外文翻譯---企業(yè)稅收籌劃的有效性

1、<p>　　譯文一：企業(yè)稅收籌劃的有效性：基于對報酬的激勵作用（上）</p><p>　　譯文二：企業(yè)稅收籌劃的有效性：基于對報酬的激勵作用（下）</p><p>　　學生姓名 </p><p>　　學 號 </p><p>　　院

2、 系 經(jīng)濟與管理學院 </p><p>　　Corporate Tax-Planning Effectiveness: The Role of Compensation-Based Incentives (Ⅰ)</p><p>　　John D. Phillips University of Connecticut</p><p><b&

3、gt;　　ABSTRACT</b></p><p>　　This study investigates whether compensating chief executive officers and business-unit managers using after-tax accounting-based performance measures leads to lower effectiv

4、e tax rates, the empirical surrogate used for tax-planning effectiveness. Utilizing proprietary compensation data obtained in a survey of corporate executives, the relation between effective tax rates and after-tax perfo

5、rmance measures is modeled and estimated using a two-step approach that corrects for the endogeneity bias </p><p>　　KEYWORDS tax planning; performance measures; endogenous treatment effects.</p>

6、<p>　　I. INTRODUCTION</p><p>　　Effective tax planning, defined by Scholes et al. (2002) as tax planning that maximizes the firm's expected discounted after-tax cash flows, requires managers to cons

7、ider their decisions' after-tax consequences. In this paper, I investigate whether after-tax accounting-based performance measures lead to lower effective tax rates (ETR), my empirical surrogate for tax planning effe

8、ctiveness.1 The ETR, an income-statement-based outcome measure calculated as the ratio of total income tax expense to </p><p>　　Accounting research has addressed the relation between accounting-based compens

9、ation and managers' actions (e.g., Larcker 1983; Healy 1985; Wallace 1997). This paper is the first to address whether after-tax accounting-based performance measures motivate managers to take actions that help lower

10、 their firms' ETR and does so at both the chief executive officer (CEO) and business-unit (SBU) manager levels. Prior after-tax performance measure research has focused only on the determinants of compensa</p>

11、<p>　　A common issue in cross-sectional studies that attempt to link a particular management accounting choice to an outcome measure is that all sample firms may be optimizing with respect to the choice being inves

12、tigated (Ittner and Larcker 2001). Without addressing the endogeneity of a firm's choice, it is difficult to provide evidence consistent with this choice leading to an improved outcome. To address this issue, the rel

13、ation between ETR and CEO and SBU-manager after-tax performance measures is </p><p>　　Even if a manager's efforts are expected to lead to a lower ETR, a firm will use an after-tax performance measure onl

14、y if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs of doing so. An after-tax performance measure is expected to lead to a lower ETR because it motivates the manager's increased cooperation with tax professionals to

15、 help identify, develop, and execute tax-planning strategies. McLemore (1997, 1) cites Hewlett Packard's tax director to support the need for SBU-manager involvement i</p><p>　　Tax planning is only as go

16、od as being involved in the early stages of such things as business planning, strategic planning, and merger and acquisition work....Your tax department has to be represented at the table when those decisions are made. T

17、he evolving model for the future is the tight integration of tax people with business unit planning.</p><p>　　Costs associated with using after-tax performance measures include the additional wage that must

18、be paid to compensate the manager for the increased risk due to potential tax law changes and the increased effort that results from including income tax expense in the compensation contract. Other potential costs associ

19、ated with after-tax compensation include the administrative cost of allocating tax expense to a firm's SBU, increased tax examination costs, and increased tax authority scrutiny. Cont</p><p>　　Proprietar

20、y data obtained in a survey of corporate executives are used to construct certain test variables, including those indicating whether CEOs and SBU managers are compensated using after-tax accounting-based performance meas

21、ures. Publicly available data are used to construct ETR and other test variables. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that compensating SBU managers, but not CEOs, on an after-tax basis leads to lower ETR, res

22、ulting in an estimated median tax savings of $13.3</p><p>　　The results contribute to the accounting-based compensation literature by linking after- tax accounting-based performance measures to SBU-manager i

23、nvolvement that is incrementally effective in lowering firms' ETR. Consistent with Guidry et al. (1999) who document bonus-induced earnings management at the SBU level, this finding provides additional insight into t

24、he effect that SBU-manager accounting-based incentives have on managers' actions. Also, the estimated explicit tax savings resulting from</p><p>　　The paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets for

25、th the hypotheses tested in this study. Section III outlines the empirical models and estimation procedures used in testing these hypotheses. Section IV provides a discussion of the data and sample, including a brief ove

26、rview of the survey used to obtain proprietary compensation data. Results are presented in Section V. The final section provides the conclusion and a discussion of the study's limitations.</p><p>　　II. H

27、YPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT</p><p>　　Newman (1989), Cares and Guffey (2000), and Atwood et al. (1998) investigate firms' choices of after-tax earnings as the contracting variable in CEO bonus plans. These stud

28、ies hypothesize that firms with greater tax-planning opportunities, consistent with the Antle and Demski (1988) controllability principle, are more likely to use after-tax performance measures. Using proxies for tax-plan

29、ning opportunities, these studies collectively find that multinational status, number of operating segments,</p><p>　　企業(yè)稅收籌劃的有效性：基于對報酬的激勵作用（上）</p><p>　　約翰D ·菲利普斯 康涅狄格大學</p><p>

30、;<b>　　摘 要</b></p><p>　　本研究探討首席執(zhí)行官是否修正主管和業(yè)務部門經(jīng)理利用稅后會計為基礎的績效措施，導致較低的實際稅率，以報酬激勵用于稅收籌劃的有效性。企業(yè)的主管由于被激勵獲得的專有報酬的數(shù)據(jù)，運用建模和估計這兩個步驟來研究有效稅率和稅后性能指標之間的關系來更正企業(yè)的管理人員的決定，以修正相關的內生性偏置前與后的計稅基礎。結果與假設一致修正了業(yè)務部門經(jīng)理，但是沒有

31、修正主管，關于稅后導致較低的實際稅率。</p><p>　　關鍵詞 稅收計劃； 性能指標； 內源性的處理效果</p><p><b>　　引言</b></p><p>　　有效的稅收籌劃，根據(jù)斯科爾斯等人的定義（2002），稅收籌劃，即最大限度地提高公司的預期稅后凈現(xiàn)金流量，要求管理者要考慮他們的決定所造成的稅后結果。在本文中，研究是否以稅

32、后會計為基礎的績效措施，將導致較低的實際出口退稅稅率。實際的經(jīng)驗替代了出口退稅的稅務規(guī)劃效力，一個基礎的收入結果被合適的計量，所得稅費用總額作為稅前收入的一定比例，通常測量減稅策略將導致更高的稅后收入的有效性。較低的出口退稅，然而，僅能夠代理節(jié)稅以及通常并不意味稅后收入或者是現(xiàn)金流已經(jīng)達到最大值。盡管有這一局限性，出口退稅還是被用來衡量稅收功能性支出的有效性（米爾斯，1998）和企業(yè)各部門稅務績效（道格拉斯，1996）。另外，降低出口退

33、稅是經(jīng)常被作為一種增加收入（齊格勒，1997）和使股價上升的手段(e.g. Mintz 1999; Swenson 1999)。</p><p>　　會計研究處理了以會計績效為基礎的薪酬和經(jīng)理的行為之間的關系(e.g., Larcker 1983; Healy 1985; Wallace 1997)，本文是第一個從事這方面研究的文章：是否以稅后會計為基礎的績效管理措施鼓勵經(jīng)理人員采取行動來降低他們公司的出口退稅，

34、并且首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)部經(jīng)理也要求做。在此之前的稅后業(yè)績計量研究只集中于首席執(zhí)行官們的報酬的決定因素為預先的稅后收益 (e.g., Newman 1989; Carnes and Guffey 2000; Atwood et al. 1998; Dhaliwal et al. 2000)，沒有提供任何證據(jù)說明降低一個公司的稅務負擔與稅后報酬的關系。這項調查擴展到了事業(yè)部層次，這些部門的報酬激勵動機與減少稅收的目的目的之間存在明顯的沖突(e

35、.g., McLemore 1997)以及觀察的經(jīng)驗是，大多數(shù)企業(yè)沒有這樣做(e.g., Douglas et al. 1996)。目前的研究提供的證據(jù)關于明確激勵首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)部管理人員納入其經(jīng)營和投資決策的稅務結果的增量效益。</p><p>　　以某個側面來研究出口退稅與管理層薪酬的共同課題，衡量的結果是所有樣本公司可優(yōu)化關于被調查的選擇(Ittner and Larcker 2001)。如果不解決公司選

36、擇的內生性，很難提供一致的證據(jù)關于這選擇導致改善的結果。為了解決這個問題，首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)部經(jīng)理關于稅后績效與出口退稅的聯(lián)系依舊采用兩步方式估計，可以幫助對潛在的內生性與相關偏見這兩個變量做出正確的選擇。作為實施這一方法的第一步，the Antle and Demski (1988) 可控性原則是用來模擬一個公司的決定,通過對首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)部經(jīng)理稅后績效指標的衡量。要包括一個特別措施在經(jīng)理人的薪酬合同中，這一原則要求持有一個衡量預期收

37、益和負責任的經(jīng)理更加努力工作來規(guī)避所支付的附加工資之間的額外風險。因此，稅后績效指標應作為一個激勵經(jīng)理人的獲取額外報酬的方法，只有當經(jīng)理的稅務規(guī)劃工作的參與導致了稅前和稅后核算結果之間的差異，這通常反映在出口退稅上面。與以前的研究相一致，包括與首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)部經(jīng)理選擇稅后模型的變量，對于一個企業(yè)的稅務籌劃的機會控制，因為這種機會的存在會在某種程度上反映了經(jīng)理人的行動，可以預期，將會降低出口退稅</p><p>

38、　　即使通過經(jīng)理人的努力，預計將導致較低的出口退稅，公司將使用稅后績效指標只有當預期收益超過預期成本才這樣做，稅后業(yè)績措施預計會導致較低的出口退稅，因為它促使管理人員和稅務專業(yè)人員加強合作以達成一致的，發(fā)展的，執(zhí)行稅收籌劃策略，McLemore (1997, 1)引用惠普公司的稅務主任支持稅務規(guī)劃工作需要事業(yè)部經(jīng)理參與的必要性：</p><p>　　稅收籌劃這種事情也只有在被作為業(yè)務規(guī)劃的早期階段，戰(zhàn)略上的規(guī)劃，

39、兼并和收購工作……你的稅務部門要在會議上，代表這些部門做出決定。對未來的發(fā)展模式是稅務策劃人與業(yè)務部門緊密合作完成的。</p><p>　　與使用稅后業(yè)績的措施有關的費用包括附加工資必須支付給經(jīng)理以彌補由于潛在的稅法變化增加的風險，使經(jīng)理加倍的努力，包括，從合同中補償個人所得稅方面費用的增加的結果。與稅后報酬有關的其他潛在費用包括向一個公司的事業(yè)部分配行政費用開支，稅務檢查成本增加，并增加稅務機關審查頻率。相反，

40、通過觀察出口退稅的好處來衡量稅后報酬，有沒有稅后業(yè)績計量的成本效益明顯的有經(jīng)驗代理人。因此，本研究著重于在管理者的基礎上實現(xiàn)的稅后補償效益，但不提供相關的成本，規(guī)模的證據(jù)。</p><p>　　在企業(yè)主管的調查中所獲得的專有數(shù)據(jù)用于構造并測試某些變量，說明是否包括那些首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)部的經(jīng)理們使用稅后會計基礎的績效指標。公開數(shù)據(jù)用于構造出口退稅和其他變量來測試，結果與假設一致，即事業(yè)部經(jīng)理的報酬，但不包括公司首席

41、執(zhí)行官的，與稅后導致較低的出口退稅有關，估計使每年平均節(jié)省1330萬美元的稅款。模擬公司進行敏感性測試的子樣本中，邊際稅率(Graham 1996)提供進一步的證據(jù)表明，低邊際稅率的公司將會有降低潛在出口退稅的行動，可能對現(xiàn)金流量和稅后利潤不吻合這一結果產(chǎn)生模棱兩可的影響。敏感性測試有助于進一步排除了稅收職能外包的比例，作為另一種解釋，統(tǒng)計上和經(jīng)濟上顯示事業(yè)部經(jīng)理的稅后報酬和出口退稅呈負相關。</p><p>　

42、　研究結果有助于薪酬以會計為基礎的著作，通過實施事業(yè)部經(jīng)理參與的以稅后會計為基礎的績效措施，是逐步降低企業(yè)出口退稅的有效措施。符合Guidry et al. (1999)表明了獎金導致事業(yè)部盈余管理水平的不同，這一發(fā)現(xiàn)提供了更多的有洞察力的影響，事業(yè)部經(jīng)理以會計績效為基礎對管理人員的行為進行激勵。另外，明確的表明企業(yè)的決策者設計降低所得稅費用的公司稅后業(yè)績會使管理層人員獲得更多薪酬的措施來激勵事業(yè)部經(jīng)理。</p><

43、p>　　該文章的過程如下：下一節(jié)闡述了在這項研究中測試的假設。第三節(jié)概述了經(jīng)驗模型和估計程序在測試中使用的一些假說。第四節(jié)提供了數(shù)據(jù)和樣本的討論，包括用于獲得所有的用于調查的報酬數(shù)據(jù)的簡要概述。結果列于第五章最后一節(jié)提供了一個結論，即關于該研究的局限性的討論。</p><p><b>　　II. 假說發(fā)展</b></p><p>　　Newman (1989),

44、 Cares and Guffey (2000), and Atwood et al. (1998) 調查作為稅后盈利企業(yè)對首席執(zhí)行官獎金計劃包含變量的選擇。這些研究假設，企業(yè)有更大的稅收籌劃的機會，與Antle and Demski (1988)的可控性原則一致，更有可能使用稅后業(yè)績的措施。利用稅收籌劃的機會代理，這些研究都發(fā)現(xiàn)了跨國公司的地位，經(jīng)營分部的數(shù)量，企業(yè)規(guī)模，首席執(zhí)行官的報酬和資本密集度呈正相關，Atwood et al.

45、 (1998) 還提出證據(jù)，充分利用這一負相關的選擇。</p><p>　　Corporate Tax-Planning Effectiveness: The Role of Compensation-Based Incentives (Ⅱ)</p><p>　　John D. Phillips University of Connecticut</p><p>　

46、　Dhaliwal et al. (2000) also focuses on the relation between a firm's tax-planning opportunities and the decision whether to use after-tax earnings in CEO bonus plans, but measures planning opportunities using only r

47、ealized tax credits and absolute values of firms' permanent book-tax differences. They exclude temporary book-tax differences such as those resulting from accelerated tax depreciation because these differences do not

48、 impact a firm's after-tax accounting earnings, the performance measu</p><p>　　Consistent with prior literature, Dhaliwal et al. (2000) find that firms with greater tax credits and absolute values of per

49、manent book-tax differences are more likely to compensate their CEOs on an after-tax basis. Because permanent differences can either increase or decrease taxable income relative to book income, they provide no direct evi

50、dence of an association between after-tax CEO compensation and lower ETR. The current study investigates this relation between after-tax CEO compensation an</p><p>　　H1: Using after-tax performance measures

51、in CEO accounting-based bonus plans leads to lower ETR.</p><p>　　This paper also extends the pre- versus after-tax compensation analysis to SBU-manager incentive compensation plans. The need for SBU-manager

52、involvement in tax-planning efforts is consistent with the coordination task that arises when specialists require input and cooperation from non specialists (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). The firm's tax professionals no

53、t only need help from the firm's SBU managers in the identification of tax-planning opportunities, but also their cooperation in developing an</p><p>　　In the context of lowering the ETR and increasing a

54、fter-tax accounting income, how do SBU managers participate in efforts that increase tax credits and lead to permanent differences that lower taxable income? Colgate-Palmolive's CFO states that "Colgate man- age

55、rs routinely watch for ways to time remittances from overseas [which leads to higher foreign tax credits], maximize research and development tax credits...." (Mintz 1999, 2.) SBU managers can also help tax professio

56、nals formulate transfer</p><p>　　The above discussion suggests that SBU-manager involvement is helpful in lowering the ETR. It is possible that the pre- versus after-tax nature of the CEO's accounting-ba

57、sed bonus plan signals tax planning's importance and thus provides implicit incentives sufficient to motivate SBU managers to assist in efforts that lower the firm's ETR. If this were so, then explicit incentive

58、pay would not be necessary to motivate such efforts. Wilson (1995, 12), however, cites an interview with a corporate e</p><p>　　We instituted after-tax divisional measures that we have continued to refine. T

59、his puts the business units in the position that they think about taxes as they make decisions.</p><p>　　Similarly, Mintz (1999, 2) cites the Colgate-Palmolive CFO's argument for after-tax performance me

60、asures:</p><p>　　Were pre-tax income to govern incentives, then employees with bonuses on their minds would pay far less attention to favorable tax implications....But because incentive compensation reflects

61、 after-tax earnings...managers are rewarded when taxes are lowered.</p><p>　　The above arguments are consistent with evidence that mid-level managers respond to explicit bonus-based incentives (e.g., Kahn an

62、d Sherer 1990; Guidry et al. 1999). Compensating a firm's SBU managers on an after-tax basis is thus expected to promote efforts that lead to a lower ETR. The second hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is as foll

63、ows:</p><p>　　H2: Using after-tax SBU-manager accounting-based performance measures leads to lower ETR.</p><p>　　III. EMPIRICAL MODELS</p><p>　　To test the hypotheses stated in the

64、previous section, the following equations are estimated cross sectionally:</p><p>　　Variable Definitions </p><p>　　Endogenous Variables</p><p>　　The effective tax rate (ETR) is defi

65、ned as the ratio of total tax expense (TTE) to pre- tax income. An average annual ETR for the three-year period 1995-1997 is used to control for unexplained year-to-year fluctuations in the annual ETR. TTE is used in the

66、 numerator because only efforts that lower TTE decrease the ETR and increase after-tax earnings. Accordingly, the ETR as currently measured represents the appropriate theoretical construct for evaluating the effectivenes

67、s of using after-tax acc</p><p>　　There are at least two potential issues, however, regarding measurement of the ETR using TTE in the numerator. First, TTE excludes the effects of temporary book-tax differen

68、ces, so tax-planning actions that result in a tax deferral are not reflected in the ETR. For example, a more favorable purchase price allocation in an asset acquisition, which leads to greater book-tax depreciation diffe

69、rences, is not reflected in the ETR. Similarly, investments in special purpose entities could lead to tempo</p><p>　　The second measurement issue regarding the ETR is that TTE excludes the tax benefit of ded

70、uctions resulting from the exercise of nonqualified employee stock options (ESO). Firms that have little or no tax liability because of their ESO deductions could have high ETR, which can be problematic in studies that a

71、ttempt to use the ETR to measure a firm's tax burden or to evaluate a firm's incentive to engage in tax-planning actions (e.g., Hanlon and Shevlin 2002). Arguably, these firms have little in</p><p>　

72、　CEO TAX is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO receives an annual bonus based, at least in part, on an accounting measure determined on an after-tax basis, and 0 otherwise. BUATAX equals 1 if the firm uses a uni

73、t-based accounting measure in the compensation plans of a majority of its BU managers and this measure reflects the allocation of at least one unit-specific income tax item.8 If a firm does not use a business-unit-based

74、accounting measure, then BUATAX equals 1 if the firm uses an </p><p>　　The ETR model also includes two selectivity correction variables, A CEO and SBU, which represent the double-selection analogs to the Hec

75、kman (1976) single-equation inverse Mills' ratio. These variables, which are calculated based on the results of the bivariate probit estimation of the CEOATAX and BUATAX models, are included in the ETR model to achie

76、ve consistent coefficient estimates using OLS (Tunali 1986). These variables are described in more detail below in the "Estimation" subsection.</p><p>　　Exogenous Variables Common to the ETR and Co

77、mpensation Equations</p><p>　　All three equations contain variables that proxy for a firm's tax-planning opportunities. The rationale for including these variables in the ETR equation is that a firm'

78、s ETR differs from the statutory rate only to the extent it has opportunities to take actions that either increase or decrease taxable income or tax credits (Mills et al. 1998). Consistent with prior research (e.g., Newm

79、an 1989; Atwood et al. 1998; Dhaliwal et al. 2000) and the Antle and Demski (1988) controllability principle, t</p><p>　　From: Corporate Tax-Planning Effectiveness: The Role of Compensation-Based Incentives：

80、 The Accounting Review, Vol. 78, No. 3 (Jul., 2003).</p><p>　　企業(yè)稅收籌劃的有效性：基于對報酬的激勵作用（下）</p><p>　　Dhaliwaletal (2000)還關注了“企業(yè)的稅收籌劃機會和決定，是否與首席執(zhí)行官稅后收益的獎金計劃的之間的關系”，但有關措施只實現(xiàn)了稅收籌劃的機會使稅收抵免和企業(yè)永遠不變的繳稅財產(chǎn)清單和

81、稅率的絕對值。但不包括那些臨時繳稅財產(chǎn)清單和稅率差異造成的加速折舊，因為這些差異并不影響一個公司的稅后會計盈余，用于測量稅后會計績效為基礎的獎金計劃。同樣地，在目前的研究中使用的出口退稅是利用計算器計算所得稅費用總額，從而排除了臨時繳稅財產(chǎn)清單和稅率差異的影響。</p><p>　　與以前的文獻相一致，Dhaliwal et al. (2000) 發(fā)現(xiàn)有更大的稅收抵免和繳稅財產(chǎn)清單和稅率差異絕對值使公司更容易給首

82、席執(zhí)行官高的稅后報酬。由于永久性差異可以增加或減少應稅收入的相對預期收入，他們沒有提供首席執(zhí)行官的稅后報酬和降低出口退稅之間的直接證據(jù)。目前研究首席執(zhí)行官的稅后報酬和出口退稅的關系。第一個假設，闡明的另一種形式是：</p><p>　　H1: 利用企業(yè)稅后業(yè)績?yōu)榛A來衡量首席執(zhí)行官的獎金計劃將導致出口退稅的降低。</p><p>　　本文還擴展了稅前稅后報酬的分析，以作為激勵事業(yè)部經(jīng)理的薪

83、酬計劃。對于事業(yè)部經(jīng)理參與協(xié)調稅務規(guī)劃工作的任務時，專家要求從非專業(yè)人員投入和合作保持一貫性(Milgrom and Roberts 1992)。該公司的稅務專業(yè)人士不僅要幫助該公司的事業(yè)部經(jīng)理在稅務規(guī)劃機會的選擇，而且在他們制定和執(zhí)行戰(zhàn)略，以利用這些機會合作。</p><p>　　在調低出口退稅，增加稅后會計收益方面，怎么使事業(yè)部經(jīng)理更加的努力，增加稅收抵免，并導致應納稅所得額永久性差異的降低？高露潔公司首席財

84、務官說“高露潔人提供學習的機會經(jīng)常留意海外[從而導致更高的外國稅收抵免]時間匯款的方式，最大限度地提高研究和發(fā)展的稅收抵免” (Mintz 1999, 2.) 事業(yè)部經(jīng)理也可以幫助稅務專業(yè)人士制定轉移價格(Ernst & Young 1999), 這有助于降低出口退稅，通過國家報告反映的事業(yè)部經(jīng)理參與減少（增加）收入的其他例子，有助于降低出口退稅。包括：（1）在雇傭職工前看其工資是否具有抵免稅收的資格，（2）向該公司的稅務專業(yè)人

85、士咨詢公司設立的地點，因為公司所處的不同位置適用不同的稅率，（3）協(xié)助稅務專業(yè)人士收集申報納稅所需的數(shù)據(jù)文件。</p><p>　　上述討論表明，事業(yè)部經(jīng)理的參與對降低出口退稅是有幫助的。在會議上傳達稅收籌劃效果對首席執(zhí)行官稅后獎金的重要性，從而對他們產(chǎn)生足夠的激勵，以使事業(yè)部經(jīng)理通過加倍努力來降低企業(yè)的出口退稅。如果是這樣的話，那么明確的獎勵工資就沒有必要去激勵他們付出更多的努力了。Wilson (1995,

86、12),因此，舉一個有公司主管會談記錄，以支持他的結論，激勵事業(yè)部經(jīng)理稅后措施應在稅務規(guī)劃工作中有所涉及：</p><p>　　我們建立了并不斷完善部門的稅后激勵措施。這迫使經(jīng)營單位站在對節(jié)稅有利的立場上考慮問題。</p><p>　　類似地，Mintz (1999, 2) 列舉了高露潔公司財務總監(jiān)關于稅后業(yè)績計量的說法：</p><p>　　是關于稅前收入的管理激

87、勵，公司在考慮將支付給員工多少獎金時得多注意稅收優(yōu)惠的影響……但是，由于激勵的報酬取決于稅后收益回報……當公司稅收降低會使經(jīng)理得到更多的報酬。</p><p>　　上述論點的證據(jù)表明，與中層管理人員額外獎金的激勵機制相一致(e.g., Kahn and Sherer 1990; Guidry et al. 1999)。一個公司的事業(yè)部經(jīng)理額外報酬基于稅后收益，預計會使管理人員更加努力，導致較低的出口退稅。第二個假

88、設，為另一種表現(xiàn)形式，如下：</p><p>　　H2:對事業(yè)部經(jīng)理使用會計為基礎的績效措施，將導致較低的出口退稅。</p><p><b>　　III.經(jīng)營模型</b></p><p>　　為了測試在上一節(jié)所述的假設，下面的等式通過部分估計：</p><p>　　變量定義 內生函數(shù)</p>&l

89、t;p>　　實際的出口退稅率被定義為稅收總收入的費用率關于稅前收入。1995-1997年期間平均每年的出口退稅是用來控制不確定的年與年之間在每年的出口退稅上的波動。因為只有努力降低出口退稅，才會增加稅后收益。因此，出口退稅當前被作為適當?shù)睦碚撚脕碓u價稅后會計績效為基礎的獎金計劃的效力。</p><p>　　至少有兩個潛在的問題，然而，出口退稅方面的測量，在計算中的使用。首先，計算時不包括臨時賬面稅率差異的影

90、響，因此稅收籌劃的行動，在稅收延期結果方面，是沒有反映在出口退稅上。例如，一個更加有利的購買資產(chǎn)的收購，從而導致更大的賬面折舊攤銷的差異，是不會體現(xiàn)在出口退稅上的。同樣，有特殊目的實體的投資可能會導致的暫時性差異也未反映在出口退稅上(e.g., Hanlon 2002)。設立一個外國子公司在低稅率的國家和推遲遣返外國收入的另一種方式是推遲納稅并不會影響出口退稅，除非該公司是以財務報告的立場，即外國收益永久或無限期地投資(Krull 20

91、01)。對于一個企業(yè)的首席執(zhí)行官的薪酬是以企業(yè)稅后績效為基礎的，涉及決定稅收延期的可能，這很可能是國外設立公司的情況并形成特殊目的實體，出口退稅將無法衡量首席執(zhí)行官為稅收籌劃付出的努力。</p><p>　　第二次測量有關出口退稅問題，計算時排除了由非限定員工股票期權產(chǎn)生的扣除稅收優(yōu)惠。企業(yè)很少或沒有應納稅額，因為他們的股票期權中可以扣除更高的出口退稅，這可能是不確定的研究，嘗試使用出口退稅來衡量一個企業(yè)的稅務負

92、擔或評價一個公司的激勵從事稅務規(guī)劃工作的行為(e.g., Hanlon and Shevlin 2002)?？梢哉f，這些企業(yè)缺乏動力去從事代價高昂的稅務規(guī)劃行動并不太可能使用稅后業(yè)績的措施。調整出口退稅反映了員工股票期權扣減的稅務優(yōu)惠會導致這些企業(yè)降低出口退稅，盡管稅前抵扣得適當使用，并表明企業(yè)稅后業(yè)績和出口退稅之間沒有聯(lián)系的假設不成立。</p><p>　　如果首席執(zhí)行官收到年度獎金，則總裁稅的指標變量等1，一

93、位首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)部經(jīng)理，它代表的赫克曼單方程逆米爾斯比雙選模擬(1976)。這些變量，是在用BUATAX模型，在計算的基礎上對總裁稅的估計結果，包括在出口退稅模型，實現(xiàn)統(tǒng)一使用OLS估計系數(shù)(Tunali 1986)。這些變量詳細描述在下面“估計”小節(jié)。</p><p>　　出口退稅和補償方程的共同外生變量</p><p>　　所有這三個方程包含變量，是一個企業(yè)的稅務籌劃的機會代理。包括

94、在這些變量方程的理由是，各個公司的法定的出口退稅率不同，因此有機會采取行動，增加出口退稅，從而減少應稅收入或增加稅收抵免(Mills et al. 1998)。與以前的研究相一致(e.g., Newman 1989; Atwood et al. 1998; Dhaliwal et al. 2000)和Antle and Demski (1988)可控性的原則，稅務規(guī)劃機會變量也包括在CEOATAX and BUATAX方程。由于所在地稅

95、務的影響，跨國經(jīng)營的企業(yè)預計將有較大的稅務規(guī)劃機會，更多的遣返和轉移定價決策，為跨國經(jīng)營的代理，作為外國資產(chǎn)的比例，截至2006年年底，以1997.9 CAPINT作為財產(chǎn)的比例計算總資產(chǎn)的賬面價值，廠房和設備的總資產(chǎn)，截至2006年年底以1997年（BVA）賬面價值，并列入有關控制固定資產(chǎn)投資的機會。規(guī)模較大的公司，通過其業(yè)務范圍和規(guī)模，預計將有更多的機會進行稅務規(guī)劃工作。截至2006年的比例，以1997年年底的自然對數(shù)作為BVA。以