cost accounting-a managerial emphasis【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　原文</b></p><p>　　Material Source: Cost Accounting-A Managerial Emphasis </p><p>　　Author: Charles T.Horngren、Srikant M.Data

2、r和George Foster</p><p>　　Intensity of Incentives and financial and Nonfinancial Measurements</p><p>　　What affects the intensity of incentives? That is, how large should the incentive component

3、of a manager’s compensation be relative to the salary component? To answer these questions, we need to understand how much the performance measure is affected by actions the manager takes to further the owner’s objective

4、s.</p><p>　　We illustrate this trade-off in the context of our Hospitality Inns example. Sally Fonda owns the Hospitality Inns chain of hotels. Roger Brett manages the Hospitality Inns San Francisco (HISF).

5、Assume Fonda uses RI to measure performance. To improve RI, Fonda would like Brett to increase sales, control costs, provide prompt and courteous customer service, and reduce working capital. But even if Brett did all th

6、ose things, high RI is not guaranteed. That’s because HISF’s RI is affected by many f</p><p>　　As an entrepreneur, Fonda expects to bear risk. But Brett does not like being subject to risk. One way of “insur

7、ing “ Brett against risk is to pay Brett a flat salary, regardless of the actual amount of RI earned. All the risk would then be borne by Fonda. This arrangement creates a problem, however, because Brett’s effort is diff

8、icult to monitor. The absence of performance-based compensation means that Brett has no direct incentive to work harder or to undertake extra physical and mental effort</p><p>　　Preferred performance measure

9、s are those that are sensitive to or that change significantly with the manager’s performance. They do not change much with changes in factors that are beyond the manager’s control. Sensitive performance measures motivat

10、e the manager as well as limit the manager’s exposure to risk, reducing the cost of providing incentives. Less-sensitive performance measures are not affected by the manager’s performance and fail to induce the manager t

11、o improve. The more that owners</p><p>　　The salary component of compensation dominates when performance measures that are sensitive to managers’ actions are not available. This is the case, for example, for

12、 some corporate staff and government employees. A high salary component, however, does not mean incentives are completely absent. Promotions and salary increases do depend on some overall measure of performance, but the

13、incentives are less direct. The incentive component of compensation is high when sensitive performance measures ar</p><p>　　In evaluating Brett, Fonda uses measures from multiple perspectives of the balanced

14、 scorecard because nonfinancial measures on the balance scorecard-employee satisfaction and the time taken for check-in, cleaning rooms, and providing room service-are more sensitive to Brett’s actions. Financial measure

15、s such as RI are less sensitive to Brett’s actions because they are affected by external factors such as local economic conditions beyond Brett’s control. Residual income may be a very good measure</p><p>　　

16、Another reason for using nonfinancial measures in the balanced scorecard is that these measures follow Hospitality Inns’ strategy and are drivers of future performance. Evaluating managers on these nonfinancial measures

17、motivates them to take actions that will sustain long-run performance. Therefore, evaluating performance in all four perspectives of the balanced scorecard promotes both short-and long-run actions.</p><p>&l

18、t;b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　Cost Accounting-A Managerial Emphasis</p><p>　　資料來源:外文資料《Cost Accounting-A Managerial Emphasis》</p><p>　　作者：Charles T.Horngren、Srikant M.Datar和George

19、Foster</p><p><b>　　摘要：</b></p><p>　　激勵的強度是如何被影響的呢？這與管理者報酬的激勵成分以及薪酬水平是如何掛鉤的呢？回答這些問題時，我們需要理解管理者采取何種行為達到所有者所期望的目的，并使這種行為在最大程度上影響業(yè)績。</p><p>　　我們以Hospitality Inns 為例來闡明問題。Sal

20、ly Fonda 擁有Hospitality Inns 連鎖店。Roger Brett掌管著Hospitality Inns 舊金山分部（HISF）。而Fonda 用剩余收益率來度量績效。為了改進RI，F(xiàn)onda 希望Brett提高銷售額，控制成本，提供周到及時的服務(wù)，進而降低營運資本。但是，即使Brett完成了這些要求，但是效果并不令人滿意。HISF的RI受到許多因素的影響，有些甚至不能受到Fonda 和Brett的控制。比如，舊金山

21、市的經(jīng)濟衰退，最近才發(fā)生可能對HISF不利的地震等。另一方面，某些不可控因素也可能對旅店的生育利益產(chǎn)生不利影響，如競爭對手旅店附件修了路。不可控因素是舊金山連鎖店的利潤具有不確定性，并存在風險。</p><p>　　Fonda是個所有者，她并不擔心承擔風險，但是Brett只是個管理者，他不愿意經(jīng)受風險。確保Brett能積極工作的方法之一就是支付固定高額的薪酬，不論取得怎樣的剩余收益，所有的風險都有Fonda承擔。

22、然而，這還存在問題，Brett付出的努力在一定程度上很難得到監(jiān)控，并且這種不以績效為基礎(chǔ)的報酬不能促進Brett更好地工作，提高積極性，除了保住自己的工作和提高個人價值以外，就不愿為了公司的業(yè)績而付出額外的腦力和體力勞動。這就要求公司有良好的業(yè)績指標。</p><p>　　良好的業(yè)績評價指標隨著管理者績效的變化而變化，但是與超出管理者控制權(quán)限范圍之外的因素變化不大。良好的業(yè)績評價指標能激勵管理者，同時也限制了管理

23、者經(jīng)受不可控風險的程度，也減少了為了使管理者接受激勵制度而付出的成本。效用不好的業(yè)績指標不會直接受到管理者的業(yè)績影響，同時也無法促進管理者對業(yè)績進行有效地改變。當所有者有更多有效地指標時，所有者就能更好地利用管理者激勵報酬體系進行管理。</p><p>　　我們假設(shè)Brett無權(quán)決定投資，并進一步假設(shè)他的收入很大程度上取決于當?shù)氐慕?jīng)濟等因素，以及Brett所作出的決只能影響成本。在這個例子中，如果我們就采用RI作

24、為業(yè)績評價的指標，就會對Brett造成過度承受風險的影響，因為業(yè)績評價指標里的兩大因素，即投資與收入，是與他的收入無關(guān)的，為了創(chuàng)造更多的激勵，管理會計人員可能會建議Fonda對Brett采取其他業(yè)績評價指標，如Fonda可以關(guān)注舊金山連鎖店的成本，從而對Brett的工作積極程度進行評價。要注意的是，在這個例子中，RI對舊金山連鎖店的經(jīng)濟邊度狀況可能是個非常有效地指標，但是對于評價Brett的工作績效而言，缺乏說服力，因此并不合適。<

25、;/p><p>　　將管理者的業(yè)績評價指標與工作積極程度緊密相聯(lián)系，同樣有利于促進非財務(wù)指標的使用。對Hospitality Inns一家旅店的管理部門的經(jīng)理進行評估，存在兩個可能指標，第一是管理部門的成本，第二是工作人員清理一個房間平均所花費的時間。若假設(shè)管理成本受到工資率等部門經(jīng)理無法決定的因素的影響，則清理房間所花費的時間可能是個良好指標，因為它受到部門經(jīng)理表現(xiàn)的影響。</p><p>

26、　　薪水性報酬在缺乏良好的業(yè)績評價指標的情況下起著主導作用，如公司職員或政府官員的情形，然而這并不是說完全沒有激勵因素。晉升和提高薪水的確依賴于某些綜合的業(yè)績評價指標，但激勵并不明顯。當具有良好度量的指標，且監(jiān)控職員的工作難度較大時，如，房地產(chǎn)機構(gòu)等，報酬中的激勵因素將會得到提高。</p><p>　　調(diào)查表明，分部管理者的報酬設(shè)計是薪金、紅利、與長期報酬的混合。其中長期報酬與公司的盈余和股價緊密相連。這種薪酬的

27、設(shè)計的目的是為了平衡分部與總公司整體范圍之間的激勵，也是為了平衡短期與長期的激勵。一份公司調(diào)查報告說明報酬的平均年度激勵部分如下：（1）基于短期業(yè)績的紅利等于現(xiàn)時工資的40%；（2）基于長期業(yè)績的平均年度現(xiàn)金與股票報酬等于現(xiàn)時工資的57%。樣本中的這些比例相差很大，有些公司更多地運用業(yè)績激勵因素。（調(diào)查來源于R . Bushman ,R . Indjejikian and A. Smith合作的《業(yè)務(wù)部門經(jīng)理的賠償總額性能的措施：對企業(yè)