法學(xué)外文翻譯--群體控制多數(shù)主義法院與公共輿論的反思

1、<p>　　2900單詞，16500英文字符，5200漢字</p><p>　　出處：Roesch B J. Crowd Control: The Majoritarian Court and the Reflection of Public Opinion in Doctrine[J]. Suffolk UL Rev., 2005, 39: 379-386.</p><p>&

2、lt;b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)原稿</b></p><p>　　Crowd Control: The Majoritarian Court and the Reflection of Public Opinion in Doctrine</p><p>　　Roesch B J</p><p>　　I. Introduction</p>&l

3、t;p>　　The judicial branch of the federal government has historically had an uneasy relationship with public opinion. Like the executive and legislative branches, the judiciary depends on public support for its legitim

4、acy. But unlike the political branches, the judiciary is not electorally accountable to those whose support it requires. To the contrary, one of its defining attributes is the duty to thwart political expressions of popu

5、lar will that run afoul of the Constitution. Nevertheless, it has bee</p><p>　　Traditionally, scholarly and judicial commentary on the influence of public opinion on the federal judiciary has followed two co

6、urses. Some commentators and jurists argue that judicial independence requires that public opinion have no influence on judicial decision-making. Another group of scholars advocates an indirectly influential role for pub

7、lic opinion in limited contexts. These scholars believe judges should refer to "objective" measures of public opinion as guidelines when deciding questi</p><p>　　Recent developments in empirical re

8、search suggest that these positions take too limited a view of public opinion as an influence on judicial decision- making. The research suggests that the "judicial isolation" model conflicts with reality-the i

9、nfluence of public opinion may be inevitable. This Article will examine this evidence, which suggests that many judges are influenced-at least marginally - by public opinion. Because the judiciary is the one branch of th

10、e federal government committed to a</p><p>　　One might expect public opinion to exert its influence through the judiciary's interaction with the political branches into which democracy channels it, and i

11、t is to these interactions that this Article turns first in its inquiry into the mechanics of public opinion's apparent influence on judicial outcomes. But political controls, such as Congressional control over juris

12、diction and budget, are blunt instruments. The political costs of threatening reprisal through these means for individual deci</p><p>　　Presidential refusal to execute the judiciary's rulings is a more p

13、recise-but rarely invoked-constraint. Formal political constraints ultimately fail to explain public opinion's influence on individual cases.</p><p>　　The Article next turns to more informal influences o

14、n judicial decisions. These constraints include the role of stare decisis and the appellate process, as well as concerns about the jurist's individual reputation and that of the judiciary as a whole. Public opinion m

15、ay reinforce several of these constraints, but seems to have most of its influence where these constraints leave jurists with discretion. Public opinion thus appears to operate in much the same sphere as the judge's

16、own political id</p><p>　　Because consideration of both formal and informal constraints and attitudinal models of decision-making yields unsatisfying answers, the Article turns from influences external to th

17、e judicial decision-making framework and examines the framework itself. In an attempt to understand the apparent influence of public opinion, this Article imagines what a principled incorporation of public opinion into t

18、he various analyses might look like. That is, the Article speculates what American jurisprudence wo</p><p>　　The Supreme Court's citation of opinion polls in Atkins v. Virginia n4 suggests that polls may

19、 be useful evidence of public opinion if public opinion had a legitimate place in legal analysis. The use of opinion polls as evidence of public opinion would expand the universe of issues about which there may be judici

20、ally knowable public opinion, and represent a significant step towards the potential principled incorporation of public opinion into judicial decision-making. Although the court's use of</p><p>　　The tra

21、ditional "spectrum of deference" n5 suggests it is possible to make a reasoned evaluation of the appropriateness of public opinion as an influence in various judicial contexts. The spectrum is based on a realis

22、tic evaluation of the relative institutional advantages of the judiciary and Congress, and affords Congress varying degrees of deference depending on the various functions implicated by the decision-making context. Altho

23、ugh the considerations are not identical when the question is t</p><p>　　For example, Professor Eskridge has argued that public values ought to and do influence the process of statutory interpretation. n6 At

24、kins suggests that public opinion, which may amount to something less than Eskridge's public values, might influence statutory interpretation depending on the strength of the preference and the strength of other trad

25、itional indicators of statutory meaning.</p><p>　　Federal common law is another potential context for the consideration of public opinion. Although the common law does not always directly reflect public pref

26、erences, democratic principles suggest that public opinion could be relevant to determining common law rules. The common law context illuminates several instances where public opinion should not be considered-in most cas

27、es where the rule may affect the public's tax burden, or where public opinion is adverse to a minority or individual who do</p><p>　　Public opinion could also theoretically play a role in constitutional

28、adjudication. Perhaps ironically, determining whether legislation is within Congress's power under the Interstate Commerce Clause - in which the Court grants Congress substantial deference - proves to be an inappropr

29、iate doctrine for incorporating public opinion. The reason is twofold. First, there is no reason to believe that the public has any inherent advantage over the judiciary in determining whether an activity substanti</p

30、><p>　　The vindication of national opinion over a majority in a smaller constituency may justify consideration of public opinion in the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Doctrinal developments in

31、Lawrence v. Texas suggest that public opinion could become a legitimate and explicit consideration in the substantive due process arena. In the course of striking down Texas's law against homosexual sodomy only seve

32、nteen years after upholding the states' ability to prohibit such conduct in Bowers v.</p><p>　　The examination of how public opinion might fit into various judicial doctrines suggests where and how publi

33、c opinion may influence outcomes. In most instances, the correlation of public opinion and judicial outcomes is the result of the process by which judges routinely make decisions rather than an influence external to the

34、decision-making process. This influence therefore need not be viewed as a threat to judicial independence. Current doctrine is, across the board, well designed to reflect p</p><p>　　This Article proceeds as

35、follows: Part II identifies several instances where there is agreement that public opinion must not play a role in judicial decision-making, and examines the competing judicial traditions regarding the role of public opi

36、nion in constitutional adjudication. Part III then surveys evidence that public opinion influences judicial decision-making, and concludes that public opinion may have a marginal effect. It next attempts to explain how t

37、his influence operates, but finds b</p><p>　　II. The Debate over Public Opinion in Judicial Decision-making</p><p>　　A．Public Opinion as Anathema to Judicial Independence</p><p>　　T

38、here is widespread agreement that in certain cases, public opinion should not play any role in a judge's decision. For example, determinations of whether probable cause exists to try a defendant should not be influen

39、ced by public outcry that the defendant is guilty. n9 Nor should public animus influence individual sentencing decisions. n10 A recent example of these dangers is illuminating.</p><p>　　In 1995, Federal Dist

40、rict Judge Baer of the Southern District of New York presided over a high profile drug prosecution. After a hearing where Judge Baer found the testimony of defense witnesses credible and the testimony of police officers

41、"incredible," he excluded large quantities of drugs and a confession, ruling that they were obtained in violation of the defendant's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.</p><p>　　The public and p

42、olitical responses were immediate. The New York Times ran several editorials condemning the ruling. Members of Congress spoke publicly about impeachment, and some even asked President Clinton to add his voice to the crit

43、icism. In the meantime, Judge Baer granted a rehearing on the suppression motion. President Clinton declined to comment on the case pending the results of the rehearing. According to the New York Times, a group of Circu

44、it Court judges, and several commentators, t</p><p>　　After rehearing the motion, Judge Baer reversed his original decision and admitted the evidence, citing newly-introduced police reports as additional evi

45、dence that compelled him to change his mind. But critics claim that this additional evidence could not have been a sufficient ground for reversal, and may have even hurt the prosecution's case by creating additional

46、inconsistencies with the officers' testimony. Judge Baer was in a no-win situation. There was negative publicity about his original</p><p>　　The late Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote about the effects of pu

47、blic opinion on the judicial decision-making process, concluding that "no judge can conscientiously say in so many words, "I gave you my best judgment when I decided that the Constitution meant thus and so, but

48、 since the public overwhelmingly disagrees with my interpretation of the Constitution, I will therefore change my mind." On its face, this statement appears to reject public opinion as a consideration in constitutio

49、nal adjudicat</p><p>　　In these contexts, capitulation to contrary public opinion would signal the end of judicial independence. But a careful consideration of public opinion in certain cases does not necess

50、arily indicate an erosion of judicial independence. Commentators and jurists have long acknowledged the influence of public opinion without concluding that the judiciary has abdicated its responsibility of independent ju

51、dgment.</p><p>　　B. Competing Judicial Views on the Propriety on Considering Public Opinion</p><p>　　Commentators and jurists have long recognized the effect of public opinion on the judiciary i

52、n circumstances where it is not a threat to judicial independence. The Chief Justice Rehnquist, drawing on his experience as a law clerk to Justice Jackson, concluded that public opinion had a significant influence on th

53、e Court's disposition in the "Steel Seizure" case. In 1952, President Truman, fearing that a reduction in steel production would hinder the Korean War effort, ordered federal officials to</p><p&g

54、t;　　The timing of the government's "inherent power" argument was not good, as support for both the Korean War and President Truman was at its nadir. Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the tides of publi

55、c opinion, accelerated and intensified by the rapid movement of the case through the federal judicial system, influenced the Court's decision. </p><p>　　Acknowledging public opinion's influence and i

56、ncorporating it into doctrine are separate propositions, however. Chief Justice Rehnquist repeatedly dissented from opinions taking public opinion into account, stating that public opinion was constitutionally irrelevant

57、. Justice Scalia agreed with Rehnquist's theory, commenting on "how upsetting it is, that so many of our citizens...think that we Justices should properly take into account their views, as though we were engaged

58、 not in ascertaining an</p><p>　　Chief Justice Rehnquist also drew considerable support for his position from a longstanding belief among the public that judges do not-and must not-consider public opinion in

59、 making decisions. Moreover, many jurists share this view of the judiciary and of their own work. Justice Douglas described judges as strong amid the winds of political change. Chief Justice Burger wrote that "legis

60、latures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people." </p><p>　　Support for public opinion as a factor in judicial decision-making among U.S. Cou

61、rt of Appeals judges is mixed. Of thirty-five judges surveyed in 1981, only one responded that public opinion was "a very important" factor, while eight said that it was "moderately important" and twe

62、nty-two said that it was "not important." Judge Tacha of the Tenth Circuit declared that public opinion should have no influence whatsoever in articulating ideal judicial procedure.</p><p>　　Justic

63、e Story wrote that "it is not for judges to listen to ... popular appeal." Chief Justice Taney also addressed the role of public opinion in Dred Scot v. Sanford, concluding that current public opinion was irrel

64、evant to constitutional interpretation. Strictly denying the influence of public opinion is problematic in several respects, however. First, it does not appear to reflect reality. Evidence discussed below suggests that p

65、ublic opinion influences judicial decision-making, even if only </p><p>　　There is also a tradition of recognizing public opinion in certain constitutional contexts. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pen

66、nsylvania v. Casey, Justice Souter cited divided public opinion as a reason to uphold the central holding in Roe v. Wade. According to Justice Souter, the Court should refrain from reversing its watershed cases until sub

67、stantial public opinion for the decision becomes unfavorable. </p><p>　　Justice Souter's incorporation of public opinion into constitutional doctrine is also firmly grounded in judicial tradition. In 181

68、2, the Court held in United States v. Hudson n43 that the federal courts lacked the power to make criminal common law. In the decision, Justice Johnson stated that although this question is brought up now for the first t

69、ime to be decided by this Court, we consider it as having been long since settled in public opinion. In no other case for many years has this jurisdi</p><p><b>　　外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯稿</b></p><p>　

70、　群體控制：多數(shù)主義法院與公共輿論的反思</p><p>　　作者：本杰明·J·羅斯切</p><p><b>　　一、序言</b></p><p>　　聯(lián)邦國(guó)家機(jī)關(guān)的司法部門(mén)有史以來(lái)就與社會(huì)輿論有著令人不安的緊張關(guān)系。如同行政和立法部門(mén)，司法部門(mén)也有賴(lài)于從大眾的支持中獲得合法地位。但不同于政治部門(mén)的是司法部門(mén)并非通過(guò)被選舉

71、的方式來(lái)對(duì)支持他們的人負(fù)責(zé)。相反，它的固有職責(zé)之一就是阻止那些違憲的群眾性的政治表達(dá)。然而，根據(jù)一些法學(xué)學(xué)者的說(shuō)法，有人指出普通法系的上訴法院法官的觀點(diǎn)有必要建立在社會(huì)對(duì)法外價(jià)值的共識(shí)上。換句話(huà)說(shuō)，那些常常反對(duì)多數(shù)主義的法官也必須做出社會(huì)大眾在長(zhǎng)期內(nèi)能接受的判決以維持其合法地位。凱姆林斯基教授提出假說(shuō)：“司法的合理性取決于其判決的社會(huì)接受度和得出這個(gè)判決的程序的合法性?！?lt;/p><p>　　傳統(tǒng)上認(rèn)為，學(xué)者和法

72、官在輿論對(duì)聯(lián)邦司法部門(mén)的影響上的分析主要走兩個(gè)路徑——一些評(píng)論家和法學(xué)家認(rèn)為司法獨(dú)立要求輿論對(duì)司法判決的作出不應(yīng)當(dāng)產(chǎn)生任何影響，另一群學(xué)者則提倡輿論在例外情形下可以對(duì)司法判決的作出產(chǎn)生間接的影響。這些學(xué)者認(rèn)為法官應(yīng)該在某些情況下尋求公眾輿論作為“客觀”的指引，比如在作出法律解釋時(shí)，在界定什么是第八修正案禁止的“殘酷的非正常的待遇”時(shí)。</p><p>　　根據(jù)最近一些實(shí)證研究的發(fā)現(xiàn)表明，上述觀點(diǎn)過(guò)于限制輿論對(duì)司法

73、判決產(chǎn)生的影響。這項(xiàng)研究表明“司法中立”模式可能與現(xiàn)實(shí)相悖，社會(huì)輿論的影響不可避免。本文將考察這一認(rèn)為法官或多或少都會(huì)受到輿論影響的論據(jù)。因?yàn)樗痉ú块T(mén)也是聯(lián)邦機(jī)關(guān)的一個(gè)分支，所以也要付諸于透明的決策制定過(guò)程，本文將分析社會(huì)輿論在各種情形下如何影響司法判決的制定過(guò)程。輿論對(duì)司法的這一明顯影響機(jī)制將會(huì)顯著影響我們?nèi)绾卧O(shè)想輿論和司法判決之間的關(guān)系以及這種影響是否構(gòu)成對(duì)司法獨(dú)立的威脅。</p><p>　　有人可能認(rèn)為民

74、主制度會(huì)引導(dǎo)輿論通過(guò)司法和政治部門(mén)的互動(dòng)來(lái)發(fā)揮它的影響，并且正是關(guān)注這種互動(dòng)的本文首次開(kāi)始調(diào)研輿論對(duì)司法判決影響的機(jī)制。但政治控制，例如國(guó)會(huì)對(duì)司法管轄權(quán)和財(cái)政的控制就是一把鈍器。通過(guò)上述方式對(duì)法官的個(gè)人決策進(jìn)行報(bào)復(fù)所產(chǎn)生的政治成本促使他們以“認(rèn)定無(wú)效”作為一種手段，逐案地影響司法的基礎(chǔ)?？偨y(tǒng)拒絕執(zhí)行司法機(jī)關(guān)的判決是一個(gè)更準(zhǔn)確說(shuō)明對(duì)司法機(jī)關(guān)制約的例子，雖然總統(tǒng)很少這么做。官方正式的政治制約最終未能解釋輿論對(duì)個(gè)案的影響。</p>

75、<p>　　本文于是轉(zhuǎn)而更多地討論那些以非正式的方式對(duì)司法判決產(chǎn)生的影響。這些產(chǎn)生影響的制約力量包括尊重先例原則、上訴的程序以及對(duì)法學(xué)家的個(gè)人威望和對(duì)司法整體的關(guān)注。輿論可能會(huì)加強(qiáng)上述幾方面的約束力，但似乎在這些制約因素允許法學(xué)家自由裁量的時(shí)候其影響力是最為強(qiáng)大的。輿論于是在類(lèi)似于法官個(gè)人政治理念的領(lǐng)域里發(fā)揮作用，而在這一領(lǐng)域中，根據(jù)司法決策的“態(tài)度”模式，法官可以在先例約束原則的范圍內(nèi)擴(kuò)大自由裁量的空間。</p&g

76、t;<p>　　由于對(duì)正式和非正式約束力量以及司法決策中的“態(tài)度”模式的考量會(huì)得出不能令人滿(mǎn)意的答案，本文于是從外部影響轉(zhuǎn)而討論司法決策的內(nèi)部框架并審查這個(gè)框架本身。為了更進(jìn)一步理解輿論的顯著作用，本文進(jìn)而設(shè)想有原則地融入社會(huì)輿論后的各種分析會(huì)是什么樣子。也就是說(shuō)，本文首先以一個(gè)特別的判例為開(kāi)頭——該案中法官視民意調(diào)查為司法決策的合法部分——推演出當(dāng)社會(huì)輿論作為一種切實(shí)的而不是神秘莫測(cè)的影響力量來(lái)影響司法判決的作出時(shí)，美國(guó)

77、的判例法體系將會(huì)怎樣。這種想法的實(shí)驗(yàn)最終得出另一種對(duì)司法結(jié)果和輿論之間關(guān)系的解釋。</p><p>　　最高法院在阿特金斯訴弗吉尼亞州的案件中引用民意調(diào)查的事例表明如果輿論在法律推理中有合法地位的話(huà)，民意測(cè)驗(yàn)將會(huì)是一項(xiàng)非常有用的證據(jù)。將民意調(diào)查作為證據(jù)使用的這一案例擴(kuò)大了通過(guò)司法程序獲知民意這一問(wèn)題的研究領(lǐng)域，同時(shí)也代表著我們向著將民意有原則地融入司法決策的潛在可能邁出了極有意義的一步。雖然不幸的是在該案中民意測(cè)

78、驗(yàn)不能在審判中受到專(zhuān)家證人的審查和評(píng)論，但是民意測(cè)驗(yàn)依然是一項(xiàng)潛在的反映社會(huì)輿論的重要而有力的證據(jù)。同時(shí)，針對(duì)該案中法院使用民意測(cè)驗(yàn)作為證據(jù)的評(píng)論認(rèn)為，社會(huì)輿論足以精確地測(cè)量以支持法官將它作為證據(jù)采用。</p><p>　　傳統(tǒng)的“服從頻譜”表明，對(duì)在各種司法環(huán)境中產(chǎn)生影響的社會(huì)輿論的適當(dāng)性進(jìn)行合理評(píng)價(jià)是完全可能的。這個(gè)頻譜基于對(duì)相對(duì)的體制優(yōu)勢(shì)進(jìn)行現(xiàn)實(shí)的評(píng)估，并允許國(guó)會(huì)根據(jù)不同決策環(huán)境下的各種職能表現(xiàn)出不同的服從

79、度。雖然當(dāng)問(wèn)題集中在社會(huì)輿論而不是對(duì)政府機(jī)構(gòu)的服從度的情況下時(shí)，這個(gè)頻譜考慮的因素與之并不完全相同，但是對(duì)政府和司法機(jī)關(guān)基本價(jià)值的審查將啟發(fā)司法機(jī)關(guān)何時(shí)以及如何反映輿論。</p><p>　　比方說(shuō)，艾斯克瑞吉教授就認(rèn)為社會(huì)價(jià)值觀應(yīng)該而且確實(shí)影響著法律解釋。阿特金斯提出，輿論的影響力雖然小于艾斯克瑞吉所說(shuō)的社會(huì)價(jià)值，但是仍可能影響法律解釋?zhuān)Q于法官個(gè)人偏好的程度以及法定意義上的其他傳統(tǒng)因素的力量。</p&

80、gt;<p>　　美國(guó)聯(lián)邦的普通法是另一個(gè)對(duì)民意進(jìn)行考量的潛在背景。雖然普通法并非經(jīng)常直接反映社會(huì)的偏好，但是民主原則要求對(duì)普通法規(guī)則的制定必須考慮民意。普通法體系的背景表明了在若干情況下不應(yīng)當(dāng)考慮輿論，包括影響公共稅收負(fù)擔(dān)的情況，公共輿論對(duì)少數(shù)派或者不受憲法權(quán)利保護(hù)的個(gè)體不利的情況。</p><p>　　公共輿論理論上同樣對(duì)憲法裁決產(chǎn)生影響?？赡苡悬c(diǎn)諷刺的是，決定是否立法在州際貿(mào)易條款下屬于國(guó)會(huì)的

81、權(quán)限——在州際貿(mào)易條款中法院對(duì)國(guó)會(huì)給予實(shí)質(zhì)上的服從——被證明是不恰當(dāng)?shù)夭杉{民意的做法。原因是雙重的，首先，沒(méi)有理由相信公眾相比于司法機(jī)關(guān)在確定一項(xiàng)活動(dòng)是否實(shí)質(zhì)上影響州際貿(mào)易上更具有固有的優(yōu)勢(shì)。其次，法院的貿(mào)易條款僅僅為憲法上適當(dāng)?shù)臎Q策者作為引進(jìn)民意的裁定依據(jù)，這一點(diǎn)似乎與立法行為要求的民意普遍性毫無(wú)關(guān)系。然而，社會(huì)輿論驚人地適用于其他的憲法原則。</p><p>　　即使是在小選區(qū)里對(duì)全國(guó)流行的觀點(diǎn)進(jìn)行的辯駁也可

82、以證明對(duì)法院第生死修正案中對(duì)社會(huì)輿論的考慮是正當(dāng)合理的。在勞倫斯訴德州案中的學(xué)理發(fā)展表明輿論可能在實(shí)質(zhì)正義的領(lǐng)域內(nèi)成為一個(gè)合法的和明確的考慮因素。在反對(duì)德克薩斯州禁止同性性行為的過(guò)程中，僅僅在支持德州阻止類(lèi)似行為十七年之后，勞倫斯法院就得出了與第八修正案具有驚人相似性的分析。勞倫斯法院于是指出了在實(shí)質(zhì)正義程序的判例中輿論的學(xué)理地位。因?yàn)轭?lèi)似的發(fā)展并未出現(xiàn)在法院的平等保護(hù)判例中，所以本文保留了關(guān)于平等保護(hù)學(xué)說(shuō)契合民意的判斷。</p&

83、gt;<p>　　對(duì)輿論可能如何契合各種司法原則的審查研究指出了輿論在哪里以及怎樣影響著司法的判決結(jié)果。在大多數(shù)情況下，輿論的司法判決結(jié)果的相關(guān)性是體現(xiàn)在法官按照常規(guī)作出決定的過(guò)程而不是外部因素直接影響法官作出決定的過(guò)程。因此，這種影響不需要被視為對(duì)司法獨(dú)立的威脅。一刀切地說(shuō)，目前的原則是為旨在反映民意。</p><p>　　本文將如此展開(kāi)：第Ⅱ部分首先提出一些不能讓民意干預(yù)司法的特定情況并考察具有

84、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性的司法傳統(tǒng)在有關(guān)于民意影響憲法裁決時(shí)發(fā)揮的作用。第Ⅲ部分調(diào)查輿論影響司法判決的證據(jù)并得出輿論具有邊際效應(yīng)的結(jié)論。接著，本文筆者嘗試著解釋了這種效應(yīng)如何發(fā)揮作用并發(fā)現(xiàn)了政治性的以及非正式的內(nèi)部司法控制的不足導(dǎo)致輿論對(duì)司法產(chǎn)生的影響。最終，本文考察了對(duì)民意測(cè)驗(yàn)的在阿特金斯案中的采用來(lái)定義“殘酷而非正常的懲罰”。第Ⅳ部分考察了司法判決這個(gè)工具本身來(lái)解釋社會(huì)輿論對(duì)司法判決的明顯影響。在這部分中，本文首先概述了什么是傳統(tǒng)的“服從頻譜”，并將

85、其作為一個(gè)例子來(lái)分析在形形色色的情形下是否可以在理論上把輿論列為作出司法判決的考量之一。本文接著分析在形形色色的情形下輿論是否可以作為合法的考慮因素，包括在立法解釋、普通法的立法過(guò)程以及若干憲法性質(zhì)的情況下。本文是通過(guò)考察各種反映民意的學(xué)說(shuō)傾向和近期判例對(duì)社會(huì)輿論鏡像反映上述學(xué)說(shuō)的能力的影響而得出最后結(jié)論的。</p><p>　　二、討論在司法判決作出過(guò)程中的輿論</p><p>　?。ㄒ?/p>

86、）司法獨(dú)立絕對(duì)禁止輿論干擾的觀點(diǎn)</p><p>　　有一種廣為人知的觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為輿論絕對(duì)不可以對(duì)司法判決的作出產(chǎn)生任何干擾。比如，無(wú)論是否存在可能的原因，對(duì)被告的定罪過(guò)程始終不能受到那些認(rèn)為其有罪的輿論的影響。同樣也不應(yīng)該讓輿論的敵意來(lái)影響被告的量刑。最近的一個(gè)案例正說(shuō)明了這一點(diǎn)。</p><p>　　1995年，紐約南區(qū)聯(lián)邦地方法院法官貝爾審理了一起有名的對(duì)毒品案件的起訴。在經(jīng)過(guò)庭審聽(tīng)證之

87、后，法官貝爾認(rèn)為辯方的論證具有可信度而控方的指控沒(méi)有可信度，他排除認(rèn)定大量毒品存在和辯方的認(rèn)罪，判決被告的第四、五項(xiàng)修正案權(quán)利被侵犯。</p><p>　　針對(duì)這一判決，民間和官方的反應(yīng)都非常迅速。紐約時(shí)代周刊的幾篇評(píng)論都譴責(zé)這一判決。國(guó)會(huì)的議員公開(kāi)表示要彈劾法官，甚至有些議員要求克林頓總統(tǒng)加入他們的聲討。當(dāng)此之時(shí)，貝爾法官也批準(zhǔn)了對(duì)該案的重審，克林頓總統(tǒng)則拒絕評(píng)論該案以待該案的重審。根據(jù)紐約時(shí)代，一群巡回法院的

88、法官和若干評(píng)論家傳遞給貝爾法官的信息是很明確的：保全你自己或者冒著丟掉工作的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)去堅(jiān)持己見(jiàn)，盡管僅因?yàn)榉ü賹?duì)某案件的判決就彈劾其的做法不符合慣例。</p><p>　　在案件重審后，貝爾法官推翻了他原來(lái)的判決并附上證據(jù)，引用了最新產(chǎn)生的警方報(bào)告作為新證據(jù)，這份報(bào)告顯示法官貝爾曾被威脅要求改變判決結(jié)果。但是評(píng)論家認(rèn)為，這一新增的證據(jù)并不足以支持其推翻原判決，并且這樣一來(lái)由于導(dǎo)致了官方證詞的出爾反爾而可能損害該公訴案

89、件判決的可信度。貝爾法官陷入兩難境地。輿論中有反對(duì)貝爾法官排除該證據(jù)的聲音，同樣也有反對(duì)他改變態(tài)度去采納該證據(jù)的聲音，無(wú)論哪一種做法都會(huì)損害公眾對(duì)司法公平的信任。</p><p>　　已故首席大法官倫奎斯特曾這樣描寫(xiě)輿論對(duì)司法決策過(guò)程的影響——沒(méi)有一個(gè)法官能自覺(jué)地在眾多觀點(diǎn)的包圍中表達(dá)自己?！拔医o你提供最公正的判決并且我覺(jué)得憲法就是這樣規(guī)定和表達(dá)的，但是由于壓倒性的公眾意見(jiàn)反對(duì)我對(duì)憲法的解讀，于是我將改變我的觀點(diǎn)

90、?！睆谋砻嫔峡?，這句話(huà)似乎在反對(duì)將社會(huì)輿論作為憲法裁決的考慮因素之一，而更多地與論奎斯特的判決保持一致。</p><p>　　在這些情形下，屈服于社會(huì)輿論的反對(duì)聲音將意味著司法獨(dú)立的終結(jié)。但是在某些特殊情形下，對(duì)社會(huì)輿論的謹(jǐn)慎采納將完全不必然意味著對(duì)司法獨(dú)立的侵蝕。評(píng)論家和法學(xué)家早就認(rèn)可了輿論的影響力而沒(méi)有總結(jié)出這是由于司法機(jī)關(guān)自己放棄了獨(dú)立審判的職責(zé)而引起的結(jié)果。</p><p>　?。?/p>

91、二）關(guān)于如何在司法過(guò)程中合理考慮民意的觀點(diǎn)</p><p>　　評(píng)論家和法學(xué)家很早就認(rèn)識(shí)到輿論對(duì)司法的影響也可以存在于其對(duì)司法獨(dú)立不構(gòu)成威脅的情況下。首席大法官倫奎斯特總結(jié)自己作法律秘書(shū)時(shí)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)對(duì)杰克遜法官說(shuō)：“在‘鋼鐵劫持案’中，輿論對(duì)法庭的立場(chǎng)有著顯著的影響力。”1952年，杜魯門(mén)總統(tǒng)因擔(dān)心鋼產(chǎn)量的下降會(huì)影響到當(dāng)時(shí)對(duì)朝鮮的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，下令聯(lián)邦機(jī)關(guān)在一場(chǎng)罷工中控制和經(jīng)營(yíng)一些鋼鐵生產(chǎn)機(jī)構(gòu)。鋼鐵企業(yè)于是提起訴訟并從法院獲

92、得了禁令，責(zé)令總統(tǒng)不得奪取鋼鐵廠。聯(lián)邦政府從法院收到了中止令并直接上訴至最高法院，最高法院同意復(fù)審并在九天后聽(tīng)取了他們的申辯。法院駁回了政府認(rèn)為他們的扣押是基于憲法第二條賦予總統(tǒng)的一項(xiàng)權(quán)力這一說(shuō)法。</p><p>　　政府提出“固有權(quán)利”這一論點(diǎn)的時(shí)機(jī)并不好，因?yàn)楫?dāng)時(shí)對(duì)朝鮮戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)和杜魯門(mén)總統(tǒng)的支持正處于其最低點(diǎn)。首席大法官倫奎斯特認(rèn)為，輿論的浪潮會(huì)通過(guò)司法系統(tǒng)加速并加劇案件的快速變化，影響著法庭的決策。</

93、p><p>　　然而，承認(rèn)輿論的影響力和把它融匯入判案原則是兩回事。首席大法官倫奎斯特多次反對(duì)把輿論列入考慮的做法，認(rèn)為輿論與憲法不具有相關(guān)性。斯卡利亞法官同意倫奎斯特的理論，如此評(píng)論道：“多令人苦惱啊，這么多我們的市民們都認(rèn)為我們法官應(yīng)該把他們的意見(jiàn)列入考慮，好像我們從事的不是確定某項(xiàng)客觀的法律規(guī)則而是決定某項(xiàng)社會(huì)共識(shí)。”</p><p>　　首席大法官倫奎斯特也從一種長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)的理念中尋求到

94、了對(duì)自己立場(chǎng)的支持，這種理念就是法官不會(huì)也不應(yīng)該在作出判決的考慮公眾的意見(jiàn)。</p><p>　　不僅如此，許多法學(xué)界也對(duì)司法工作和他們自己的工作抱有同樣的看法。法官道格拉斯把法官描述成能在政治變革之風(fēng)中挺立那般強(qiáng)大。首席大法官貝格如此寫(xiě)道：“應(yīng)當(dāng)是立法機(jī)關(guān)而不是法院有義務(wù)回應(yīng)民意以及人民的道德價(jià)值觀。”法官鮑威爾也同意并表示：“對(duì)民意進(jìn)行評(píng)估本質(zhì)上是一項(xiàng)立法性質(zhì)的只能而不是司法性質(zhì)的?！狈ü俜ㄌm克福也曾寫(xiě)過(guò)法院

95、與代表機(jī)構(gòu)不同，因?yàn)樗麄儭安皇且辉O(shè)計(jì)成一個(gè)對(duì)民主社會(huì)良好的反映系統(tǒng)”。</p><p>　　支持將民意作為判決作出的考慮因素的意見(jiàn)在美國(guó)上訴法院法官中是混雜不清的。在1981年對(duì)35名法官的調(diào)查中，只有1名法官認(rèn)為民意是一項(xiàng)非常重要的考慮因素，而8名法官認(rèn)為它比較重要，且有22名法官認(rèn)為其不重要。第十巡回法院的法官塔克聲稱(chēng)在立項(xiàng)的司法程序中輿論應(yīng)當(dāng)沒(méi)有任何的影響力。</p><p>　　

96、法官司道麗寫(xiě)道：“聽(tīng)取民意不是法官的工作。”首席大法官泰尼在德萊德·斯科特訴桑福德案中總結(jié)輿論的作用說(shuō)，當(dāng)下流行的輿論與憲法解釋毫無(wú)關(guān)系。</p><p>　　但是，嚴(yán)格否定輿論的作用在某些情況下是有問(wèn)題的。首先，這樣做不符合實(shí)際。下文討論的證據(jù)就表明輿論的確影響司法決策，雖然只是在無(wú)意識(shí)的層面中。其次，在某些情況下，輿論可以作為政策制定法庭的一項(xiàng)合法的考量因素。</p><p>