我國(guó)石油進(jìn)出口現(xiàn)狀與問(wèn)題分析外文翻譯

1、<p>　　本 科 畢 業(yè) 設(shè) 計(jì)（論文）</p><p><b>　　( 2012屆)</b></p><p><b>　?。ㄍ?文 翻 譯）</b></p><p>　　題 目: 我國(guó)石油進(jìn)出口現(xiàn)狀與問(wèn)題分析</p><p>　　學(xué) 院:__商學(xué)院_______________

2、________</p><p>　　專(zhuān)　　業(yè):__國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)與貿(mào)易_______________</p><p>　　班　　級(jí):__10國(guó)貿(mào)專(zhuān)升本_________________</p><p>　　姓 名:__陳超群_______________________</p><p>　　學(xué) 號(hào):__10101215102_____

3、_____________</p><p>　　指導(dǎo)老師:__張建民_______________________</p><p>　　原文題目：《中國(guó)的石油出口和價(jià)格》</p><p>　　作者：若昂里卡多·法利亞</p><p>　　原文出處: 學(xué)院經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的討論文件，第08,12，提供合作：肯特大學(xué)</p><

4、;p><b>　　中國(guó)出口和石油價(jià)格</b></p><p>　　在新世界發(fā)展的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境下，石油價(jià)格的上漲是最實(shí)質(zhì)性，而不是一個(gè)臨時(shí)加息的情況。評(píng)論家認(rèn)為高油價(jià)是停留在一個(gè)位置。這個(gè)說(shuō)法的一個(gè)主要的原因是，中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)高速增長(zhǎng)是推動(dòng)增加對(duì)石油的需求和價(jià)格上漲的罪魁禍?zhǔn)?。然而，鑒于中國(guó)是一個(gè)石油進(jìn)口國(guó)，這就增加了石油價(jià)格，對(duì)于中國(guó)石油的出口擴(kuò)張?jiān)黾由a(chǎn)成本產(chǎn)生了負(fù)面的影響。但根據(jù)數(shù)據(jù)檢

5、測(cè)現(xiàn)實(shí)，這樣的結(jié)果似乎并沒(méi)有發(fā)生。相反，中國(guó)的石油出口沒(méi)有受到石油價(jià)格提高的影響。 </p><p>　　另一個(gè)程式化的事實(shí)是，在洛迪克（2006）中國(guó)的石油出口占世界的比例也越來(lái)越多的被討論。肖特（2005）為一種相關(guān)的方法。根據(jù)賴(lài)（2004）中國(guó)對(duì)外貿(mào)易成功在經(jīng)濟(jì)方面的市場(chǎng)化改革，恰當(dāng)?shù)膮R率和貿(mào)易政策，并積極參與外商企業(yè)投資。2張和張（2005）表明，隨著中國(guó)制造業(yè)在國(guó)際上的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力增強(qiáng)，全要素生產(chǎn)率和勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)

6、率的提高，中國(guó)已經(jīng)成為世界上最大的貿(mào)易集團(tuán)，占有著6%的全球貿(mào)易，在2002年成為世界第四大石油出口國(guó)。這是一個(gè)驚人的有關(guān)成功方面的產(chǎn)出增長(zhǎng)率的數(shù)據(jù)。1980以來(lái)中國(guó)平均增長(zhǎng)率每年約10%。中國(guó)的增長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于其他地區(qū)，平均11.45%在1991年至2003年期間。</p><p>　　在本文中我們提出一個(gè)合理的解釋?zhuān)@個(gè)事實(shí)有關(guān)中國(guó)在出口方面的擴(kuò)張，產(chǎn)量和石油價(jià)格的價(jià)格都得到增長(zhǎng)。我們的假設(shè)是，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的飛速發(fā)展

7、是石油價(jià)格上漲背后的強(qiáng)大驅(qū)動(dòng)力。然而，由于彈性的勞動(dòng)力供給，由于中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)市場(chǎng)上大量?jī)?chǔ)備的勞動(dòng)力，石油價(jià)格的上漲損害中國(guó)出口能力的程度低于對(duì)它的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手所造成的損害。中國(guó)石油出口的快速擴(kuò)張?jiān)诹硪环矫嬗直仨毰c當(dāng)前的現(xiàn)象結(jié)合到一起。</p><p>　　競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力作為洛迪克（2006）措施進(jìn)步完善有很大關(guān)系。因此，我們可以看出，石油價(jià)格和中國(guó)的出口增加時(shí)間也有關(guān)。當(dāng)然，也有其他可能原因來(lái)解釋這個(gè)問(wèn)題，比如同時(shí)增加中國(guó)出口和

8、石油的價(jià)格。例如，另一個(gè)假設(shè)，與假設(shè)正好對(duì)應(yīng)的是中國(guó)出口并不是能源密集型，石油也不會(huì)是一個(gè)重要的投入和生產(chǎn)對(duì)象。因此，在石油生產(chǎn)成本和出口價(jià)格方面，石油價(jià)格上漲帶來(lái)的因素對(duì)我國(guó)的影響并不大。這一假設(shè)石油有意義不是本文討論的對(duì)象。我們的目的是測(cè)試這個(gè)想法，中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)對(duì)油價(jià)的影響，同時(shí)影響其出口的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，因?yàn)槲覀冇写罅康氖Ｓ鄤趧?dòng)力。</p><p>　　艾肯格林等證據(jù)支持這一假說(shuō)。（2004年），這表明中國(guó)出口

9、的東西主要集中在消費(fèi)品市場(chǎng)，跟其他亞洲國(guó)家的出口是一樣的。羅蘭 - 霍爾斯特和Weiss（2005）發(fā)現(xiàn)，中國(guó)出口的產(chǎn)品削弱了亞洲其他國(guó)家在美國(guó)和日本區(qū)域的市場(chǎng)份額，這從拉爾和Albaladejo（2004）]也可以看出來(lái)。菲爾普斯（2004）認(rèn)為，中國(guó)的出口增長(zhǎng)是因?yàn)榻?jīng)濟(jì)欠發(fā)達(dá)，尤其是像拉丁美洲，這種情況實(shí)際上是有害的，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)導(dǎo)致貿(mào)易條件急劇惡化，減少拉丁美洲的比較優(yōu)勢(shì)。</p><p>　　中國(guó)出口優(yōu)

10、勢(shì)的另一個(gè)因素是在于生產(chǎn)力資源蟲(chóng)族。小弟，小鐘（2004）顯示，勞動(dòng)密集型產(chǎn)品的形式在出口商品中占了最大的比例，在中國(guó)的出口中，勞動(dòng)密集型產(chǎn)品幾乎都可以無(wú)限制的供應(yīng)。</p><p>　　labor.5一個(gè)勞動(dòng)力供給過(guò)剩的含義是，中國(guó)可以大幅提高其在出口部門(mén)的勞動(dòng)人口的就業(yè)率，工資并不會(huì)提高。因?yàn)?，在出口部門(mén)提高生產(chǎn)率的結(jié)果是不太可能提高工資的，大幅度增加出口和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力的供應(yīng)。因此，生產(chǎn)率的外生因素，比如采用國(guó)外技

11、術(shù)或外國(guó)直接投資，對(duì)產(chǎn)出的增長(zhǎng)和出口競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力產(chǎn)生積極的影響。這反過(guò)來(lái)又導(dǎo)致石油價(jià)格上漲，這樣有助于解釋油價(jià)和中國(guó)的出口。</p><p>　　我們提出了一個(gè)程式化的理論模型，考慮到所有的這些因素。該模型能夠解釋如何在外生增長(zhǎng)全要素生產(chǎn)率（TFP），可以生成一個(gè)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)和石油價(jià)格之間的正相關(guān)。然后，我們估計(jì)中國(guó)出口的理論模型減少的形式方程模型研究經(jīng)驗(yàn)的影響。這個(gè)公式考慮到羅德瑞克（2006）（expy）開(kāi)發(fā)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力

12、的措施，與石油價(jià)格，生產(chǎn)率，實(shí)時(shí)匯率，和國(guó)外的工業(yè)生產(chǎn)。我們利用自回歸分布滯后（ARDL）方法提供的靈活性，解釋1992-2005年期間每月中國(guó)的制成品出口。估計(jì)油價(jià)系數(shù)和expy產(chǎn)生非常大的正面價(jià)值觀。根據(jù)模型的數(shù)據(jù)，從而為我們的猜想提供了強(qiáng)有力的支持，對(duì)于勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率也有積極作用，與理論保持了一致。為負(fù)值的實(shí)際匯率也與理論的驗(yàn)證也一致，而國(guó)外工業(yè)收入的影響雖然是積極的，但卻影響力卻比較弱。</p><p>　　

13、China’s Exports and the Oil Price</p><p>　　By João Ricardo Faria</p><p>　　School of Economics discussion papers, No. 08,12</p><p>　　Provided in cooperation with: University of

14、Kent</p><p>　　The increase in oil prices is one of the most substantive recent developments in the world macroeconomic environment. Rather than being a temporary hike, commentators have argued that higher oi

15、l prices are here to stay. One of the main reasons behind this hypothesis is that China’s economic growth is driving the increase in the demand for oil and its price hike. However, given that China is an oil importing co

16、untry, this increase in the price of oil should have a negative impact on China’s expor</p><p>　　Another stylized fact is that China’s share in the world’s exports is also increasing as discussed in Rodrik (

17、2006). See also Schott (2005) for a related approach. According to Lai (2004) Chinese foreign trade success lies in the market-oriented reforms of the economy, appropriate exchange rate and trade policies and the active

18、participation of foreign invested enterprises.2 Zhang and Zhang (2005) show that the significant improvement of international competitiveness in China’s manufacturing sec</p><p>　　In this paper we advance a

19、plausible explanation for this set of facts relating Chinese export expansion, output growth, and the oil price. Our hypothesis is that China’s growth has been a driving force behind the oil price increase. However, give

20、n the elastic labor supply due to the large reserves of workforce of the Chinese economy, the oil price increase harms China’s export capacity less than that of its competitors. The rapid expansion of Chinese exports, on

21、 the other hand, has to do with i</p><p>　　Competitiveness as advanced by Rodrik’s (2006) measure of relative competitiveness. As a consequence, we observe that both oil prices and China’s exports increase o

22、ver time. Of course, there are other possible explanations for the simultaneous increase in China’s exports and oil prices. For instance, another hypothesis, not necessarily opposed to ours, is that Chinese exports are n

23、ot energy intensive, that is, oil is not a significant input in its production and, therefore, increases in oil pric</p><p>　　This hypothesis is backed by evidence in Eichengreen et al. (2004), which shows t

24、hat Chinese exports crowd out the exports of other Asian countries mainly in markets for consumer goods. Roland-Holst and Weiss (2005) find that China’s exports are eroding the market share of its regional neighbors in t

25、he U.S. and Japan [see also Lall and Albaladejo (2004)]. Phelps (2004) argues that China’s exports growth is detrimental for less advanced economies, especially Latin America, since Chinese competiti</p><p>

26、　　Another factor behind Chinese exports’ strength lies in the productivity gains of its work force. Xiaodi and Xiaozhong (2004) show that labor-intensive products form the largest ratio of Chinese exports, which is due t

27、o China’s almost unlimited supply of</p><p>　　labor.5 One implication of the excess of supply of labor is that China can increase substantially the employment of its work force in the exports sector without

28、inflating wages. Also, the productivity gains in the export sector are less likely to raise wages, which increases substantially the supply of exports and its competitiveness. Hence, exogenous increases in productivity b

29、rought about by factors such as foreign technology adoption or FDI have a positive impact on output growth and export c</p><p>　　We present a stylized theoretical model that takes into account all these fact

30、ors. The model is able to explain how an exogenous increase in total factor productivity (TFP) can generate a positive correlation between Chinese growth and the oil price. We then examine empirically the implications of

31、 the model by estimating a reduced form equation for Chinese exports derived from the theoretical model. This equation takes into account the measure of competitiveness developed by Rodrik (2006) (expy)</p><p&

32、gt;　　原文題目：《中華人民共和國(guó)石油儲(chǔ)備的發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略》</p><p><b>　　作者：丹尼爾</b></p><p>　　原文出處: 賓夕法尼亞大學(xué)</p><p>　　中華人民共和國(guó)石油儲(chǔ)備的發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略</p><p>　　今天，籠罩在國(guó)際關(guān)系領(lǐng)域中的幾個(gè)問(wèn)題比世界日益減少石油供應(yīng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)顯得更為突出。同時(shí)，中國(guó)人民

33、共和國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)從第三世界過(guò)渡到全球超級(jí)大國(guó)構(gòu)成了冷戰(zhàn)后的世界秩序的最大挑戰(zhàn)。如果美國(guó)全球霸權(quán)的崛起的故事是20世紀(jì)的故事，類(lèi)似中國(guó)的崛起可能是21世紀(jì)的故事。所以這并不奇怪，中國(guó)的能源安全，這兩個(gè)具有不可估量的全球合流進(jìn)口的問(wèn)題將獲得越來(lái)越多國(guó)際的關(guān)注。</p><p>　　中國(guó)在全球石油市場(chǎng)的作用只是在最近成為國(guó)際社會(huì)的主題關(guān)注。中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)改革始于1978年，但西方對(duì)中國(guó)崛起的顧慮是直到中國(guó)于2001年加入世界貿(mào)易

34、組織時(shí)，開(kāi)始達(dá)到一個(gè)火熱的高音點(diǎn)上。2002年中國(guó)的石油消費(fèi)超過(guò)日本，今天，只有美國(guó)的消費(fèi)超過(guò)中國(guó)石油的消費(fèi)。隨后，在2004年，中國(guó)石油進(jìn)口增加了前所未有的49％，在全球石油價(jià)格上貢獻(xiàn)了33％的跳躍。通過(guò)一些計(jì)算，在過(guò)去的5 年里中國(guó)已占到世界石油需求增量的約40％。</p><p>　　中國(guó)石油爭(zhēng)論的中心內(nèi)容是一場(chǎng)關(guān)于兩個(gè)不同的世界觀的國(guó)際政治經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域的拔河戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)：經(jīng)濟(jì)自由主義和經(jīng)濟(jì)民族主義。 “前者強(qiáng)調(diào)通過(guò)比

35、較優(yōu)勢(shì)的開(kāi)發(fā)提高一般福利在國(guó)際貿(mào)易中的效用。這是自由市場(chǎng)資本主義的世界觀。后者假定貿(mào)易在國(guó)家權(quán)力的最大化的背景下，強(qiáng)調(diào)自給自足的相對(duì)而不是絕對(duì)的福利。</p><p>　　中國(guó)的石油工業(yè)仍然是經(jīng)濟(jì)民族主義占主導(dǎo)地位。如上所述，中國(guó)的各大石油公司是國(guó)有企業(yè)，政府繼續(xù)調(diào)節(jié)石油產(chǎn)品價(jià)格。最重要的是，經(jīng)濟(jì)民族主義繼續(xù)影響著中國(guó)石油供應(yīng)穩(wěn)定的探索。</p><p>　　在過(guò)去的十年里，中國(guó)一直奉行新

36、重商主義的石油安全政策通常被稱(chēng)為“權(quán)益油”。</p><p>　　寧可通過(guò)國(guó)際交流的傳統(tǒng)渠道買(mǎi)石油，而不是引導(dǎo)其國(guó)有石油公司通常是以共同勘探和生產(chǎn)權(quán)的形式海外購(gòu)買(mǎi)石油資產(chǎn)。業(yè)內(nèi)專(zhuān)家之間的共識(shí)是，中國(guó)以收購(gòu)出高價(jià)換取更大的石油供應(yīng)安全。 </p><p>　　事實(shí)上，權(quán)益油的方法在很大程度上依賴(lài)于這一概念，由于全球石油供應(yīng)緊張，中國(guó)在國(guó)外的石油項(xiàng)目的股份，將確保穩(wěn)定的供應(yīng)。這表明中國(guó)在石油市

37、場(chǎng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)自由主義的觀點(diǎn)，其中石油訪問(wèn)的唯一標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是買(mǎi)它的能力的信心不足。在許多方面，這些方法作為自我實(shí)現(xiàn)的預(yù)言，如果中國(guó)政府要求中國(guó)的石油進(jìn)口，使中國(guó)市場(chǎng)財(cái)政不合理的收購(gòu)和出售虧損，全球石油市場(chǎng)的流動(dòng)性會(huì)相應(yīng)減少。</p><p>　　權(quán)益油的方法玷污了中國(guó)在海外的形象，損害任何分離中國(guó)的主要石油企業(yè)與政府的幻想。例如，美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)對(duì)中國(guó)海洋石油公司收購(gòu)優(yōu)尼科的一片嘩然出現(xiàn)主要是由于中國(guó)政府對(duì)中海油的控制。中國(guó)還從事戰(zhàn)

38、略雙邊消費(fèi)者和生產(chǎn)者的關(guān)系，提供政治住宿，希望確保獲得石油。在西方與伊朗和蘇丹，特別是中國(guó)的伙伴關(guān)系提出了梳理，和一些鷹派評(píng)論員甚至警告中國(guó)和中東無(wú)賴(lài)國(guó)家之間的關(guān)系以及潛在的有關(guān)武器的石油。</p><p>　　隨著名義上創(chuàng)新高的石油價(jià)格與全球性的焦點(diǎn)都對(duì)準(zhǔn)了中國(guó)的石油需求，中國(guó)石油儲(chǔ)存量的發(fā)展是不能犯一點(diǎn)錯(cuò)誤的。目前，在中國(guó)的狀態(tài)是支持日本的模式，盡管日本計(jì)劃改革其系統(tǒng)，但是模仿日本的系統(tǒng)將是一個(gè)錯(cuò)誤。中國(guó)將會(huì)

39、發(fā)展得更好如果能發(fā)展一個(gè)適合中國(guó)獨(dú)特的經(jīng)濟(jì)，政治和戰(zhàn)略條件的靈活的系統(tǒng)。</p><p>　　本文沒(méi)有發(fā)現(xiàn)中國(guó)的儲(chǔ)備計(jì)劃的第一階段的任何問(wèn)題。 進(jìn)口碼頭和煉油廠附近存放百萬(wàn)桶，將成為中國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略儲(chǔ)備的基礎(chǔ)。然而，用國(guó)內(nèi)成品油填補(bǔ)這些坦克沒(méi)有意義。除非國(guó)內(nèi)嚴(yán)峻的石油配給，任何國(guó)內(nèi)成品油用于填補(bǔ)萬(wàn)桶將需要通過(guò)進(jìn)口替代，最終全球石油市場(chǎng)上有相同的效果。此外，中國(guó)儲(chǔ)存石油以取代進(jìn)口以防供應(yīng)中斷的情況。石油儲(chǔ)備應(yīng)與進(jìn)口石油相

40、同，這是為了備份。</p><p>　　中國(guó)政府和各大石油公司之間非同一般的關(guān)系可以在發(fā)展中國(guó)的石油庫(kù)存發(fā)揮優(yōu)勢(shì)。美國(guó)和國(guó)際能源機(jī)構(gòu)的反對(duì)是因?yàn)樗麄儞?dān)心，在緊急情況下，利潤(rùn)最大化的企業(yè)為保護(hù)國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)利益的私人戰(zhàn)略儲(chǔ)備可能無(wú)法分享他們政府的利益。</p><p>　　創(chuàng)新，合作的措施比比皆是，可以為中國(guó)節(jié)省成本，但最終，中國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略儲(chǔ)備制度的未來(lái)取決于有關(guān)中國(guó)決策者的心態(tài)。保守，安全為基礎(chǔ)的思

41、想，對(duì)于政府來(lái)說(shuō)將導(dǎo)致更大的成本，更對(duì)世界石油市場(chǎng)的壓力以及中國(guó)在海外的形象有消極后果。一個(gè)更加開(kāi)放的態(tài)度，將有利于高效的儲(chǔ)備和相對(duì)低廉的完成。</p><p>　　The People’s Republic of China’s Development of Strategic Petroleum Stockpiles</p><p>　　By Daniel Nieh</p>

42、<p>　　University of Pennsylvania</p><p>　　Today, few issues loom larger in the realm of international relations than the competition for the world’s dwindling supply of oil. At the same time, the Peop

43、le’s Republic of China’s transition from third world economy to global superpower constitutes the greatest challenge to the post-Cold War world order. If America’s rise to global hegemonic power was the story of the 20th

44、 century, China’s similar emergence may be the story of the 21st. So it is not surprising that China’s energy security—the</p><p>　　China’s role in the global oil market has only recently become a subject of

45、 international concern. China’s economic reform began in 1978, but not until the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 did Western apprehension of China’s rise begin to approach today’s fervent pitch. C

46、hina’s oil consumption passed Japan’s in2002; today, only the United States consumes more oil than the PRC. Then, in 2004, China’s oil imports increased by an unprecedented 49 percent, contributing to a 33</p><

47、;p>　　The Chinese oil debate centers on a tug of war between two different outlooks within the realm of international political economy: economic liberalism and economic nationalism. The former emphasizes the utility o

48、f international trade in increasing general welfare through the exploitation of comparative advantages. It is the worldview of free market capitalism. The latter posits trade in the context of the maximization of nationa

49、l power, emphasizing self-sufficiency and relative rather than absol</p><p>　　In the past decade, China has pursued a neo-mercantilist oil security policy often called “equity oil.” Rather than purchase oil

50、through the conventional avenues of international exchange, the PRC has instead guided its state-owned oil companies to purchase oil equity abroad, generally in the form of shared exploration and production rights. The c

51、onsensus among industry experts is that China overpays for these acquisitions in exchange for a perceived greater oil supply security. </p><p>　　Indeed, the equity oil approach relies heavily on the notion t

52、hat as global oil supplies</p><p>　　tighten, Chinese stakes in oil projects abroad will ensure a steady supply. This demonstrates a Chinese lack of faith in the economic liberalist view of the oil market, in

53、 which the sole criterion of oil access is the capacity to buy it. In many ways, these approaches act as self-fulfilling prophecies; if the Chinese government requires Chinese oil importers to make financially unjustifia

54、ble acquisitions and sell to the Chinese market at a loss, the liquidity of the global oil market will corres</p><p>　　The equity oil approach has tarnished China’s image abroad, damaging any illusion of sep

55、aration between the government and China’s major oil companies. For example, the US Congress’s uproar over the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company’s bid for Unocal arose mainly due to the Chinese government’s control o

56、ver CNOOC. China has also engaged in strategic bilateral consumer-producer relationships, offering political accommodations in hopes of securing access to oil. China’s partnerships with Iran a</p><p>　　With

57、nominal oil prices at unprecedented highs, and with a global spotlight trained on China’s oil demand, there is little room for error in the PRC’s development of oil stockpiles. At the moment, sentiment in China favors th

58、e Japanese model, even as Japan plans to reform its system.26 Imitating the Japanese system would be a mistake. China would be better off developing a flexible system suited to the unique economic, political and strategi

59、c conditions in the PRC.</p><p>　　This paper finds no problem with the first phase of China’s stockpiling plan. The 100million barrels stowed near import terminals and refineries will form the foundation of

60、China’s strategic reserve. However, filling these tanks with domestic oil does not make sense. Barring draconian domestic oil rationing, any domestic oil used to fill the barrels would require replacement by import, ulti

61、mately having the same effect on the global oil market. Furthermore,China is stockpiling oil to replace imp</p><p>　　The unusual relationship between China’s government and its major oil companies could play

62、 to China’s advantage in developing oil stockpiles. The US and IEA oppose private strategic reserves because they fear that, in an emergency scenario, profit-maximizing companies may not share their government’s interest