出口退稅外文翻譯

1、<p>　　本 科 生 畢 業(yè) 論 文</p><p>　　外 文 資 料 翻 譯</p><p>　　專 業(yè) 國際經(jīng)濟與貿(mào)易 </p><p>　　班 級 </p><p>　　姓 名

2、 </p><p>　　指導(dǎo)教師 </p><p>　　所在學(xué)院 外經(jīng)貿(mào)學(xué)院　 </p><p>　　附 件1.外文資料翻譯譯文;2.外文原文</p><p>　　出口稅及收入分配：菲律賓椰子征稅</p><p><b&g

3、t;　　彼得沃爾</b></p><p><b>　　世界經(jīng)濟回顧</b></p><p>　　2002 - 斯普林格138卷，第3期，437-458，分類號：10.1007/BF02707948</p><p>　　出口的稅收往往是有爭議的。出口國在國際市場上對特定的商品擁有壟斷權(quán)的情況下，有一個著名的論證用于支持適用于那些商品

4、的一種出口稅。在沒有出口稅的競爭均衡的情況下，出口水平將達到生產(chǎn)的邊際成本等于國際和國內(nèi)的價格，但如果有市場力量的存在，邊際收益比價格低，這意味著邊際成本大于邊際收益。出口稅的目的是通過限制出口量來利用這個差額，也可以通過減少國內(nèi)價格和國際價格的對比來利用這個差額。當(dāng)邊際成本等于邊際收益的時候最優(yōu)稅收限制出口的水平，這是由出口稅比例稅率等于對與國際價格相關(guān)商品的出口需求彈性絕對值的相反數(shù)得出的。（科登1974年）。</p>

5、<p>　　對于出口稅的政治案件常常顯得尤為強烈并連帶著大型貨幣貶值。眾所周知，在這種情況下出口商得到意外收益，這些收益稅通常得到支持，同時也能促進政府的收入。但是，這種論證是完全不同于上述國際貿(mào)易條件的論點。由于國內(nèi)價格相對貶值的影響是暫時的，應(yīng)付給出口商的意外收獲也是暫時的，因此這種論證是很大程度上得建議臨時稅，而貿(mào)易條件論證的默示條款稅是永久的。此外，貿(mào)易條件論證提出對特定商品征稅 –該特定商品是在該國擁有壟斷力量的

6、- 而潛在的意外收益論證適用于所有的出口，也將同樣適用于在世界市場上完全不擁有壟斷勢力的國家。</p><p>　　在世界市場上存在一定程度的壟斷勢力也許是最頻繁的在一個國家生產(chǎn)上具有特定的自然比較優(yōu)勢的初級商品。出口商關(guān)心的往往是發(fā)展中國家。但是，許多棘手的問題出現(xiàn)在決定是否應(yīng)引入稅收（或繼續(xù)引入），如果是引入，應(yīng)該以何種稅率。什么是和長期運行的出口商品的國際需求彈性相關(guān)的呢？什么將是該國貿(mào)易伙伴對待征收此稅的

7、反應(yīng)呢？什么將是這種稅在征收范圍內(nèi)的分配效應(yīng)呢？</p><p>　　菲律賓對這些問題提供了一個很好的例子。菲律賓是迄今為止世界上最大的椰子產(chǎn)品出口國，最重要的是椰子油。從20世紀(jì)70年代到80年代初期，菲律賓馬科斯政府采取行動，利用國家明顯的壟斷權(quán)在國際市場上對椰油大量征收出口稅。這項稅收是不得人心的。公眾關(guān)注的是其收入分配的影響，該影響來源于椰子產(chǎn)品稅降低了國內(nèi)價格的明顯事實，從而抑制椰子生產(chǎn)者，主要是影響低

8、收入的小農(nóng)戶的收入。此外，據(jù)稱該計劃的管理存在腐敗，其收入挪用被頻繁的指控（Intal和Power 1990年，1991年）。</p><p>　　上述問題被當(dāng)時的政府拒絕了，但根據(jù)這些評論出口稅在1985年被取消，馬科斯政府1986年被“人民力量”的反抗所取代。該稅尚未恢復(fù)，1997年的亞洲危機和菲律賓貨幣貶值，它引發(fā)了一場政府稅收潛能的復(fù)興，以提高公眾利益的外匯收入和政府收入。椰子產(chǎn)品出口稅仍然是政府及其可能

9、的經(jīng)濟影響的政策選擇仍然是在菲律賓一個有爭議的問題。</p><p>　　除了椰子出口對菲律賓經(jīng)濟的重要性和圍繞早期椰子征稅的爭議，很少會有對菲律賓椰子出口退稅影響的經(jīng)濟分析。在菲律賓公眾的心目中，先前的出口稅可以理解為是與腐敗和“權(quán)貴資本主義”相聯(lián)系的前馬科斯政府。但問題是，菲律賓椰子產(chǎn)品出口稅在現(xiàn)在是否可以在原則上合乎情理，若其收入分配腐敗的不是其中一個因素，若在同樣的稅率下，則使得這個分析性的問題仍得不到解

10、決，原因是做了這樣復(fù)雜的稅收收入分配。</p><p>　　在菲律賓的椰子油出口的國際需求彈性上利用了經(jīng)驗主義的例證，并利用了一個剛剛建成的菲律賓經(jīng)濟的一般均衡模型。這個分析中利用模擬該模型，以確定對椰子油出口的“最佳”的稅值，并闡明其收入分配的影響。該模擬練習(xí)利用一個大型線性菲律賓經(jīng)濟的一般均衡模型的使用。其主要區(qū)別特征是一個高度細(xì)分生產(chǎn)部門之間分配的收入，按收入的以五分之一收入為家庭的收入分配細(xì)部處理（沃爾1

11、997年，2002年）。該模型結(jié)合使用近來的軟件開發(fā)來適應(yīng)線性模型逼近到非線性問題的解決。</p><p>　　本分析中政策的相關(guān)性是多方面的。首先，該模擬的是一個回顧性政策分析的工作。直到80年代中期還在探索的一項重要政策的經(jīng)濟效應(yīng)，但其影響直到今天仍存在爭議。為了理解為什么這個政策被使用，不管它是否是可取的，還是這種稅收是否應(yīng)重新推出，這是對其經(jīng)濟影響的理解所必需的。如果它是被相關(guān)體系知識所補充的，一般均衡分

12、析能有助于實現(xiàn)這一目的。其次，因為重新引入這種稅，目前仍是菲律賓政府的政策選擇，這不僅僅是因為稅收提高的影響，其影響中的一般均衡分析，可能在目前的政策辯論中發(fā)揮建設(shè)性作用。第三，由于出口稅是許多其他發(fā)展中國家重要的政策手段，尤其是對初級產(chǎn)品出口大國，菲律賓著名的“椰子征稅”影響的詳細(xì)分析，可以在政策辯論中作出建設(shè)性貢獻。</p><p>　　在方法論的層面上，對一種稅收福利最大化水平的推導(dǎo)是這種類型的新模式。建模

13、框架也為延伸出口退稅圍繞收入分配影響的一般分析提供了可能性。</p><p>　　Export Taxes and Income Distribution: The Philippines Coconut Levy</p><p>　　Peter Warr</p><p>　　Review of World Economics</p><p>

14、;　　2002 – Springer</p><p>　　Volume 138, Number 3, 437-458, DOI: 10.1007/BF02707948</p><p>　　The taxation of exports is often controversial. In cases where the exporting country possesses a degre

15、e of monopoly power in the international market for a particular commodity, there is a wellknown argument in favour of an export tax applied to that good. Under a competitive equilibrium with no export tax, exports will

16、reach the level where the marginal cost of production is equal to the international and domestic price, but if market power exists, marginal revenue is less than price, implying </p><p>　　The political case

17、for an export tax often seems especially strong following a large currency depreciation. As is well known, exporters receive windfall gains in these circumstances and there is often support for a tax on these gains, simu

18、ltaneously contributing to government revenue. But this argument is quite different from the international terms of trade argument outlined above. Since the domestic relative price effects of a depreciation are temporary

19、, the windfall gains accruing to exporter</p><p>　　Cases in which a degree of monopoly power exists in the world market are perhaps most frequent with primary commodities in which one country has a particula

20、r natural comparative advantage in production. The exporters concerned are often developing countries. But many difficult questions arise in determining whether such a tax should be introduced (or continued) and if so,

21、at what rate. What is the long-run international elasticity of demand for the export commodity concerned? What would be the</p><p>　　The Philippines provides a good example of these issues. It is by far the

22、 world's largest exporter of coconut products, most importantly coconut oil. From the early 1970s through the first half of the 1980s, the Marcos government of the Philippines acted to exploit the country's appa

23、rent monopoly power in the international market for coconut oil by imposing a substantial export tax, known domestically as the 'coconut levy'. The tax was unpopular. There was public concern about its income dis

24、tri</p><p>　　The above concerns were denied by the government of the time, but in response to these criticisms the export levy was abolished in 1985, shortly before the Marcos government was itself displace

25、d by the "peoples' power" revolt of 1986. The tax has not been reinstated since, even though the Asian crisis of 1997 and the large depreciation of the Philippine currency which followed it provoked a renew

26、ed public interest in the potential of such a tax to enhance foreign exchange earnings and public re</p><p>　　Despite the importance of coconut exports for the Philippine economy and the controversy surround

27、ing the earlier coconut levy, there has been little economic analysis of the effects within the Philippines that may follow from an export tax on coconut products. In the minds of the Philippine public, the former export

28、 levy is understandably associated with the corruption and 'crony capitalism' of the former Marcos government. But the analytical question of whether an export tax on Philippine coco</p><p>　　The pr

29、esent paper examines these issues, drawing on available empirical evidence on the elasticity of international demand for Philippine coconut oil exports and utilizing a recently constructed general equilibrium model of th

30、e Philippine economy. The analysis uses simulations with this model to determine the 'optimal' value of a tax on coconut oil exports and also to clarify its income distributional impact. The simulation exercise m

31、akes use of a large, linearized general equilibrium model of t</p><p>　　The policy relevance of this analysis is several-fold. First, the simulations are an exercise in retrospective policy analysis. We are

32、exploring the economic effects of a policy that was important until the mid-1980s but whose impacts remain controversial today. To understand why this olicy was used, whether it was desirable and whether such a tax shoul

33、d be re-introduced, an understanding of its economic effects is required. A general equilibrium analysis can contribute to this end, provided it </p><p>　　At a methodological level, the derivation in this pa

34、per of the welfaremaximizing level of a tax is new for this type of model. The modelling framework also makes it possible to extend the usual analysis of an export tax to encompass its income distributional implications

35、and we demonstrate this capability in the final section of the paper.</p><p>　　出口退稅對產(chǎn)業(yè)競爭力的影響：以印度尼西亞的棕櫚油產(chǎn)業(yè)為例</p><p>　　莫漢默德F·漢森，米歇爾R·瑞德，瑪麗A·馬爾尚</p><p><b>　　經(jīng)濟發(fā)展雜志

36、</b></p><p>　　2001年12月，第2號，26卷</p><p>　　本研究利用時間序列分析了印度尼西亞出口棕櫚油行業(yè)業(yè)績出口稅的動態(tài)效果。在向量自回歸模型的結(jié)果表明出口隨著稅收征收急劇下降。本研究表明，征收出口稅對印度尼西亞棕櫚油行業(yè)的競爭力有持久的，負(fù)面的影響。方差分解顯示，超過83%的凈出口份額的預(yù)測誤差的波動是以它本身的沖擊解釋的，還有8.6％和8.4％分

37、別是以出口退稅和相對出口價格解釋的。</p><p><b>　　一、引言</b></p><p>　　棕櫚油在印度尼西亞經(jīng)濟中有兩個重要特征。首先，棕櫚油是一種重要的出口商品，可以提供出口收入，并給數(shù)百萬的農(nóng)民家庭帶來就業(yè)機會。其次，棕櫚油是政府認(rèn)為的印尼最基本的食用油的主要來源。 “基本商品”可承受價格的有效性是印度尼西亞政府對維持經(jīng)濟和政治穩(wěn)定的關(guān)鍵。由于是這種

38、地位，棕櫚油行業(yè)受政府的嚴(yán)重干預(yù)，這是不足為奇的。政府通過投資政策干預(yù)棕櫚油的生產(chǎn)，特別是對于小農(nóng)戶發(fā)展項目和擴大印度尼西亞棕櫚油的出口。同時，政府在國內(nèi)市場干預(yù)，以保證可承受價格的棕櫚油供應(yīng)充足。在這方面，印度尼西亞政府使用了很多政策措施，如國內(nèi)的分配價格，出口限制和出口退稅等。</p><p>　　1991年6月，作為其貿(mào)易自由化政策的一部分，政府也放寬了所有的棕櫚油貿(mào)易限制，包括國內(nèi)出口分配價格和出口數(shù)量限

39、制。這項放寬政策導(dǎo)致了國內(nèi)棕櫚食用油的價各的大幅增加，并且印度尼西亞的棕櫚油出口份額在世界市場上顯著增加。隨著食用油價格上升，印度尼西亞政府頒布了一項新政策，對棕櫚油產(chǎn)品征收出口稅：毛棕櫚油（CPO）;提煉，漂白，脫臭（RBD）的棕櫚油;原油油脂和RBD的油脂（棕櫚烹飪油）。這些新稅種是在1994年至1997年生效的。在1998年初，隨著印尼經(jīng)濟危機和政治動亂，印度尼西亞政府禁止了毛棕櫚油及其產(chǎn)品的出口。 鑒于這些獨特的事件，

40、本研究的目的是使用計量時間序列分析棕櫚油出口稅對棕櫚油出口額和競爭力的動態(tài)效應(yīng)。具體來說，使用向量自回歸模型（VAR的），并連同脈沖響應(yīng)函數(shù)和方差分解來探討出口稅的動態(tài)效果。這項研究通過運用計量經(jīng)濟時間序列的方法增加了研究文獻，以分析出口稅對短期和長期的產(chǎn)業(yè)競爭力的的影響，。這種動態(tài)的透視不同于以往使用靜態(tài)模型的研究，。決策者可用這些結(jié)論分析出口退稅政策的影響，當(dāng)多年生作物的出口稅被考慮時這些結(jié)論也應(yīng)被考慮在內(nèi)。</p>

41、<p><b>　　二、文獻綜述</b></p><p>　　出口稅主要是用于發(fā)展中國家，目的是產(chǎn)生的政府收入，或者是因為政治原因保護特殊群體。出口稅對競爭性市場結(jié)構(gòu)下的小國家的影響，導(dǎo)致在出口國價格低于國際價格（里德，2000；麥卡拉和杰森林，1985）。在這項政策下，出口國的將喪失生產(chǎn)商，因為他們接受較低的價格和出口下降。經(jīng)過降低價格，出口國獲得更多消費者并給政府帶來的稅收。就

42、一個出口大國而言出口稅的影響的的情況是不同的（即，一個國家面臨的需求曲線向下傾斜）。如果在世界市場上有市場支配力，出口退稅則會導(dǎo)致國內(nèi)產(chǎn)量減少，那么說來，出口則下降并且國際價格上漲。假若是這樣的話，出口國的消費者，生產(chǎn)者和政府都可從這一政策上獲利（里德，2000；麥卡拉和杰森林，1985）。</p><p>　　對出口稅影響的實證研究已經(jīng)由秋山（1992）;布魯斯和佩雷斯加西亞（1992）;沃爾（1997）和馬克

43、斯，拉爾森和波默羅伊（1998）進行調(diào)查。秋山（1992）研究了在大國情況下，對（可可）多年生作物的最優(yōu)稅收的影響。尤其是，他的研究以一種最佳的出口稅，生產(chǎn)者剩余和政府儲備的影響為中心。他的研究結(jié)果表明，出口稅大大影響了在農(nóng)民和政府之間國家福利的分配，也大大影響了可可長期的生產(chǎn)。布魯斯和佩雷斯加西亞（1992）利用有競爭性全球貿(mào)易模式研究了一項美國的出口稅對林產(chǎn)品的經(jīng)濟影響。他們的研究結(jié)果顯示，美國消費者的福利損失和從木材種植者到中間商

44、的大量財富的轉(zhuǎn)移，。沃爾（1997年）進行了一項關(guān)于泰國大米出口稅的類似研究，并且計算出了經(jīng)濟收益和經(jīng)濟損失。</p><p>　　最后，馬科斯，拉爾森和波默羅伊（1998）利用靜態(tài)模型分析了棕櫚油的出口稅對印尼收入分配的影響。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，出口退稅降低了棕櫚油產(chǎn)品的價格，如果其他條件不變，那么則使消費者受益。此外，他們還發(fā)現(xiàn)，這種稅降低棕櫚油生產(chǎn)商所賺取收益，而中間商的損失也略有增幅。政府從出口稅收獲得收益，但從政

45、府作為業(yè)主的棕櫚產(chǎn)業(yè)所有者的角度看政府損失了更多收益。因此，最終結(jié)果是，政府喪失了棕櫚油的出口稅。我們的研究利用動態(tài)得時間序列模型擴展了他們的研究，評估了印度尼西亞棕櫚油出口稅對競爭力的短期和長期的影響。</p><p>　　上述文學(xué)主要研究出口貿(mào)易政策的分配效應(yīng)，即識別誰收益誰損失。此外，大多數(shù)研究使用一般均衡貿(mào)易模式，以鑒定和評估政策影響。在一般均衡貿(mào)易模式隱含的假設(shè)是所有部門和行業(yè)都將處于平衡狀態(tài)并且在外生

46、政策沖擊后都將恢復(fù)到平衡。在這些模型中，完整的供需系統(tǒng)的估計，和特定的貿(mào)易政策影響的評估都使用樂這些估計供求參數(shù)。這種方法的一個局限是，它無法獲取特定貿(mào)易政策對模型中的變量的動態(tài)效果。</p><p>　　在這項研究中，計量經(jīng)濟時間序列分析方法，分析了對出口業(yè)績的出口稅的動態(tài)行為。指定矢量回歸（VAR）模型并且由此產(chǎn)生了脈沖響應(yīng)函數(shù)和方差分解分析。脈沖響應(yīng)函數(shù)揭示了出口額如何對來自其他因素的“沖擊”做出回應(yīng)，諸如

47、出口稅。方差分解表明預(yù)測誤差變化的數(shù)量與取決于其他變數(shù)沖擊的出口額相一致。這種方法有其局限性，因為它不能跟蹤其他部門特定貿(mào)易政策的溢出效應(yīng)，并且也沒有考慮到該部門完整的供求體系。盡管有這些限制，向量自回歸模型提供了一個關(guān)于貿(mào)易政策的有用并獨特的動態(tài)視角。</p><p>　　Effects of an Export Tax on Competitiveness: The Case of the Indonesia

48、n Palm Oil Industry</p><p>　　Mohamad F. Hasan, Michael R. Reed and Mary A. Marchant</p><p>　　Journal of economic development</p><p>　　Volume 26, Number 2, December 2001</p>&

49、lt;p>　　This research analyzes the dynamic effects of an export tax on export performance of the Indonesian palm oil industry using time series analysis. The vector autoregressive model results show exports fell dramat

50、ically with the imposition of the tax. This research showed that the imposition of an export tax has long-lasting, negative effects on competitiveness of the Indonesian palm oil industry. The variance decomposition revea

51、ls that more than 83% of the variation in the forecast error of the ne</p><p>　　I. Introduction</p><p>　　Palm oil has two important characteristics in the Indonesian economy. First, palm oil is

52、an important export commodity that provides export earnings and generates employment opportunities for millions of farm families. Second, palm oil is the primary source for cooking oil, which the government considers “an

53、 essential commodity” for Indonesia. The availability of “essential commodities” at affordable prices is key to the Indonesian government’s policy of maintaining economic and political stabil</p><p>　　Concur

54、rently, the government intervenes in domestic markets to guarantee an adequate supply of palm oil at affordable prices. In this regard, the Indonesian government uses a variety of policy measures, such as a domestic allo

55、cation price, export restrictions and an export tax.</p><p>　　In June 1991, as a part of its trade liberalization policies, the government lifted all palm oil trade restrictions, including domestic allocatio

56、n prices and export quantity restrictions. This liberalization policy resulted in a considerable increase in the domestic price of palm cooking oil, along with a significant increase in Indonesian export shares of palm o

57、il in the world market. </p><p>　　Concerned with the cooking oil price increase, the Indonesian government issued a new policy imposing export taxes on palm oil products: crude palm oil (CPO); refined, bleac

58、hed, deodorized (RBD) palm oil; crude olein; and RBD olein (palm cooking oil). These new taxes were in effect from 1994 to 1997. At the beginning of 1998, following the economic crisis and political turmoil in Indonesia,

59、 the Indonesian government banned exports of CPO and its products.</p><p>　　Given these unique events, the objective of this research is to analyze the dynamic effects of a palm oil export tax on export perf

60、ormance and competitiveness using econometric time series analysis. Specifically, a vector autoregressive model (VAR) is used along with the impulse response function and variance decomposition to investigate the dynamic

61、 effects of an export tax.</p><p>　　This study adds to the literature by applying econometric time series methods in analyzing the effects of an export tax on industrial competitiveness in both the short and

62、 long run. This dynamic perspective differs from previous studies, which use a static model. These results can be used by policy makers to analyze the impact of export tax policies and should be considered when an export

63、 tax on perennial crops is considered.</p><p>　　II. Literature Review</p><p>　　Export taxes are predominantly used by developing countries with the objective either to generate government revenu

64、es or to protect particular groups for political reasons. The effect of an export tax by a small country under a competitive market structure causes the price in the exporting country to fall below the world price (Reed

65、(2000), McCalla and Josling (1985)). Under this policy, producers in the exporting country will lose because they receive lower prices and exports decline. Consumers</p><p>　　Empirical studies on the effect

66、of export taxes have been conducted by Akiyama (1992); Bruce and Perez-Garcia (1992); Warr (1997); and Marks, Larson, and Pomeroy (1998). Akiyama (1992) examined the effect of an optimal tax on perennial crops (cocoa) in

67、 a large country case. In particular, his research focused on an optimal export tax and its implications on producer surplus and government reserves. His results showed that an export tax significantly affected the distr

68、ibution of national welfare </p><p>　　Finally, Marks, Larson, and Pomeroy (1998) analyzed the effect of an export tax for palm oil on the distribution of income in Indonesia using a static model. They found

69、that an export tax reduced the price of palm oil products, ceteris paribus, thus, benefiting consumers. In addition, they found that the tax lowered profits earned by palm oil producers, and that processors lost slightly

70、 as well. The government gained revenue from the export tax, but lost more revenue in the government’s role as </p><p>　　Most of the above literature focused on the distributional effects of the export trade

71、 policy, namely, identifying who gains and who loses. In addition, most studies used general equilibrium trade models to identify and estimate policy impacts. Implicit in a general equilibriu m trade model is the assumpt

72、ion that all sectors are in equilibrium and sectors would return to equilibrium after the exogenous policy shock. In these models, complete demand-supply systems are estimated and the effects of</p><p>　　In

73、this study, econometric time series analysis is used to analyze the dynamic behavior of an export tax on export performance. A vector autoregressive (VAR) model is specified and the resulting impulse response function an

74、d the variance decomposition are analyzed. The impulse response function reveals how export performance responds to “shocks” from other variables, such as an export tax. The variance decomposition indicates the amount of