聰明的機(jī)構(gòu)，愚蠢的選擇有限合伙人的業(yè)績(jī)困惑【外文翻譯】

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯</b></p><p><b>　　譯文</b></p><p>　　標(biāo)題：聰明的機(jī)構(gòu)，愚蠢的選擇：有限合伙人的業(yè)績(jī)困惑</p><p>　　資料來(lái)源: 金融雜志，2007（4），62卷，第二期，p731-764．</p><p>　　作者：?jiǎn)滔＠占{，安托瓦內(nèi)

2、特舍布爾，黃灣</p><p>　　機(jī)構(gòu)投資者通常選擇用基金投資私人企業(yè)。這個(gè)選擇很大程度上是受私人企業(yè)直接投資的困難所驅(qū)使的。選擇合適的投資需要集中的關(guān)系和良好的盡職調(diào)查能力，這些技巧只有很少的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者具有。相同地，大多數(shù)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者沒(méi)有足夠的資源集中監(jiān)控私營(yíng)公司的投資組合。努力在私人公司聯(lián)合投資與私人股本集團(tuán)經(jīng)常遇到的代理問(wèn)題。此外，如果他們要直接投資于一家公司的投資者，有限合伙制結(jié)構(gòu)可防止?jié)撛诘呢?zé)任問(wèn)題出現(xiàn)

3、。</p><p>　　因此，在私募股權(quán)機(jī)構(gòu)中大部分是通過(guò)基金投資的。這些基金主要是提出一個(gè)指定期間（通常為十年，但也許可以延長(zhǎng)），并受投資者之間協(xié)議（有限合伙人）和最主要的基金（普通合伙），它指定該基金的活動(dòng)的管轄的性質(zhì)，所得款項(xiàng)劃分等等。私募基金集團(tuán)籌集的基金通常會(huì)每隔數(shù)年，開(kāi)始為以前的投資基金完成籌款過(guò)程。</p><p>　　被譽(yù)為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者不同，他們的方法廣泛地在其復(fù)雜的私人股權(quán)

4、投資。大學(xué)捐贈(zèng)基金和基礎(chǔ)通常被視為是最平均老練的投資者，而公共養(yǎng)老金被認(rèn)為是最少的。這些差異是由于若干考慮：</p><p>　　經(jīng)驗(yàn)和訪問(wèn)。大學(xué)和基金最早開(kāi)始于私募基金的投資計(jì)劃。這些團(tuán)體往往對(duì)私募基金投資有比較深入的了解，也是因?yàn)樗麄冞@種“祖父”級(jí)別的權(quán)利是他們繼續(xù)用后續(xù)資金投資于那些對(duì)心的投資人已經(jīng)關(guān)閉的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本組。</p><p>　　管理方法。許多政治任命官員在許多公共養(yǎng)老基金中

5、主導(dǎo)著投資面板。這些主管對(duì)私募股權(quán)行業(yè)了解很少，并且有可能在某些情況下尋求對(duì)自己直接有利的投資。這些問(wèn)題并非一無(wú)所知，在其他類別的機(jī)構(gòu)中不太嚴(yán)重。</p><p>　　銀行一直以來(lái)都很重視私募股權(quán)投資者。其投資活動(dòng)的動(dòng)機(jī)玩玩比LP更復(fù)雜。當(dāng)他們也想尋求較高的回報(bào)時(shí)他們的投資決策通常是間接形成的。例如，許多銀行從對(duì)企業(yè)融資買(mǎi)入或者從其他人正在做的交易咨詢中獲得可觀的利潤(rùn)。因此，他們可能會(huì)收購(gòu)?fù)顿Y基金，但不打算獲得較

6、高的收益，如果這個(gè)投資的概率增加，他們將會(huì)從集團(tuán)交易中產(chǎn)生實(shí)質(zhì)性的交易費(fèi)收入。</p><p>　　在過(guò)去的三十年中，機(jī)構(gòu)投資者已經(jīng)控制了不斷增加的美國(guó)股票市場(chǎng)份額。然而，在不相同的投資策略和跨越不同類型的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者中有一個(gè)問(wèn)題是非常罕見(jiàn)的。因?yàn)榻M織上、投資目標(biāo)以及各種機(jī)構(gòu)的復(fù)雜性的巨大差異，因此這種忽視是令人驚訝的。此外，最近的理論文獻(xiàn)突出研究了關(guān)于最大的投資者和金融機(jī)構(gòu)之間的代理問(wèn)題，這會(huì)對(duì)投資決策、投資組合

7、的分配以及最終的投資回報(bào)產(chǎn)生深遠(yuǎn)的影響。例如，Shleifer和Vishny提出投資者和中介機(jī)構(gòu)之間的信息不對(duì)稱問(wèn)題會(huì)造成套利限制，可能會(huì)影響投資組合策略和最終的投資回報(bào)。因?yàn)椴煌潭鹊拇韱?wèn)題對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)造成的影響不同，與機(jī)構(gòu)投資者預(yù)期的存在相當(dāng)大的不同。</p><p>　　本文著眼于一種由某一機(jī)構(gòu)做出投資決定的特殊種類：私募基金的投資。我們通過(guò)各種不同種類的投資人也就是有限合伙人（LPs）分析投資模式。我們首先確

8、定了一個(gè)難題：在過(guò)去的二十年里，不同類別的投資者在私募基金中享有不同的回報(bào)。利用詳細(xì)的關(guān)于資金構(gòu)成和性能的記錄這些被挑選的不同種類的投資者到目前為止還沒(méi)有被考慮到的學(xué)術(shù)，我們記錄非常大量不同的通過(guò)投資者享有的回報(bào)。平均起來(lái)，許多有天賦的人可以從私募基金取得年回報(bào)率接近14%，高于一般投資者。由投資顧問(wèn)和銀行選擇的接近則大幅度的滯后。</p><p>　　自然關(guān)注的是這些實(shí)質(zhì)性的差異是否是由投資周期的變化造成的。許

9、多有天賦的人先于其他投資者開(kāi)始投資私募基金。即使后來(lái)受限于基金的種類和當(dāng)年投資，我們?nèi)匀豢吹?%~10%的年度業(yè)績(jī)。結(jié)果反映基金檢驗(yàn)?zāi)Ｐ偷姆€(wěn)定性，而不是投資、等級(jí)：績(jī)效是正相關(guān)于投資本基金的養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)的數(shù)量，但是負(fù)相關(guān)于投資銀行的數(shù)量。我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)了，在不同的組，年長(zhǎng)的LP比稍后時(shí)間進(jìn)入這一行業(yè)的有限合伙人更傾向于擁有好的績(jī)效。這些差異特別針對(duì)企業(yè)養(yǎng)老金、顧問(wèn)和保險(xiǎn)公司。我們認(rèn)為這至少揭示了一部分的原因，為什么年輕的LP在私募股權(quán)投資方面缺

10、乏經(jīng)驗(yàn)并且可能比較難成功的獲得資金的事實(shí)。</p><p>　　另一個(gè)問(wèn)題是，是否這些績(jī)效的變動(dòng)是由于系統(tǒng)的差異表現(xiàn)在LP選擇該基金的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)狀況。舉例來(lái)說(shuō)，養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)可以有計(jì)劃地投資在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較高的基金，因此受到較高的回報(bào)。為了解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題，我們控制一些常常被認(rèn)為是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素的可測(cè)特征，例如焦點(diǎn)和投資的成熟度來(lái)選擇基金，以及該基金的規(guī)模、年齡和所處地理位置。雖然我們的結(jié)果是在這些控制的穩(wěn)定性內(nèi)，但是我們不能完全排除有無(wú)法觀

11、察的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)狀況的可能性。</p><p>　　我們探討了LP績(jī)效的差異對(duì)于基金的再投資策略的重要性。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)和公共養(yǎng)老金通常不太可能再投資給特定的合伙企業(yè)。此外，那些LP能夠更好的預(yù)測(cè)后續(xù)資金所帶來(lái)的績(jī)效。基金的養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)決定于再投資的比那些決定不再進(jìn)行再投資的表現(xiàn)出更高的績(jī)效。其他的LP組不顯示出這些績(jī)效模型。事實(shí)上，企業(yè)養(yǎng)老金和顧問(wèn)更傾向于再投資于一般的基金，如果這能讓他們擁有更高的績(jī)效，但是這未必能在未

12、來(lái)轉(zhuǎn)化成更高的績(jī)效。這些研究結(jié)果表明，養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)愿意用他們獲取的信息作為內(nèi)部投資人，而其他的LP似乎不那么愿意或能夠用信息使他們成為現(xiàn)有的基金的投資者。</p><p>　　我們還探討了性能優(yōu)越的養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)或者公共養(yǎng)老基金的結(jié)果的可能性：即這些LP作為有限合伙人通過(guò)他們?cè)缙诘慕?jīng)驗(yàn)可能有更多的機(jī)會(huì)來(lái)成立私人股本集團(tuán)的管理高性能的基金。為了檢驗(yàn)這一假設(shè)，我們從在所有類別的LP組中研究了年輕的私募基金集團(tuán)的投資（1990年

13、以后成立的）。如果這些性能的差異主要是由較好的年長(zhǎng)的LP已建立的私募基金集團(tuán)（也稱為普通合伙人（GPs）），對(duì)年輕的GP應(yīng)該消除不同組的LP之間的績(jī)效差異的條件作用。當(dāng)我們重復(fù)我們對(duì)年輕GP條件作用的分析時(shí)，我們?nèi)匀话l(fā)現(xiàn)養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)和公共養(yǎng)老金的業(yè)績(jī)保費(fèi)比通過(guò)用全部的GP來(lái)分析具有更小的差異。盡管這些結(jié)果不支持這些LP僅僅由于歷史的偶然性獲得較高的績(jī)效這種觀點(diǎn)，我們不能排除有些績(jī)效的差異性是由于他們較早的獲得了優(yōu)越的基金。</p>

14、;<p>　　最后，我們研究了在LP在選擇中介機(jī)構(gòu)是的特定差異。近年來(lái)，已經(jīng)有了一大批關(guān)于投資風(fēng)格的學(xué)術(shù)研究。但是許多投資機(jī)構(gòu)投資不全面，甚至直接將資金通過(guò)中介機(jī)構(gòu)投入。這些機(jī)構(gòu)做出的選擇就是我們所定義的“中介形式”，都是了解甚少。</p><p>　　金融經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家對(duì)于機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與個(gè)人投資者之間的差異的關(guān)注日益加深。不同類型的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者策略越發(fā)多樣性，更不用說(shuō)細(xì)致了。本文試圖通過(guò)研究各種機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在

15、私募股權(quán)基金投資中的經(jīng)驗(yàn)來(lái)解決這個(gè)差距。</p><p>　　我們?cè)谑褂媒?jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家迄今還未探索的投資選擇和執(zhí)行的數(shù)據(jù)時(shí)，記錄了一種令人詫異的模式：不同機(jī)構(gòu)在收益上的令人吃驚的區(qū)別。當(dāng)由投資顧問(wèn)和銀行執(zhí)行選擇的基金特別差時(shí)，養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)還有較其他機(jī)構(gòu)高14%左右的年回報(bào)。當(dāng)我們使用多種控制和規(guī)模時(shí)，這些差異一直存在。我們?cè)诮忉孡P績(jī)效的區(qū)別時(shí)研究基金投資策略的重要性。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)和公司養(yǎng)老基金在一個(gè)特定的合伙企業(yè)中越

16、來(lái)越不像再投資。此外，LP在預(yù)測(cè)繼續(xù)基金的績(jī)效上更為優(yōu)越。養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)中決定再投資的基金比決定不再投資的基金顯示了更為高的收益。這就表明養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)前攝的使用了他們作為一個(gè)內(nèi)部投資者獲取的利益，而其他LP似乎不太愿意或者能夠使用他們作為一個(gè)現(xiàn)有基金投資者獲得的利益。</p><p>　　我們還研究了養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)或者公共養(yǎng)老基金從歷史事件中獲得較高收益的可能性，即LP通過(guò)他們?cè)缙谧鳛橛邢藓匣锶说慕?jīng)歷可能更為接近已建立的、有高收

17、益的基金。為了檢驗(yàn)這一假設(shè)，我們通過(guò)所有種類的LP研究了年輕私募投資基金（1990年以后提出）的投資。如果績(jī)效差異主要由較老的LP在已建立的基金中的良好增長(zhǎng)，受限于年幼基金的影響應(yīng)該除去不同種類LP在績(jī)效上的差異。當(dāng)我們重復(fù)對(duì)影響年幼基金的分析時(shí)，我們?nèi)匀话l(fā)現(xiàn)養(yǎng)老保險(xiǎn)和公共養(yǎng)老基金的績(jī)效保費(fèi)，不過(guò)這個(gè)差異遠(yuǎn)小于1990年前成立的基金。盡管這一發(fā)現(xiàn)不支持LP的優(yōu)良績(jī)效不僅僅由歷史事件驅(qū)動(dòng)的理念，我們不能排除一些績(jī)效差異是由他們提前獲得優(yōu)良

18、基金造成的。</p><p>　　最后，我們研究了LP的“中介模式”：當(dāng)選擇私募基金時(shí)他們所顯示的系統(tǒng)模式。我們認(rèn)為，LP在投資模式中特有的差異與LP間績(jī)效差異存在顯著關(guān)系。有較高的內(nèi)部收益率固定效應(yīng)的LP，同時(shí)也趨向于投資于規(guī)模較小且增長(zhǎng)緩慢的基金，并且LP的在相同地理區(qū)域擁有GP的一小部分。</p><p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)原文</b></p>

19、<p>　　Title: Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices: The Limited Partner Performance Puzzle</p><p>　　Material Source: Journal of Finance, Apr2007, Vol. 62 Issue 2, p731-764.</p><p>　　Author: J

20、osh Lerner, Antoinette Schoar and Wan Wong</p><p>　　Institutional investors frequently choose to invest in private businesses through funds. This choice is largely driven by the difficulties of directly inve

21、sting in the private firms. The selection of appropriate direct investments requires intensive relationships and excellent due diligence skills, which few institutional investors have. Similarly, most institutional inves

22、tors do not have the resources to intensively monitor a portfolio of private firms. Efforts to jointly invest in private firm</p><p>　　As a result, the bulk of institutional investment in private equity is d

23、one through funds. These funds are raised for a specified period (typically a decade, though extensions may be possible) and are governed by an agreement between the investors (the limited partners) and the principals in

24、 the fund (the general partners), which specifies the nature of the fund’s activities, the division of the proceeds, and so forth. Private equity groups will typically raise a fund every few years, beginning </p>

25、<p>　　Institutional investors are reputed to widely differ in their sophistication in their approach to private equity investments. University and foundation endowments are often regarded as being on average the mos

26、t sophisticated investors, while public pensions are considered the least. These differences are attributed to a number of considerations:</p><p>　　? Experience and access. Universities and foundations began

27、 many of the earliest private equity investment programs. These groups thus frequently have a deeper understanding of private equity investments, as well as “grandfather” rights that allow them to continue to invest in s

28、ubsequent funds of venture capital groups that are closed to new investors.</p><p>　　? Governance. Political appointees dominate the investment boards at many public pension funds. These directors frequently

29、 have little understanding of the private equity industry, and may in some cases be seeking to direct investments in ways that are personally advantageous to themselves. These problems, while not unknown, are less severe

30、 at other classes of institutions.</p><p>　　Banks have long been important private equity investors. The motivations for their investment activity, however, are frequently more complex than those of other LP

31、s. While they also seek to earn high returns, their investment decisions are often shaped by indirect considerations as well. For instance, many banks garner substantial profits from lending to firms undergoing leveraged

32、 buyouts or else from advising on these transactions. As a result, they may invest in a buyout fund that they do not </p><p>　　Over the past three decades, institutional investors have controlled an increasi

33、ng share of the U.S. equity markets. One question that has attracted much less scrutiny, however, is the heterogeneity in investment strategies and sophistication across different types of institutional investors. This n

34、eglect is surprising because of the large differences in the organization, investment objectives, and sophistication of various institutions. Moreover, recent theoretical literature highlights the ext</p><p>

35、;　　This paper looks at a specific class of investment decisions made by institutions: their investments in private equity funds. We analyze investment styles and performance across several different classes of investors,

36、 known as limited partners (LPs). We begin with the identification of a puzzle: different classes of investors in private equity have enjoyed dramatically different returns over the past two decades. Using detailed recor

37、ds of the composition and performance of funds that are selecte</p><p>　　A natural concern is whether these substantial differences are driven by variations in the time periods in which the investments were

38、made. Many endowments began investing in private equity funds before other investors. Even after controlling for fund type and the year in which the investment was made, we continue to see superior annual performance of

39、between 8 and 10 percent by endowments. The results are robust to examining patterns at the fund, rather than the investment, level: performance i</p><p>　　Another issue is whether these variations in perfor

40、mance are due to systematic differences in the risk profiles of the funds that the LPs choose. For example, endowments could be systematically investing in riskier funds and therefore have higher returns. To address this

41、 concern, we control for a number of observable characteristics that are often considered risk factors, such as the focus and maturity of the investments selected by the fund and the fund’s size, age, and location. While

42、 our resu</p><p>　　We explore the importance of funds’ reinvestment strategies in explaining the differences in LP performance. We find that endowments and public pension funds generally are much less likely

43、 to reinvest in a given partnership. Moreover, those LPs are better at forecasting the performance of follow-on funds. Funds in which endowments decided to reinvest show much higher performance than those where endowment

44、s decided not to reinvest. Other LP classes do not display these performance patterns. In fa</p><p>　　We also explore the possibility that the superior performance of endowments or public pension funds resul

45、ts from historical accident: i.e., that these LPs through their early experience as limited partners may have greater access to established private equity groups that manage high performing funds. To test this hypothesis

46、, we examine investments in young private equity groups (those established after 1990) across all classes of LPs. If the performance difference is mainly driven by the superio</p><p>　　Finally, we examine th

47、e LP-specific differences in the selection of intermediaries. In recent years, there has been a growth of academic research into investment style (e.g., Barberis and Shleifer (2003) theoretically discuss investors’ choic

48、es between value and growth stocks and their implications). But many institutions do not invest all—or even most—of their funds directly, but rather do so through intermediaries. The choices that institutions make when s

49、electing institutions, what we may ter</p><p>　　The differences between institutional and individual investors have attracted growing attention by financial economists. The diversity of strategies across the

50、 various classes of institutional investors, however, has been much less scrutinized. This paper seeks to address this gap, examining the experience of various institutional investors in private equity funds.</p>

51、<p>　　Using data on investment choices and performance that have not been hitherto explored by economists, we document a puzzling pattern: dramatic differences in the performance of investments by different institut

52、ions. Endowments have an annual return some 14% better than other institutions, while funds selected by investment advisors and banks perform particularly poorly. These differences remain present when we employ a variety

53、 of controls and specifications. We explore the importance of funds’ re</p><p>　　We also explore the possibility that the superior performance of endowments or public pension funds results from historical ac

54、cident: i.e., that these LPs through their early experience as limited partners may have greater access to established, high-performing funds. To test this hypothesis, we examine investments in young private equity funds

55、 (those raised after 1990) across all classes of LPs. If the performance difference is mainly driven by the superior access that older LPs have in establi</p><p>　　Finally, we examine the LPs’ “intermediary

56、style”: the systematic patterns they display when selecting private equity funds. We show that LP-specific differences in investment styles are significantly correlated with the performance differences between LPs. LPs t