外文翻譯---在孟加拉國的農(nóng)村地區(qū)存在有商業(yè)價值的農(nóng)作物保險嗎

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯</p><p>　　外文題目：Is there a commercially viable market for crop insurance in rural Bangladesh? </p><p>　　出 處： Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Change (2009) 14:215–229 </p&g

2、t;<p>　　作 者： Sonia Akter, Roy Brouwer, Saria Choudhury, Salina Aziz </p><p><b>　　原 文</b></p><p>　　Is there a commercially via

3、ble market for crop insurance in rural Bangladesh?</p><p>　　Abstract：The study aims to assess the commercial viability of a potential crop insurance market in Bangladesh. In a large scale household survey, a

4、gricultural farm households were asked for their preferences for a hypothetical crop insurance scheme using double bounded(DB) contingent valuation (CV) method. Both revenue and production cost based indemnity payment ap

5、proaches were applied to assess the commercial viability of a crop insurance program assuming a partner-agent (PA) model of insurance</p><p>　　Key words: Crop insurance; Commercial viability; Willingness to

6、pay; Double bounded contingent valuation ; Bangladesh</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　Agriculture contributes one quarter of the Bangladesh GDP and is the source of employment for more than 80% o

7、f the rural population. Weather related risk is a major source of income fluctuations for agricultural households in Bangladesh. Both coastal as well as inland farm households face natural disaster risks due to its geogr

8、aphical location and very low land elevation. The increased volume of rainfall and other catastrophic events caused by climate change during the past decades have intensif</p><p>　　Whilst the use of micro-in

9、surance to cover life and health risks is prevalent to some extent, the use of micro-insurance to hedge against natural disaster losses in rural areas of Bangladesh is still only emerging. The National Adaptation Program

10、 of Action (NAPA 2005), prepared by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, suggests exploring options for spreading natural disaster risks by investigating the potential of crop insurance markets so that agricultural f

11、armers are better prepared to cope</p><p>　　The aim of the study presented here is to assess the financial viability of a potential crop insurance market in Bangladesh, one of the poorest and most disaster p

12、rone countries in the world. In a large scale household survey carried out at the end of 2006, 3600 riverine and coastal floodplain residents in Bangladesh were asked for their preferences for crop insurance schemes usin

13、g the double bounded (DB) contingent valuation (CV) method, i.e. asking them for their willingness to pay (WTP) for c</p><p>　　Analytical framework</p><p>　　The analytical framework of this stud

14、y is based on a simple model used by Hazell . According to Hazell , the premium collected on an insurance scheme must exceed average payouts in order to ensure the viability of the insurance contract, where average payou

15、t is modeled by summing up both administrative costs per insurance contract and indemnities. The term ‘indemnity’ refers to the compensation sum that insurers make to the holder of the insurance contract upon post assess

16、ment of damage due to a</p><p>　　Ii =Di If Disaster event strikes</p><p>　　Ii =0 If Disaster event does not strike</p><p>　　where, insurer</p><p>　　Di damage incur

17、red by the insured</p><p>　　Ii indemnity paid by the</p><p>　　Therefore, the condition for a viable and sustainable insurance contract takes the following form (Hazell 1992):</p><p&

18、gt;<b>　　(A+I)/P<1</b></p><p><b>　　where</b></p><p>　　A average administrative costs per insurance contract</p><p>　　I average indemnities paid</p>

19、;<p>　　P average premiums received</p><p>　　Hazell (1992) uses time series data over the period 1975–1989 for seven countries to test the long-term viability and sustainability of crop insurance prog

20、rams. In view of the fact that an insurance market currently does not exist in Bangladesh, Hazell’s model was estimated using expected values. Expected indemnity payment for crop insurance was proxied by average crop dam

21、age costs incurred by households in a disaster event prior to the survey year. Expected premium per contract for crop insuran</p><p>　　WTP =1 Rejecting both the start bid (ci) and follow--up bid (bi)</p&g

22、t;<p>　　WTP =2 Rejecting the start bid (ci) and accepting the follow --up bid (bi)</p><p>　　WTP =3Accepting the start bid (ci) and rejecting the follow --up bid (di)</p><p>　　WTP =4Accept

23、ing both the start bid (ci) and follow --up bid (di)</p><p>　　The average WTP for crop insurance was estimated using standard statistical software. The estimated average WTP values were used to calculate fut

24、ure values of expected insurance premiums receivable by the insurers using the following formula:</p><p>　　Pe=WTP*[(1+r)n-1]/r</p><p><b>　　where</b></p><p>　　Pe futur

25、e value of insurance premium (per insurance contract)</p><p>　　r interest rate</p><p>　　n number of payments</p><p>　　WTP estimated average willingness to pay for crop insu

26、rance</p><p>　　A partner-agent (PA) model of institutional framework was assumed for insurance supply. In a PA model, insurance companies and micro-credit providers collaborate to jointly offer the insurance

27、 schemes. Generally, insurance companies bear the full risk, while micro-credit providers carry out most of the field level operational and administrative work through their established extensive client network. Administ

28、rative cost of offering, distributing and maintaining insurance contracts under such a m</p><p>　　Summary and conclusion</p><p>　　The aim of the study presented here was to assess the commercial

29、 viability of a hypothetical crop insurance market in rural areas facing four different types of natural disaster risks. Three thousand six hundred residents were asked about the nature and extent of damage costs incurre

30、d due to catastrophic events and their WTP to reduce damage risks using the DB CV method. We find around half of the sample households was willing to buy an insurance in principle which indeed indicates low demand fo<

31、/p><p>　　Our study reveals that crop insurance demand varies across household head’s primary occupation, land ownership and size of the farm land. We find that it was mainly agricultural farmers who owned large

32、 parcels of farm land were willing to buy crop insurance to protect themselves against the risks of catastrophic damage. Our study further reveals that crop damage cost and household WTP to reduce crop damage vary signif

33、icantly across the nature of the disaster risks. Households who suffered from t</p><p>　　On the basis of the crop damage cost data obtained from the household survey, we calculate expected average indemnity

34、payment by the potential insurance providers on the basis of two different indemnity payout principles, namely forgone revenue income and production cost. Using average crop damage cost incurred by farm households in dif

35、ferent risk areas, we tested our simple analytical model of commercial viability by comparing the future value of the expected premium receivable by the insurer w</p><p>　　Three important policy implications

36、 follow from the results presented in this study. First, the findings of the study suggest that a uniform structure of crop insurance market does not exist in Bangladesh. Crop damage varies depending on the nature of cat

37、astrophe risks and WTP varies depending on the socio-economic characteristics of rural communities living in different risk areas. Hence, crop insurance scheme needs to be developed carefully by taking these two key crit

38、erions into consideration</p><p>　　However, it is important to note that the financial viability results that we portrayed in this study ignore administrative implementation costs of insurance contract. Esse

39、ntially, a positive and considerably high administrative cost may result in the crop insurance scheme being impractical, even in riverine floodplain areas.</p><p>　　We used this study to set out a methodolog

40、y for testing commercial viability of a potential micro-insurance market at the preliminary stage of policy implementation. We propose, through the testing of our own case study, that such an analytical model could be us

41、eful for policy makers and development practitioners to tailor the insurance product for target clients and to roughly estimate the amount of subsidy that the public provision of such a disaster risk mitigating scheme ma

42、y require at the v</p><p><b>　　譯 文</b></p><p>　　在孟加拉國的農(nóng)村地區(qū)存在有商業(yè)價值的農(nóng)作物保險嗎?</p><p>　　摘要：文章的目的是為評估農(nóng)作物保險在孟加拉等國的潛在的商業(yè)可行性服務(wù)市場。保險計劃假設(shè)一個PA的模式供應(yīng)保險。作物保險在河流泛濫的平原地區(qū)發(fā)現(xiàn)商業(yè)價值。這預(yù)期持續(xù)超出在

43、濕地盆地和沿海平原的預(yù)期賠償支付保險費。認為在孟加拉等國不存在一個統(tǒng)一結(jié)構(gòu)的農(nóng)作物保險市場。面臨災(zāi)難和風(fēng)險的農(nóng)戶和社會需要一個考慮到這些因為的保險方案。</p><p>　　關(guān)鍵詞：農(nóng)作物保險；商業(yè)價值；購買意愿；雙界評估；孟加拉國</p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p>　　農(nóng)業(yè)為孟加拉國貢獻四分之一的國民生產(chǎn)總值（GDP）

44、，超過80%的農(nóng)村人口是孟加拉國的就業(yè)來源。天氣的波動風(fēng)險對于孟加拉等國的農(nóng)村地區(qū)來說是是一個主要收入來源。內(nèi)陸河沿海地區(qū)的農(nóng)戶都要面對由于特殊的地理環(huán)境和極低的土地的水平造成的自然災(zāi)害風(fēng)險。在過去的幾十年里，氣候變化導(dǎo)致降水量增加和其他災(zāi)難性的事件發(fā)生是農(nóng)民所要面臨的風(fēng)險，這成為了這個世界的一部分。在過去的幾十年里，在孟加拉國防范增加農(nóng)作物生產(chǎn)的內(nèi)在和相關(guān)的數(shù)額的風(fēng)險已經(jīng)成為減少貧困的主要程序。傳統(tǒng)上,在孟加拉農(nóng)業(yè)災(zāi)害風(fēng)險管理圍繞著基

45、礎(chǔ)措施，如堤防建設(shè)和事后救災(zāi)措施，包括增加的災(zāi)后的信貸設(shè)施等。證明的孟加拉國最成功的是小額保險，它保護農(nóng)村農(nóng)民避免收入沖擊造成的災(zāi)難性風(fēng)險，所以越來越多的人對小額保險持樂觀的態(tài)度。提出災(zāi)難的小額保險的目的是為窮苦的人們分散自然災(zāi)害風(fēng)險，為了使他們對與更大的氣候災(zāi)害做好準備，比如洪水、颶風(fēng)和暴浪。</p><p>　　而在某種程度上，使用小額保險來規(guī)避的生活與健康風(fēng)險是普遍的，在孟加拉的農(nóng)村地區(qū)使用小額保險來對沖自

46、然災(zāi)害損失只是剛剛浮出水面。由森林和環(huán)境保護局制定的《國家適應(yīng)行動綱領(lǐng)》(NAPA 2005),建議通過調(diào)查的潛在農(nóng)作物保險市場，選擇推廣自然災(zāi)害風(fēng)險，能使農(nóng)民們更好地做好準備應(yīng)付日益增加的莊稼損失的風(fēng)險。由商務(wù)部和環(huán)境保護局研究，在孟加拉等國目前還在對農(nóng)作物保險的可行性進行研究。</p><p>　　盡管小額保險常被視為一種減少有效的工具，共享和傳播與氣候有關(guān)的風(fēng)險和成本。保險方案的商業(yè)可行性，對于窮人發(fā)展經(jīng)濟

47、來說是最重要的。對于整個社會來說，對受影響的進行損失的轉(zhuǎn)移不可能在一個比較合理的保險費率。雖然對于達成這樣的方案任何結(jié)論來說，經(jīng)驗和可利用的信息太局限，總的來說，在全世界，基于商業(yè)標準，農(nóng)作物保險一直不是很成功的。特別是在那些由于自然災(zāi)害不斷發(fā)生損失，擁有最貧困人群的發(fā)展中國家，為了支付管理成本，投保災(zāi)難保險計劃，根本沒有獲得足夠的保費收入。</p><p>　　本文研究的主要目的是對孟加拉等國，世界上最貧困，災(zāi)

48、難最容易發(fā)生的地區(qū)的潛在的農(nóng)作物保險市場進行財務(wù)的可行性評估。在2006年末，開展對大型的家庭支出調(diào)查。在孟加拉等國，3600沿海居民被要求對自己喜好的農(nóng)作物保險計劃進行調(diào)查。使用雙界（DB）和或有評估（CV）方法，問他們?yōu)橄磥頌?zāi)害風(fēng)險，對作物的保險計劃的支付意愿（WTP）。盡管現(xiàn)在估計農(nóng)作物保險需求時應(yīng)用或有評估已相當廣泛。這樣一個廣泛的、明確的可行性試驗，在有嚴重自然災(zāi)害發(fā)展中國家一個潛在的農(nóng)作物保險市場是十分缺乏的。之前的研究

49、主要集中在平均支付意愿和對作物保險需求影響最大的因素的確定。目前的研究超越了平均支付意愿，使用獲得的數(shù)據(jù)進行了廣泛的雙界（DB）和或有評估（CV）調(diào)查，Hazell建立了對商業(yè)可行性探析的一個長期可持續(xù)的簡單的解析試驗?zāi)Ｐ?。雖然有許多有關(guān)保險精算相關(guān)的問題，也為設(shè)計提供了一攬子保險，他們的研究超出了范圍。我們主要的興趣是從各個不同環(huán)境風(fēng)險和社會經(jīng)濟的特性來測試分散在不同區(qū)域的基于基本成本回收標準的未來農(nóng)業(yè)保險市場的潛力。</p&g

50、t;<p><b>　　分析框架</b></p><p>　　這個研究的分析框架是基于Hazell用的一個簡單的模型。根據(jù)Hazell的理論，為了保證保險合同的可行性，保險費收取必須是保險計劃超過平均支付，平均支付是一個既定的模型，通過總結(jié)行政每個保險合同和賠償?shù)某杀?。這里的“賠償”條款是指賠償金額，保險公司在保險事故發(fā)生后評估損失。我們?yōu)橐粋€特定的保險計劃假設(shè)了簡單的線性補償

51、支付功能，用以下的形式：</p><p>　　如果災(zāi)難停止，Ii =Di</p><p>　　如果災(zāi)難事件沒有停止，Ii =0</p><p><b>　　其中：</b></p><p>　　Ii代表保險人賠償；</p><p>　　Di代表費用由被保險人承擔。</p><p&

52、gt;　　因此，訂立一個可行和可持續(xù)保險合同的條件需要滿足下列條件：</p><p><b>　　(A+I)/P<1</b></p><p><b>　　其中：</b></p><p>　　A代表每個保險合同的平均行政成本；</p><p>　　I代表平均支付賠償；</p>&l

53、t;p>　　P代表平均收到的保險費。</p><p>　　Hazell使用時間序列數(shù)據(jù)，在1975-1989年這段時間里為7個國家測試了農(nóng)作物保險項目的長期生存能力和可持續(xù)發(fā)展能力。事實證明保險市場目前不存在于孟加拉等國。Hazell的模型用于估計期望價值。農(nóng)作物保險的預(yù)期支付賠償由會計計算家庭所遭受的災(zāi)難事件后的平均作物災(zāi)害損失。農(nóng)作物保險的預(yù)期支付賠償是從或有評估調(diào)查到雙界評估的啟發(fā)式方法在數(shù)據(jù)的基礎(chǔ)上

54、進行估計的。用這種評估方法，受訪者被問了兩個支付意愿的問題：你接受一個初始價格ci嗎？你接受一個后續(xù)價格bi嗎？基于這兩個問題，可以建立四個關(guān)于支付意愿的可能情況，即：</p><p>　　WTP =1 拒絕起始價ci和后續(xù)價格bi；</p><p>　　WTP =2 拒絕起始價ci和接受后續(xù)價格bi；</p><p>　　WTP =3 拒絕起始價ci和接受后續(xù)價格

55、di；</p><p>　　WTP =4 拒絕起始價ci和后續(xù)價格di。</p><p>　　農(nóng)作物保險的平均支付意愿使用標準的統(tǒng)計軟件來估算。估計的平均支付意愿價值被保險公司用來計算預(yù)期應(yīng)收保險費的未來價值，使用下面的計算公式：</p><p>　　Pe=WTP*[(1+r)n-1]/r</p><p><b>　　其中：<

56、/b></p><p>　　Pe代表每個保險合同的未來價值；</p><p><b>　　r代表利息率；</b></p><p><b>　　n代表支付的數(shù)量；</b></p><p>　　WTP代表為了農(nóng)作物保險平均愿意支付的值。</p><p>　　一個合伙代理人（

57、PA）模型假定是制度框架下的保險供應(yīng)。在一個PA模型中，保險公司和小額貸款供應(yīng)商合作共同提供保險方案。一般來說，保險公司負擔全部風(fēng)險，小額貸款供應(yīng)商通過建立了廣泛的客戶網(wǎng)絡(luò)執(zhí)行大部分的現(xiàn)場操作和行政工作。在這個模型里，每個保險合同的行政成本的提供、分發(fā)和維護，會降到零或很微不足道的金額。</p><p><b>　　總結(jié)和結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　本文研究的目

58、的是面對四種類型的自然災(zāi)害風(fēng)險，評估在農(nóng)村地區(qū)一個農(nóng)作物保險市場的商業(yè)可能性。3600居民被要求對他們喜好的農(nóng)作物保險計劃進行調(diào)查。使用雙界（DB）和或有評估（CV）方法，問他們?yōu)橄磥頌?zāi)害風(fēng)險，對作物的保險計劃的支付意愿（WTP）。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)大約有一半的城鎮(zhèn)居民家庭原則上愿意買保險，這的確表明了對作物保險的需求比較低。那些大部分不愿意購買保險的居民是因為他們無法預(yù)測未來的收入或者缺少購買保險的錢。這一發(fā)現(xiàn)證實收入的限制是在發(fā)展中國家開

59、拓災(zāi)難保險市場的主要障礙。然而,一個相當大比例(33%)的受訪者，他們不愿意購買災(zāi)難保險是因為他們不喜歡提出的保險計劃這些條款和條件。這個發(fā)現(xiàn)對于為孟加拉等國的農(nóng)村人民設(shè)計一個小額保險十分重要。在某種程度上反映出：一個完全傳統(tǒng)類型的保險市場是不會深受目標客戶的喜愛的。</p><p>　　我們的研究表明：農(nóng)作物保險的需求主要是持家人的主要職業(yè)、土地所有權(quán)及農(nóng)場土地的大小有關(guān)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)主要是擁有大面積農(nóng)地的農(nóng)民原意

60、購買農(nóng)作物保險來保護自己不受災(zāi)難性損失的風(fēng)險的影響。我們的研究進一步揭示了為了防范自然災(zāi)害的風(fēng)險以減少農(nóng)作物損失的支付意愿。飽受最高的平均水平的農(nóng)作物的損失費用的家庭原意支付最低的保險費來防范作物傷害風(fēng)險。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)由于在不同的風(fēng)險的地區(qū)平均家庭收入存在的差距，導(dǎo)致了不同支付意愿的出現(xiàn)。然而，重要的是要注意，本文提出需求分析是一種主要基于觀察相關(guān)性，采用線性相關(guān)系數(shù)和非參數(shù)測試的程序。一個更廣的確定性模型將進一步測評潛在的因果關(guān)系，他們目

61、前的研究超越了權(quán)限。</p><p>　　根據(jù)家庭調(diào)查基礎(chǔ)上損失的農(nóng)作物的數(shù)據(jù)，我們根據(jù)兩種不同的賠款支付的原則計算保險公司平均預(yù)期賠償付款，即放棄了收入和生產(chǎn)成本。農(nóng)戶在不同的風(fēng)險的地區(qū)，使用平均消耗的農(nóng)作物。我們通過比較保險人預(yù)期應(yīng)收保費的未來價值測試了我們的簡單的解析模型的商業(yè)可能性。假設(shè)每年零成本和10%的利率，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)農(nóng)作物保險在河流廣布的平原地區(qū)有稍微的可行性。平均賠償支付和保險費未來價值預(yù)期之間的差

62、距太大，因而通過損失成本估算或者或賠償支付功能難以收斂。</p><p>　　在本研究結(jié)果中所得到的三個重要政策是：第一，研究的結(jié)果表明，結(jié)構(gòu)均勻的農(nóng)作物保險市場不存在于孟加拉等國。農(nóng)作物的損失取決于災(zāi)害風(fēng)險的本質(zhì)，支付意愿取決于住在不同的風(fēng)險的地區(qū)農(nóng)村的人口社會特征。因此，農(nóng)作物保險計劃需要發(fā)展，應(yīng)該把這兩個關(guān)鍵因素都考慮進去。第二，提出可行性試驗在本文論證了生活在濕地盆地和沿海地區(qū)的農(nóng)戶面臨的作物傷害風(fēng)險原則

63、上是不能擔保的。在這兩個高風(fēng)險領(lǐng)域，保險公司估計應(yīng)賠償持續(xù)超出預(yù)期的保險費賬款。估計賠償和期望之間的差異太大了，保險費需要政府補貼的資助。最后，在這個研究里，實證結(jié)果表明在確定的商業(yè)可行性農(nóng)作物保險方案中，選擇一個賠償支出起著至關(guān)重要的功能。根據(jù)可行性試驗結(jié)果可以推斷，在河流堤防和非堤防地區(qū)基于生產(chǎn)成本賠償支付功能的農(nóng)作物保險計劃值得進一步研究。</p><p>　　然而，重要的是要注意在這項研究中忽略執(zhí)行成本的