一項(xiàng)有關(guān)日本不良貸款證券化問(wèn)題的解決方案【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p>　　A Proposal for The Japanese Non-Performing Loans Problem：Securitization as a Solution</p><p>　　Material Source: Journal of Property Investment & F

2、inance Author: Kay Ellen Herr Goe Miyazaki</p><p>　　Japanese banks continue to suffer from the aggressive loans made during the“bubble” era.Despite the fact that a large proportion of

3、these loans has turned into non-performing loans,many Japanese banks have been delaying the recognition of such non-performing loans until recently.Unlike the U.S.banks,which quickly wrote-off their non-performing loans

4、in the early 1980s,none of the Japanese banks wrote off their non-performing loans until Sumitomo Bank took the lead in March 1995.Since then,top Ja</p><p>　　The main reasons for the Japanese banks’hesitance

5、 to write-off non-performing loans can be attributed to the following:</p><p>　　(a)The Ministry of Finance’s indecisiveness in recognizing and addressing the non-performing loan problem.</p><p>

6、　　(b) The Japanese tax system does not permit tax deductions for write-offs.</p><p>　　(c) Insufficient capital for banks to write-off the loans.</p><p>　　In order to address the second issue,man

7、y academics as well as industry participants have been lobbying to change the tax laws to permit tax-deductions for write-offs.The Bank of Japan addressed the third point in 1995 by increasing the nation’s money supply i

8、n order to lower interest rates,a move that increases the net interest income of Japanese banks due to larger spreads on loans(see Exhibit A–the Japanese Interest Rate Level and Exhibit B–Net Interest Income of Japanese

9、Banks).In this envir</p><p>　　Despite this favorable operating environment for the banks,the quality of Japanese banks’assets continued to deteriorate and the international capital markets started to charge

10、a “Japan premium”on inter-bank loans.In addition,the depreciation of the Japanese yen made it increasingly difficult for Japanese banks to comply with the Bank of International Settlement’s capital-adequacy ratio as the

11、depreciation of the yen increased the value of their overseas assets and liabilities.This also increase</p><p>　　Benefits of Securitization</p><p>　　Securitization is an attractive option for Ja

12、panese banks and non-bank finance companies. For Japanese banks plagued by non-performing loans,securitization,or specifically collateralized loan obligations(CLOs),represents an opportunity to reduce bad loans on the ba

13、lance sheets,enabling them to meet the Bank of International Settlements capital-adequacy ratio.When loans are held and not securitized,Japanese banks must retain capital equal to 8%of the portfolio.However,by removing l

14、oans from the b</p><p>　　Restrictions in Japan </p><p>　　Despite its attractiveness,especially for banks and non-bank finance companies, securitization remains an underutilized tool in Japan.Alt

15、hough foreign investment banks have established departments to promote securitization,and banks such as Fuji Bank and Sumitomo have set aggressive targets for reducing balance sheet assets through securitization,the numb

16、er of deals actually completed remains relatively small.This is undoubtedly due to the significant legal,tax,and cultural restrictions and limi</p><p><b>　　Legal</b></p><p>　　Within

17、the last year,the Japanese legal system has become increasingly encouraging for securitization.The 1998 repeal of the Susshi-ho law,which had prevented non-bank finance companies from securitizing loans,increased demand

18、for securitization in Japan.The Ministry of Finance enacted the SPC Law in March 1998,which facilitated securitization by reducing the capital requirement necessary to establish a company from Y10 million to Y3 million a

19、nd by waiving the 50%corporation tax.This law facilit</p><p>　　The Law Relating to the Regulation of Business Concerning Specified Claims,Etc.(the MITI Law),a 1993 law issued by the Ministry of International

20、 Trade and Industry(MITI)was introduced to facilitate securitization in Japan.This law,which applies to“specified claims,” including lease receivables,credit card receivables,receivables under installment sales contracts

21、, and auto receivables,allows the use of public notice to perfect an assignment of receivables, allowing ABS to be issued as small-lot c</p><p>　　However,such asset-backed bonds and commercial paper were not

22、 defined as securities, resulting in illiquidity.As a result,despite the legality of such transactions,little demand materialized.To resolve this,legislation in April 1996 defined asset-backed bonds and commercial paper

23、as securities,allowing their issuance in the domestic market and facilitating the trading of these issues.The first securitization capitalizing on the law was not done until August 1997 when ING Barings brought a deal f&

24、lt;/p><p>　　Despite the legality of securitization and the steps toward creating liquidity,significant barriers remain.Due to the relatively low credit ratings of banks such as Dai-Ichi Kangyo,Fuji, Sakura,and

25、Sumitomo,securitization without true sale is impracticable if not impossible. However,due to Japanese legal restrictions,which require the notification of obligors for loan assignments,true sale is cumbersome,as Japanese

26、 banks hesitate to notify the debtor of the assignment due to relationship purpose</p><p><b>　　Tax</b></p><p>　　Critical tax issues associated with cross-border securitizations inclu

27、de ensuring that securities issued in securitizations constitute bonds and not loans.Under Income Tax Law articles 161 and 212,bonds will be treated as loans if only a few investors hold them or a few investors hold a su

28、bstantial amount of the principal;in this case,any interest paid to foreign investors will be subject to Japanese withholding tax.</p><p>　　A critical issue for both tax and accounting purposes is ensuring t

29、hat the transfer of assets from the originator to an independent third party is treated as a sale.To ensure this treatment, the following conditions must be met: </p><p>　　(a)Intent,of both the originator an

30、d the SPC.</p><p>　　(b)Perfection,which must comply with Japanese law.</p><p>　　(c)Pricing.Consideration given to the SPC must represent fair market value of the assets transferred.</p>&

31、lt;p>　　(d)Repurchase.Extensive rights of repurchase may result in the classification of the transfer as a secured borrowing instead of a sale.</p><p>　　The Ministry of Finance adopted favorable tax change

32、s to the SPC Laws,effective September 1,1998,which promoted the formation of SPCs.These included reductions of real property,registration,and acquisition taxes imposed on property transfers to SPCs,reductions in registra

33、tion and license taxes for SPC establishment,and a deduction for dividends paid if at least 90%of the SPC’s earnings are distributed to the SPC’s shareholders.</p><p>　　The creation of REITs would also impro

34、ve the non-performing loan problem and create much needed liquidity in the real estate sector.However,under Japanese tax law,REITs would be subject to double taxation.</p><p>　　Investors in Securitized Loans

35、</p><p>　　Recent articles in the popular press indicate that demand for Japanese distressed loans exists.U.S.finance companies such as Goldman,Sachs&Co.,Morgan Stanley Dean Witter& Co,and GE Capital

36、Corp.have been purchasing distressed loans for the past few years.More recently,however,hedge funds have entered the market.Cerberus Capital Management,with approximately$4 billion under management,is attempting to raise

37、$1 billion for funds that will target distressed loans in Japan.According to a recent Wall </p><p>　　Proposed Structure for Japan</p><p>　　An advantage of a Brady type structure for Japan would

38、be a reduction in cost.Since the rating agencies rate Brady Bonds at the sovereign ceiling,the bailout of the Japanese banks would be financed at the borrowing rate for Japan,not the higher borrowing rates required in pr

39、ivate sector securitizations.Similar to the Brady Program,the Japanese plan should include mandatory structural adjustments to the banks,such as those currently required for banks that accept public funds as capital infu

40、sions</p><p>　　The Optimal Plan</p><p>　　Despite the restrictions imposed on the banks that accept funds,the infusion of public funds is essentially a direct subsidy to the banks.The decision to

41、 use public funds to purchase the preferred stocks of Japanese banks faced strong opposition among politicians,leaders of various economic organizations,and the Japanese people as it was the second time in a short period

42、 of time that public funds were used to“bail out”Japanese banks.In 1995,jusen(the Housing Loan Corporation,a non-government ent</p><p>　　The benefits of this scheme are that it:</p><p>　　(a) Ena

43、bles banks to remove the Loans from their balance sheet;</p><p>　　(b) Provides banks a tax benefit(simply writing off the Loans does not provide a tax benefit);</p><p>　　(c) Relieves the governm

44、ent from using public funds to subsidize the banks,and thus avoids the accusation that the government is giving too much preferential treatment to banks.</p><p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　Our scheme

45、is certainly feasible.The largest benefit is that it enables the banks to remove the non-performing loans from their balance sheet.The removal will relieve the capital used as reserve for the potential loss of the non-pe

46、rforming loans.The next benefit is the tax- benefits for the banks,which are not available by simply writing off the loans.Our scheme does not require additional capital to be raised from the government through the issua

47、nce of preferred stocks;thus,the banks will be le</p><p>　　Private sector securitizations such as Sumitomo Bank’s Aurora Funding have been completed,despite the obstacles.We expect banks that can securitize

48、their assets on their own to continue to do so.Our scheme,on the other hand,is targeted more towards those banks that have not yet securitized their assets–either by choice or due to lack of ability,and select regional b

49、anks that are in need of such program.We propose pooling the Loans in order to diversify the risk and thus,decrease the cost of such</p><p>　　一項(xiàng)有關(guān)日本不良貸款證券化問(wèn)題的解決方案</p><p>　　資料來(lái)源:財(cái)產(chǎn)投資理財(cái)期刊

50、 作者：凱艾倫先生，宮崎駿</p><p>　　日本銀行繼續(xù)遭受在“泡沫”時(shí)代所取得的積極貸款。盡管事實(shí)上是他們中的大部分貸款已經(jīng)變成了不良貸款,日本銀行一直拖延對(duì)不良貸款的認(rèn)可。不像美國(guó)的銀行，20世紀(jì)80年代初期, 迅速的取消他們的不良貸款。直到1995年3月住友銀行率先注銷不良貸款，日本的所有銀行才注銷了他們的不良貸款。從那時(shí)起,日本最高銀行才開始注銷不良貸款，自動(dòng)跟隨住友銀行。盡管投資環(huán)境面臨

51、著強(qiáng)大的壓力。</p><p>　　日本銀行猶豫的注銷不良貸款的主要原因，可歸咎于以下幾點(diǎn)：</p><p>　　(1)財(cái)政部對(duì)于認(rèn)識(shí)和解決不良貸款問(wèn)題的優(yōu)柔寡斷。</p><p>　　(2)日本稅制不允許減稅沖銷。</p><p>　　(3)資金不足沖銷銀行貸款。</p><p>　　為了解決第二個(gè)問(wèn)題,許多學(xué)者以及

52、業(yè)內(nèi)人士一直游說(shuō)為沖銷而改變稅法，為了以低利率提高該國(guó)的貨幣供應(yīng)量，1995年日本央行偏向于第三個(gè)議題。此舉增加凈利息收入的日本銀行由于大把貸款（見圖表A，日本的利率水平和附件B的日本銀行利息收入）。在這個(gè)環(huán)境中,許多銀行能夠生成足夠的利潤(rùn)沖銷不良貸款（可疑類債務(wù)和日本銀行的操作利潤(rùn)）。</p><p>　　盡管銀行在如此良好的運(yùn)行環(huán)境下，日本銀行資產(chǎn)的質(zhì)量持續(xù)惡化, 在銀行間拆借的國(guó)際資本市場(chǎng)開始收取“日本溢價(jià)

53、”。此外，如果按照國(guó)際結(jié)算銀行的資本充足比率比來(lái)應(yīng)對(duì)貶值的日元，用來(lái)提升他們?cè)诤Ｍ獾膬r(jià)值的資產(chǎn)和債務(wù)，那么日本銀行折舊的日元也就越來(lái)越難以提升了。完全依賴于他們的主要銀行，這也增加了他們不情愿貸款給中小企業(yè)融資的思想。面對(duì)越來(lái)越多的破產(chǎn)，與1997年11月北海道拓殖銀行崩潰時(shí)一樣，超過(guò)1萬(wàn)億美元的不良貸款的進(jìn)一步闡述了問(wèn)題的嚴(yán)重性。在過(guò)去的12個(gè)月里，日本政府已經(jīng)頒布法律使用公共資金來(lái)購(gòu)買優(yōu)先股的日本銀行提供為急需資本的銀行沖銷額外的不

54、良貸款。該決議整理回收機(jī)構(gòu)（簡(jiǎn)稱“RCC”），并且建立代理購(gòu)買貸款資產(chǎn)及收債，以擴(kuò)大到日本購(gòu)買銀行不良資產(chǎn)，不過(guò)，我們認(rèn)為證券化是最有效的方式緩解日本不良貸款問(wèn)題。</p><p><b>　　證券化的好處</b></p><p>　　證券化是日本的銀行和非銀行金融公司極具吸引力的選擇，對(duì)于由非日本銀行不良貸款引起的困擾，證券化、抵押貸款或特別義務(wù)（CLOs）在資產(chǎn)負(fù)

55、債表減少不良貸款的機(jī)會(huì)，使他們能夠滿足國(guó)際清算銀行的資本充足比率。當(dāng)貸款發(fā)生而沒有證券化時(shí)，日本的銀行的投資組合必須保持資本在等于8%，然而，除去通過(guò)CLOs從銀行資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的貸款，銀行要求資本股權(quán)降至可以控制的水平。比如，該銀行在CLO保留3%的股權(quán)，那么資本要求只有3%（100%中的3%的股權(quán)）而不是由國(guó)際清算銀行標(biāo)準(zhǔn)要求的8%。對(duì)于非銀行金融公司，其中許多被銀行降低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的偏好所擠壓，證券化提供了機(jī)會(huì)，獲得了必要的資金。有了適當(dāng)?shù)慕Y(jié)

56、構(gòu)，證券交易能獲得比發(fā)端的評(píng)級(jí)較高的收視率，在降低資金成本產(chǎn)生的（見圖表F-日本銀行評(píng)等）。此外，證券化轉(zhuǎn)移，從發(fā)起人到投資者災(zāi)難性損失的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，限制了潛在損失發(fā)端保留利息或信用增強(qiáng)。因此，資產(chǎn)證券化，從貸款到信用卡應(yīng)收款，在日本已經(jīng)得到了蓬勃發(fā)展。駐東京的律師最近表示，“在日本有三個(gè)增長(zhǎng)的行業(yè)：葬禮，破產(chǎn)和證券化?！?lt;/p><p><b>　　在日本的限制</b></p>&

57、lt;p>　　盡管它的吸引力，特別是對(duì)銀行和非銀行金融公司，在日本的證券化任然是一個(gè)充分利用的工具。雖然外國(guó)投資銀行已成立部門以促進(jìn)證券化，由于證券化，如富士銀行和住友銀行已為減少資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表資產(chǎn)證券化。在實(shí)際完成交易的數(shù)量任然相對(duì)較少。這無(wú)疑是由于重要的法律，稅務(wù)，文化的限制和局限在日本的存在；我們?cè)谙旅娴拿總€(gè)章節(jié)討論這些。</p><p><b>　　法律</b></p>

58、<p>　　在過(guò)去的一年，日本的法律制度日趨證券令人鼓舞。1998年廢除Susshi-ho的法律,這已經(jīng)阻礙了證券化貸款的非銀行金融公司增加在日本的證券化的需求。財(cái)政部SPC法律制定1998年3月,證券化有利于減少資本，要求必須建立從1000萬(wàn)元到300萬(wàn)元，公司通過(guò)取消50%的公司稅。有關(guān)的法律業(yè)務(wù)的規(guī)例關(guān)于制定索賠等。（在通產(chǎn)省法）1993年的法律的國(guó)際貿(mào)易和工業(yè)（通產(chǎn)?。┎款C發(fā)實(shí)施，以促進(jìn)日本的證券化。這項(xiàng)法律，它使

59、用于“特定的索賠”，包括租賃應(yīng)收款項(xiàng)，信用卡應(yīng)收款，根據(jù)合同分期付款銷售應(yīng)收款和自動(dòng)收款，允許使用的公告，完善應(yīng)收款轉(zhuǎn)讓，使ABS得發(fā)行作為小批量索賠給投資者。</p><p>　　然而，這些資產(chǎn)抵押債券和商業(yè)票據(jù)不界定為證券，造成流動(dòng)性不足。因此，這類交易需求很少兌現(xiàn)。為了解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題，1996年4月立法界定資產(chǎn)抵押債券和商業(yè)票據(jù)證券，允許其在國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)發(fā)行和促進(jìn)這些問(wèn)題的交易。第一證券化資本化的法律卻沒有這樣做

60、，直到1997年8月，當(dāng)霸菱資產(chǎn)融資帶來(lái)了珍寶，開曼群島一個(gè)最高人民法院的協(xié)議。</p><p>　　盡管證券化的合法性和對(duì)創(chuàng)造流動(dòng)性的步驟，重大障礙仍然存在。由于如第一勸業(yè)，富士，櫻花，住友，銀行沒有信用評(píng)級(jí)較低的證券化是行不通的真實(shí)出售，如果不是不可能的。然而，由于日本的法律限制，這需要貸款轉(zhuǎn)讓債務(wù)人的通知，真實(shí)出售很麻煩，因?yàn)槿毡俱y行毫不猶豫地通知了任務(wù)，由于債務(wù)人的關(guān)系的目的。</p>&l

61、t;p><b>　　稅</b></p><p>　　關(guān)鍵稅跨境證券化相關(guān)的問(wèn)題包括確保在證券發(fā)行的證券不構(gòu)成債券和貸款。根據(jù)所得稅法第161和212，債券將被視為貸款，如果只有少數(shù)投資者持有他們或幾個(gè)投資者持有大量的主體，在這種情況下，支付給外國(guó)投資者的利益將受到日本扣留稅。</p><p>　　一種稅收和會(huì)計(jì)核算的關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題是確保資產(chǎn)從發(fā)起人轉(zhuǎn)移到一個(gè)獨(dú)立的第三

62、方作為銷售處理。為了確保這一點(diǎn)的待遇，必須滿足以下條件：</p><p>　　（1）意圖，無(wú)論是發(fā)起人和最高人民法院。</p><p>　?。?）完善，它必須遵守日本的法律。</p><p>　?。?）定價(jià)，考慮到國(guó)家計(jì)委要考慮代表轉(zhuǎn)讓資產(chǎn)的公允市場(chǎng)價(jià)值。</p><p>　　（4）買回，回購(gòu)廣泛的權(quán)利，可能導(dǎo)致，而不是作為擔(dān)保借款出售轉(zhuǎn)讓分

63、類。</p><p>　　財(cái)政部國(guó)家計(jì)委采取稅收優(yōu)惠法律的變化，在1998年9月1日生效，促進(jìn)了SPCs的形成。這些措施包括不動(dòng)產(chǎn)，登記減少，收購(gòu)稅的財(cái)產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)讓施加的SPC，在最高人民法院設(shè)立登記及牌照稅減少，并為支付的股息，扣除，如果至少有90 SPC的盈利是分配給SPC的股東。</p><p>　　該房地產(chǎn)投資信托基金的建立同時(shí)也提高了不良貸款問(wèn)題，急需建立在房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)的流動(dòng)。然而，根據(jù)

64、日本稅法，房地產(chǎn)投資信托基金將受到雙重征稅。</p><p><b>　　投資者在證券化貸款</b></p><p>　　在大眾媒體最近的文章指出，日本不良貸款的需求存在。如高盛，摩根士丹利添惠和通用電氣資本公司等美國(guó)金融公司，已購(gòu)買在過(guò)去幾年不良貸款。但是最近，對(duì)沖基金已開始進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)，Cerberus資本管理與管理的約400億美元，是試圖提高1美元資金，專門針對(duì)在日

65、本的不良貸款。根據(jù)最近的華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)的文章，Cerberus的是購(gòu)買5至10美分，對(duì)美元的商業(yè)和工業(yè)貸款。</p><p><b>　　日本擬議結(jié)構(gòu)</b></p><p>　　日本的一個(gè)布雷迪式結(jié)構(gòu)的優(yōu)勢(shì)將是降低成本。由于評(píng)級(jí)機(jī)構(gòu)在利率布雷迪債券的主權(quán)上限，日本銀行的救助資金將在日本，而不是更高的借貸利率需要私營(yíng)部門的證券借貸利率。類似的布雷迪計(jì)劃，日本計(jì)劃應(yīng)包括對(duì)銀

66、行強(qiáng)制性結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整，如目前銀行接受公共資金作為資本注入所需的。</p><p><b>　　優(yōu)選方案</b></p><p>　　盡管在銀行接受資金的限制，公共資金投入，基本上是直接補(bǔ)貼給銀行。決定使用公共資金來(lái)購(gòu)買銀行的優(yōu)先股日本政治家面臨的，各種經(jīng)濟(jì)組織領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的強(qiáng)烈反對(duì)，因?yàn)檫@是日本人民在很短的時(shí)間內(nèi)第二次公共資金被用于“保釋出“日本銀行。1995年，住專（房屋貸款

67、公司，非政府機(jī)構(gòu)）的違約使用公共資金。盡管政府不愿意使用公共資金來(lái)拯救銀行再次，Kinyu Kino Soki- kenzenka-Ho法律通過(guò)1998年10月，以鼓勵(lì)銀行貸款給小型和中型公司，以防止進(jìn)一步陷入衰退的日本經(jīng)濟(jì)。</p><p><b>　　這個(gè)計(jì)劃的好處是：</b></p><p>　?。?）使銀行能夠清除其資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的貸款;</p>&

68、lt;p>　?。?）銀行提供的稅收利益（核銷貸款根本不提供稅務(wù)優(yōu)惠）;</p><p>　?。?）免除了使用公共資金資助的銀行，從而避免了指控，政府正在給予太多優(yōu)惠待遇銀行的政府。</p><p><b>　　結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　我們的方案是可行的。最大的好處是，它使銀行免除其資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的不良貸款。搬遷將緩解作為儲(chǔ)備用于不良

69、貸款的潛在損失的資本。接下來(lái)的好處是稅收對(duì)銀行來(lái)說(shuō)，這是不是簡(jiǎn)單地核銷貸款提供的好處。我們的計(jì)劃并不需要額外的資金將由原來(lái)的首選通過(guò)發(fā)行股票的政府; 因此，銀行將不受制于金融監(jiān)督管理委員會(huì)規(guī)定的準(zhǔn)則最后，它避免了直接的房地產(chǎn)物業(yè)銷售，因此，它將減少對(duì)日本房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的下行壓力。</p><p>　　如住友銀行的證券極光私營(yíng)部門的資金已經(jīng)完成，盡管存在障礙。我們期望銀行可以對(duì)自己的證券化資產(chǎn)繼續(xù)這樣做。我們的計(jì)劃，另