share
25、s owned by government to total number of shares issued, following (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Eng and Mak, 2003; Wang et al, 2008).·MOWNi,t: Management ownership will be measure by percentage of shares owned by mana
26、gement to totalnumber of shares issued.·Sizei,t : logarithm of total assets for firm i in year t.5. FindingsThe co-linearity of independent variables investigated by SPSS before testing hypotheses. Results showed th
27、at all condition index values are less than 15; implying that there is no co-linearity between variables. Then, F-Limer test was used by applying E-Views 7 software. As it can be observed in table 1, its value is equal t
28、o 0.051 indicating that data are pooled. Durbin-Watson statistic is also 1.80 showing no autocorrelation.Table 1: Results of F-Limier testModel VDIS=β0 + β1 GOWN + β2 MOWN + β3 FSIZETest type Statistic d.f Prob.F-Limie
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