外文翻譯--中國(guó)與多邊貿(mào)易體制

1、<p>　　1877單詞，2050漢字</p><p><b>　　外文翻譯 </b></p><p><b>　　原文 </b></p><p>　　China and the Multilateral Trading System</p><p>　　Material Sou

2、rce: NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH</p><p>　　Author: Robert Z. Lawrence</p><p>　　For more than two decades, China’s rapid growth has been driven by its global economic engagement. Since it

3、s accession to the WTO in 2001, foreign trade and foreign direct investment have made even more important contributions to Chinese growth. Between 2001 and 2005, for example, the dollar value of Chinese exports and impor

4、ts increased at annual rates of 29.3 and 25.3 percent respectively and in 2005, 58 percent of Chinese exports originated from foreign owned firm. As a result of this perform</p><p>　　Given its size, the pace

5、 of its expansion, and its outward orientation, China is likely to have a growing impact on the global trading system and its policies are likely to have an important influence on the system’s evolution. These policies h

6、ave been as dynamic as its trade and investment performance. In 2001 after fourteen years of negotiations, China became a full member of the WTO, assuming obligations that are at the level of many developed economies. Si

7、nce that time it has participated ac</p><p>　　What do these policies portend? When China proposed joining the WTO several concerns were raised. One was that the system as a whole could be weakened because Ch

8、ina was not a fully market driven economy and was therefore unlikely or unable to adhere to the WTO rules. China then acceded to the WTO under very demanding terms and there were fears that either deliberately or inadver

9、tently it would not implement these commitments. </p><p>　　A second concern was that China would not participate constructively in the WTO. It would throw its weight around, try quickly to obtain disproporti

10、onate influence and use its influence to fundamentally change the WTO system. China was also seen as a potentially powerful addition to the ranks of developing countries, and many in the developed world worried that it w

11、ould seek to limit the obligations required of developing countries. </p><p>　　More recently a third set of questions is being raised with respect to China’s trade policies in the East Asian region. Would Ch

12、inese regional initiatives undermine the multilateral trading order? Is China seeking to establish an East Asian trading bloc under its leadership that discriminates against outsiders? Will it use its market to create a

13、hub and spoke system in East Asia in which China gains serves as the hub and the other countries are the spokes? Finally there is the fear that not only</p><p>　　Like almost every other WTO member, China has

14、 not confined its trade policy to the WTO. Instead, it has both embraced and stimulated the current global trend towards Free Trade Agreements. China has concluded several agreements and is in the process of negotiating

15、many more. In 2001, it began talks with ASEAN that resulted in an agreement to eliminate tariffs and continue with a view to obtaining agreements with respect to investment and services. It 2003 an agreement in agricultu

16、re was conclude</p><p>　　Asean. In 2002 a framework agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation was signed with ASEAN to serve as guide for achieving an FTA that covers goods services and investment. The

17、 goal is to have an FTA in place by 2010 among the more advanced of these countries. The newer ASEAN members Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia will have until 2015 to comply. An early harvest program reduced or elimina

18、ted tariffs in about 10 percent of lines by 2006. Most other tariffs are to be eliminated on betwe</p><p>　　Hong Kong and Macao. The Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement CEPA Agreement signed by China and

19、 Hong Kong was the first completed FTA agreement signed by both parties. Its stated purpose is “to strengthen trade and investment cooperation by liberalizing tariff and non-tariff barriers on substantially all trade, li

20、beralizing services and promoting trade and investment facilitation.” CEPA Pre- amble The Agreement signed with Macao follows a very similar template. </p><p>　　Since Hong Kong did not apply tariffs on Chine

21、se goods, for China this agreement clearly was not about eliminating tariffs on its exports. It was given greater security from anti-dumping and countervailing actions. However there are additional advantages. First, it

22、signaled the special status of Hong Kong, second it gains relief from the discriminatory treatment in the WTO agreement. Third, it clearly used the agreement to signal government support for mainland financial institutio

23、ns in Hong Kon</p><p>　　Chile. In 2005 China and Chile concluded an FTA The two countries took less than a year to negotiate the accord, which immediately eliminates tariffs on 92% of Chile's exports to

24、China and 50% of the products that China sends to Chile. The pact does not cover services. In 10 years after the start of the tariff concession process, the import tariff of 97% of the tariff lines of both sides will be

25、zero. Furthermore, the Agreement provides that the two Parties may accelerate the tariff concession u</p><p>　　New Zealand hopes to become the first developed country to sign an FTA with China. It has alread

26、y become the first developed economy to grant it market economy status. The FTA talks have gone on for several years. The New Zealand government, which was criticized for signing an agreement with Thailand that failed to

27、 include services, is insistent that the deal should be comprehensive and in addition to covering covers goods, services and investment, include provisions for rules of origin, trade r</p><p>　　Australia. Ch

28、ina is also involved in FTA talks with Australia. Again the memorandum of understanding that launched the talks granted China market economy status. The Australian Government has also made clear that it is seeking a comp

29、rehensive agreement that applies to “substantially” all goods, trade in services “as well as other non-tariff issues such as the recognition of standards, customs cooperation, protection of intellectual property rights a

30、nd regulation of foreign investment.” Australia</p><p>　　The fact that China is willing to conclude FTAs with these two developed countries that are highly competitive agricultural producers is very signific

31、ant since it indicates a willingness to contemplate major adjustments in agriculture while also indicating these countries willingness to contemplate free trade in labor-intensive manufacturing. </p><p>　　Ot

32、hers. China has also launched talks with India and Pakistan. New Delhi does not quite share the enthusiasm for a conventional FTA although it is willing to talk about cooperation. But Pakistan and China have signed a fra

33、mework agreement, implemented an early harvest and Pakistan has provided China with the requisite market economy status. China is also discussing FTAs with many other potential partners in Latin America Brazil, Peru, Sou

34、th Africa, the Gulf GCC, Iceland, Asia Korea and with regi</p><p>　　Implications </p><p>　　China has numerous goals in signing these agreements. One immediate concern is to use them to obtain ma

35、rket status recognition and relief from being subject to special safeguards. -- Ironically China is using these discriminatory agreements as a way to remove the discrimination to which it has been subjected at the WTO. A

36、 second motive is to secure access to important raw materials? many of the countries are major suppliers of minerals Chile-copper, Australia -- iron-ore and uranium, and GCC?oil</p><p>　　China is well aware

37、of concerns that it is trying to dominate East Asia and/or close it to outsiders, and it has gone to great pains to allay such fears. It is particularly reluctant to appear domineering in its interactions with Asean and

38、it prefers that ASEAN take the leading role in the bilateral relationship. China also does not want to be seen as building a fortress Asia. </p><p><b>　　譯文 </b></p><p><b>

39、　　中國(guó)與多邊貿(mào)易體制</b></p><p>　　資料來源: 國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)研究局作者:羅伯特 Z. 勞倫斯</p><p>　　在過去的二十多年里,中國(guó)的快速發(fā)展與經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化密切相關(guān)。自從2001年中國(guó)加入世貿(mào)組織,國(guó)外貿(mào)易和國(guó)外直接投資對(duì)中國(guó)的發(fā)展作出了重大貢獻(xiàn)。例如在2001年到2005年間,中國(guó)進(jìn)出口的美元匯率每年分別增長(zhǎng)了29.3%和25.3%,在2005年,中國(guó)58%的

40、出口產(chǎn)品由國(guó)外的公司發(fā)明。正因如此,中國(guó)的市場(chǎng)占有率從在世界進(jìn)口中從2001年的3.3%增長(zhǎng)到2004年的5.9%,與此同時(shí),中國(guó)在世界出口的市場(chǎng)占有率也從2001年的3.9%增長(zhǎng)到了2004年的6.5%。這一結(jié)果使中國(guó)超越了日本并成為了世界貿(mào)易中的主要成員國(guó)及東亞的主導(dǎo)貿(mào)易國(guó),中國(guó)作為勞動(dòng)密集型制成品及零部件的較大出口國(guó),其生產(chǎn)的織布機(jī)因體積特別大而享譽(yù)中外并成為主要出口國(guó),同時(shí)也成為了資本貨物、初級(jí)產(chǎn)品和半成品的主要進(jìn)口國(guó)。此外,中

41、國(guó)也是第三世界中外商直接投資的最大接受方。 </p><p>　　鑒于其規(guī)模的擴(kuò)大,擴(kuò)張步伐的加快,與外向型的發(fā)展,中國(guó)極有可能對(duì)全球貿(mào)易體系的影響日益增強(qiáng),中國(guó)的政策可能對(duì)貿(mào)易體制的發(fā)展產(chǎn)生重大影響。這些政策就如同其貿(mào)易和外商直接投資一樣呈現(xiàn)動(dòng)態(tài)發(fā)展。在2001年,經(jīng)過長(zhǎng)達(dá)14年的談判協(xié)商后,中國(guó)正式成為世貿(mào)組織的成員國(guó),同時(shí)也承擔(dān)了很多發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)水平才能承擔(dān)的義務(wù)。自加入世貿(mào)組織以來,中國(guó)積極參與各機(jī)構(gòu)部門

42、的活動(dòng)和談判協(xié)商。為了滿足其加入世貿(mào)組織的條件,中國(guó)大幅開放國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì),推出眾多國(guó)內(nèi)政策使其過渡到市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的過程得以鞏固。此外,中國(guó)采取了多軌貿(mào)易政策戰(zhàn)略,使世貿(mào)組織、國(guó)內(nèi)自由化政策與區(qū)域貿(mào)易的主動(dòng)性精神相結(jié)合。到2005年,中國(guó)已完成四個(gè)自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定(2003年泰國(guó),2004年香港和澳門,2005年智利),正如黃和Hufbauer推測(cè):未來至少還有15個(gè)國(guó)家或地區(qū)提議和(或)啟動(dòng)談判。 </p><p>　　這些

43、政策預(yù)示著什么?當(dāng)中國(guó)提出加入世貿(mào)組織,眾多的擔(dān)憂也隨之而來。其中一個(gè)擔(dān)憂就是整個(gè)體制可能會(huì)被削弱,因?yàn)橹袊?guó)并不完全是一個(gè)市場(chǎng)導(dǎo)向型經(jīng)濟(jì),因此不可能或無法遵守世貿(mào)組織規(guī)則。隨后,中國(guó)在極其苛刻的條件下加入了世貿(mào)組織,很多人擔(dān)心中國(guó)會(huì)有意無意的違背其承諾。 </p><p>　　第二個(gè)擔(dān)憂就是中國(guó)會(huì)不參加世貿(mào)組織建設(shè)。這將會(huì)對(duì)整個(gè)世貿(mào)組織產(chǎn)生影響,試圖迅速獲得一定程度的影響力并利用其影響力從根本上改變世貿(mào)組織體系。

44、同時(shí),中國(guó)在發(fā)展中國(guó)家中被視為一個(gè)潛在強(qiáng)國(guó),很多發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家擔(dān)心這會(huì)限制發(fā)展中國(guó)家在世貿(mào)組織的義務(wù)。 </p><p>　　最近第三套關(guān)于中國(guó)在東亞地區(qū)的貿(mào)易政策問題被一連串地提出。中國(guó)的區(qū)域行為是否會(huì)破壞多邊貿(mào)易秩序?中國(guó)是否正在尋求一個(gè)在其領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下建立東亞貿(mào)易集團(tuán)的機(jī)會(huì),從而排斥外來國(guó)?中國(guó)是否會(huì)利用其市場(chǎng)在東亞創(chuàng)造一個(gè)樞紐和講話平臺(tái)來充當(dāng)核心國(guó)家,而其他國(guó)家則成為配襯?此外,包括中國(guó)在內(nèi)的該區(qū)域的所有國(guó)家都擔(dān)心這

45、樣是否會(huì)創(chuàng)造一個(gè)重疊的貿(mào)易制度體系,這可能會(huì)增加不必要的交易成本,導(dǎo)致有害貿(mào)易,這實(shí)際上是分裂區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)而不是整合區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)。 </p><p>　　正如世貿(mào)組織的其他成員國(guó),中國(guó)已不僅限于世貿(mào)組織貿(mào)易政策,相反,它推動(dòng)和刺激了當(dāng)前全球走向自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定的趨勢(shì)。近幾年中國(guó)已簽訂了多項(xiàng)協(xié)議,在談判中將會(huì)締結(jié)更多的協(xié)議。2001年,中國(guó)開始與東盟會(huì)談,最終達(dá)成消除關(guān)稅的協(xié)定,并簽訂了有關(guān)投資與服務(wù)的協(xié)定。在2003年就農(nóng)業(yè)

46、方面與泰國(guó)達(dá)成協(xié)議,2004年香港及澳門與內(nèi)地簽署協(xié)議。2005年與智利簽署協(xié)議,目前與澳大利亞、新西蘭、巴基斯坦、南非關(guān)稅同盟和臺(tái)灣合作委員會(huì)就自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定談判正在進(jìn)行中。另外與巴西、冰島、印度、日本及韓國(guó)的協(xié)定正在商討中。 </p><p>　　東盟。2002年,為了實(shí)現(xiàn)貨物服務(wù)和投資的自由貿(mào)易,與東盟簽署一個(gè)有關(guān)綜合經(jīng)濟(jì)合作框架性協(xié)議。其目標(biāo)是到2010年這些較先進(jìn)的國(guó)家能夠逐步實(shí)現(xiàn)自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定。這些東盟新

47、成員(越南、老撾、緬甸和柬埔寨)都會(huì)遵守該協(xié)定直至2015年。早期收獲計(jì)劃到2006年消除或減少10%的關(guān)稅。更多的關(guān)稅將在2005年到2010年逐步消除,到那個(gè)時(shí)候90%的稅種將會(huì)被包含在內(nèi)。而其余的10%的稅目被視為敏感稅目,并會(huì)被逐漸消除。目前還有服務(wù)與投資方面的談判正在進(jìn)行,以期望東盟可以從中國(guó)的入世承諾中得到好處,從而其加快服務(wù)貿(mào)易自由化發(fā)展。 </p><p>　　香港和澳門。中國(guó)與香港簽訂《內(nèi)地與香

48、港關(guān)于建立更緊密經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系安排》,這一協(xié)定是雙方簽訂的第一個(gè)自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定。其既定目標(biāo)是“通過實(shí)質(zhì)的貿(mào)易關(guān)稅自由化和非關(guān)稅貿(mào)易壁壘來加強(qiáng)貿(mào)易和投資合作,促進(jìn)貿(mào)易發(fā)展和投資便利化?！?《內(nèi)地與香港關(guān)于建立更緊密經(jīng)貿(mào)關(guān)系安排》序言)與澳門簽署的協(xié)議遵循著非常相似的模式。 </p><p>　　由于香港對(duì)于中國(guó)商品的關(guān)稅并不適用,對(duì)于中國(guó)這個(gè)協(xié)議顯然不是在于消除其出口產(chǎn)品的關(guān)稅,而是為了反傾銷和反補(bǔ)貼更為安全。但是這個(gè)協(xié)議

49、有額外的好處。首先,這標(biāo)志著香港的特殊地位,第二,它在世貿(mào)組織協(xié)議中的歧視性待遇得以緩解。第三,通過該協(xié)議明確了政府支持在香港的內(nèi)地金融機(jī)構(gòu)。此外,它還提供了香港第一家外資占優(yōu)勢(shì)的服務(wù)公司。它同時(shí)也間接為香港和臺(tái)灣提供了優(yōu)勢(shì)。 </p><p>　　智利。2005年,中國(guó)和智利經(jīng)過不到一年的談判,成功簽訂了自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定,該事件立即消除了智利出口到中國(guó)的92%出口關(guān)稅,中國(guó)向智利出口的產(chǎn)品占50%。該協(xié)定不包括服務(wù)