公共環(huán)境外文翻譯---- 當地環(huán)境的控制與公共機構的擠出效應

1、<p><b>　　外文翻譯之一</b></p><p>　　Determining the External Social Costs of Public Space Crowding</p><p>　　Author(s): Roberts, Russell D</p><p>　　Nationality: US</p>

2、;<p>　　Source: Political Economy Working Papers, no. 137</p><p>　　Abstract：This paper uses simple models of private and public behavior to model the relationship between public and private spending on

3、 public goods. The standard discussion of the relationship between public and private spending assumes that public spending is exogenous. When public spending is exogenous, each dollar of public spending reduces private

4、spending by a dollar, unless public spending is large enough to drive donors to a corner solution. When government decision-making is endogenous, </p><p>　　I. INTRODUCTION</p><p>　　The effect of

5、 an increase in government spending on private spending is a central theoretical and empirical question in macroeconomics and public finance. What is the effect of public borrowing on private investment? What is the effe

6、ct of government housing on private housing ?What is the effect of food stamp expenditure on private food consumption? What is the effect of social security spending on private saving? What is the effect of government we

7、lfare programs on private charity?</p><p>　　The standard theoretical answer to these questions is that government will either reduce private spending or leave it unchanged—the case of neutrality. These analy

8、ses almost always assume the increase in government spending is random or exogenous.</p><p>　　This paper studies the interaction between public and private spending on public goods when government is endogen

9、ous, responding to the preferences of citizens. The paper begins with what I call the "simple model" of the private provision of public goods followed by a brief literature review. The succeeding sections look

10、at the relationship between public and private spending on the poor and the elderly, under different assumptions about how government responds to the preferences of citizens. Th</p><p>　　1. Public spending i

11、s never neutral in equilibrium.</p><p>　　2. When public spending is exogenous, an increase in public spending must drive some donors to a comer solution in order to be non-neutral. But when public spending i

12、s endogenous, corner solutions are no longer necessary for non-neutrality. The relationship between public and private spending can be positive in equilibrium.</p><p>　　3. When public spending is endogenous,

13、 the relationship between public and private spending depends on the source of the change in public spending as well as the structure of preferences, the heterogeneity of citizens, the flexibility of taxation and the dis

14、tribution of benefits.</p><p>　　4. Efficiency considerations push public spending towards a level large enough to crowd out all private spending. Whether public and private spending coexist depends on the st

15、ructure of preferences, the heterogeneity of citizens, the flexibility of taxation and the distribution of benefits. </p><p>　　決定公共空間擁擠的外部社會成本</p><p>　　作者：羅伯特.羅素.D</p><p><b>　

16、　國籍：美國</b></p><p>　　來源：政治經濟學文稿第137頁</p><p><b>　　一、引言</b></p><p>　　政府開支的增加對私人投資的影響是關于宏觀經濟和公共財政的理論和實踐問題。公共借貸對私人投資有什么影響嗎？政府投資房地產對私人住房有什么影響？食物券支出對私人餐飲消費有什么影響嗎？社會保障支出在私

17、人儲蓄有什么的影響嗎？政府福利計劃對私人慈善機構捐款有什么影響嗎？</p><p>　　標準的理論對這些問題的回答是，政府將要么減少私人開支的情況下或者離開并保持中立。這些分析幾乎總是承擔增加政府支出的隨機性或外源性。</p><p>　　本文研究了公共支出和私人支出之間的交互作用當把政府支出作為內生變量時，滿足公民的特殊偏好。本文構建了所謂的“簡單的模型”，私人提供公共物品，緊隨其后的是

18、一個簡短的文獻回顧。接下來的部分之間的關系看起來是在公共和私人消費，窮人和老年人的不同假設條件下，政府如何回應有特殊偏好的公民。主要分析的結果是：</p><p>　　1、公共支出從來就不是中性的平衡。</p><p>　　2、當公共開支是外生的，增加公共支出必須促使一些捐助者采取能夠提出解決的方法為了使其不保持中立的情況。但當公共開支是內生對的,轉角的解決方案將不在是中性的，也沒有存在的

19、必要了。公共和私人之間的關系平衡的支出可以是積極的。</p><p>　　3、當公共開支是內生的關系，公共和私人消費取決于變化的公共支出的結構參數，對公民的稅收的靈活性和稅收利益分配。</p><p>　　4、考慮到效率推動公共支出在水平方向足夠大時排擠了所有私人消費。公共和私人支出是否共存的結構取決于偏好、公民的異質性、靈活性和稅收利益分配。</p><p>&l

20、t;b>　　外文翻譯之二</b></p><p>　　Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out</p><p>　　Author(s): Juan Camilo Cardenas, John Stranlund, Cleve Willis</p><p>　　Nationa

21、lity: USA</p><p>　　South: University of Virginia Library Research literature pp.1-5</p><p>　　Abstract: Regulations that are designed to improve social welfare typically begin with the premise th

22、at individuals are purely self-interested. Therefore, in a situation in which private and social interests diverge, it should be possible to bring about a welfare improvement by imposing rules that provide the necessary

23、incentives for more socially efficient choices. However, experimental evidence shows that individuals do not typically behave as if they are purely self-interested; they tend to m</p><p>　　Keywords: Institut

24、ional Crowding-Out, External Regulation, Local Environmental Quality, Experiments, South America, Colombia</p><p>　　1. Introduction </p><p>　　Economic institutions are designed to alter behavio

25、r, to stimulate actions intended to produce outcomes that are socially superior to those expected to flow from self-regarding individual choices. However, a small empirical literature suggests that institutions designed

26、to induce Pareto-superior outcomes may affect individual choices in surprised sing and contrary ways. In this paper we present results from a series of experiments designed to study the effects of external regulatory con

27、trol of l</p><p>　　We are by no means the first to suggest that institutions designed and expected to do good might actually engender contrary behavior. A number of authors have suggested that paying a mone

28、tary reward to motivate socially desirable behavior may actually do the opposite because it may crowd out an individual’s sense of public-spiritedness. Tim (1971) suggested that individuals donate blood more willingly wh

29、en they do so purely voluntarily than when they are offered money for their donations. In th</p><p>　　Evidence that regulatory institutions may crowd out public motivations in favor of greater self-interest

30、is not limited to the effects of monetary incentives. Ostman (1998) suggests that external control of common pool resources may have a negative effect by shifting responsibility to the regulatory agency and essentially a

31、bsolving individuals from other-regarding moral obligations. Frolich and Oppenheimer (1998) designed a series of experiments to operationalize John Rawls’ (1971) “veil of igno</p><p>　　We are interested in e

32、xamining the effects of external institutions (rules and regulations imposed from outside a community) on behavior in an experimental setting, in particular the effects of external control of environmental quality in rur

33、al settings of the developing world. Our design has a number of features, which combine to make it rather unique. (The details of our experimental design are provided in section 2). First, rather than conducting experime

34、nts in a laboratory setting, our exper</p><p>　　We consider two treatments to examine whether external control of local environmental quality may crowd out group-oriented behavior. Each group of subjects pl

35、ays a number of initial rounds of the game without regulation and without being able to communicate with each other .A subset of groups go on to play additional rounds in which they are confronted with the government-imp

36、osed regulation. The other groups also play additional rounds, but instead of facing an external regulation, individuals </p><p>　　Allowing some groups to communicate was motivated by the fact that local coo

37、perative efforts are frequently the alternative to external regulation in developing countries. And by the fact that relatively more is known about the role of face-to-face communication in enhancing levels of cooperati

38、on in experiments of this general type. Much of the literature on this subject is summarized by Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994), and Ledyard (1995). In brief, the findings show that communication enhan</p><

39、p>　　In section 3 we report our results. Consistent with findings of the experimental literature on contributions to public goods and exploitation of common properties [Ledyard (1995), Ostrom (1997, p. 7)], we find th

40、at when subjects do not face external restrictions and cannot communicate with each other, their decisions tend to be neither pure Nash strategies nor efficient choices, but somewhere between these extremes. Absent regu

41、lation, the simple ability to communicate allows individuals to mak</p><p>　　Institutional crowding-out suggests that well-intentioned but modestly enforced government controls of local environmental quality

42、 and natural resource use may perform rather poorly, especially as compared to informal local management. In section 4 we discuss this and other implications of the crowding-out effect, as well as suggest ways in which

43、this line of research should be extended.</p><p>　　當地環(huán)境的控制與公共機構的擠出效應</p><p>　　作者：朱.卡梅隆，克羅諾斯, 約翰.斯路德，克利.威爾</p><p><b>　　國籍：美國</b></p><p>　　出處：維吉尼亞大學圖書館研究文獻第1-

44、5頁</p><p>　　摘要:規(guī)則的設定是為了提高社會福利，但通常個人是純粹的利己主義作為前提。因此,在這樣的情況即私人和社會利益的無法達成一致,它應該有可能帶來一個福利政策的改進制,提供必要的誘因,社會才能更加有效的選擇。然而,實驗證據表明個人通常都不會表現得好像他們是純粹的利己主義,他們更傾向于做出選擇,在自我和團體之間找到利益平衡點。我們在哥倫比亞的幾個村莊試驗,發(fā)現有監(jiān)督管理的解決方案。這個令人驚訝的結

45、果是因為個體在面臨外部性時,所做的選擇盡可能的符合自身的最大化利益；那就是,該制度本身似乎排擠自身的選擇行為。其中含義就是，一個政策的設計是建立在激勵個人朝更有效率的利己行為的方向出發(fā)，減少外部性，盡量的降低外部性，提高社會效率。</p><p>　　關鍵詞:制度 擠出效應 外部監(jiān)管 當地的環(huán)境質量 實驗 南美 哥倫比亞</p><p><b>　　1、引言</b&g

46、t;</p><p>　　經濟制度的設立是為了改變個人行為,以刺激計劃產生的效率的結果,是社會優(yōu)于個人預期的選擇。然而,實證文獻表明,機構的成立誘使帕累托最優(yōu)的結果。影響個人的選擇并出現相反的選擇結果。本文中我們提出結果從一系列的實驗設計,研究了外部監(jiān)管的影響對當地的環(huán)境的擠出效應。我們發(fā)現,他們的情況會很糟糕當他們面臨了一個寬松的政府規(guī)定，但理論標準卻表明其福利會上升。這樣做的原因似乎是不可思議的結果,當實驗的

47、對象面臨一個監(jiān)管約束對他們的行為的情況時,他們往往更傾向于純粹的平均主義,利己主義行為(也就是說,向純納什策略),而在缺乏監(jiān)管他們的選擇會更加的明顯。</p><p>　　我們并非首次表明制度的設計和行為的預期在實際上可能會產生相反的行為。許多學者建議支付高額報酬激勵社會所期望的行為，但實際上相反,因為它有可能排擠了個人的在某種意義上的公德心。提姆(1971)認為個人在捐血時更心甘情愿當他們作為志愿者時，而不是純

48、粹的自愿出錢為他們的捐贈。在環(huán)境方面,弗雷和奧博(1997)發(fā)現瑞士居民愿意在他們的社區(qū)接受核廢物處理,只是出于一種道德上的良心,他們通常會接受這個提議賠償的負外部性。坤仁素和埃斯特拉達(1990)在內華達州發(fā)現有類似的現象; 在拉斯維加斯山脈核廢物設施附近提高出口退稅未必能得到民眾的支持。</p><p>　　證據顯示,監(jiān)管機構可能會出現公眾支持排擠了更大的利益，但其動機卻不受限于貨幣報酬激勵的效果。奧斯曼(1

49、998)表明,外部控制的公共資源可能會有產生負面的影響,通過轉變管理機構的責任,而且并非單單從個人道德上的義務說明。弗拉羅奇和奧本海默(1998)設計了一系列的實驗來實現約翰·羅爾斯正義(1971)“無知之幕”語境中的所謂私人貢獻比公共投資要好的多。除了這樣一個結果外,實驗對象在賭一場比賽中,他們利益的起因出自于一個隨機個人償付的調動。這兩方面之間的聯系并不是個人的選擇和強迫主體償付的選擇考慮的后果。事實上,設計這款游戲是在處

50、理轉讓中夾雜生成的一個優(yōu)勢戰(zhàn)略，它十分有效率的滿足了公眾的利益。正如所預測的,實驗對象所做的貢獻也會跟著其大幅增加的公眾利益而增加。然而,這似乎對我們而言是最重要的發(fā)現,但同時也發(fā)現證據表明,制度的個人動機轉移了隨機利潤,走向更大的利益,即使事實是這個機構是一個強大的有方向的團體。簡言之,政府完成了它的目的,但是這似乎排擠了其他人的偏好。</p><p>　　我們對在考察外部機構的影響(法規(guī)強加誒一個團體)以及實

51、驗設置對行為的影響有興趣,特別是發(fā)展中國家中農村環(huán)境質量的外部控制。我們的設計有一定數量的特點,這二者相結合,使它相當獨特。(我們詳細的實驗設計是在第二節(jié)提供)。第一, 不是在實驗室環(huán)境下而進行實驗, 我們的實驗在田野中進行,在南美哥倫比亞的三個鄉(xiāng)村。第二,我們設計實驗時有意識地近似環(huán)境質量問題,在發(fā)展中國家農村村民很有可能要面對。具體地說,實驗者被要求去決定他們要花多少時間從周遭山林搜集柴火,雖然我知道這個活動都有負面影響,因為當地水

52、質的土壤侵蝕。第三,我們要考慮一系列的關于政府課稅的時間長短問題,才能夠使用搜集的柴火。課稅的執(zhí)行是適可而止,這是典型的指令指導環(huán)境政策。發(fā)展中國家的農村村民實際上要面對的。標準的經濟理論預言外部控制會產生更有效的選擇盡管配額的實施不是很強勢。</p><p>　　我們認為兩種方法審查外部控制對當地環(huán)境質量可能產生的擠出效應。每組實驗的對象參加有一定數量初始回合的比賽,沒有規(guī)定,沒有互相交流。其中的一個組團體繼續(xù)

53、在回合中發(fā)揮額外的作用,他們將要面臨政府的規(guī)定。其他小組也在回合中發(fā)揮額外作用,但是外部規(guī)定, 在回合之間自己的小組允許個人與他人交流。</p><p>　　允許一些群體溝通是出自這一事實, 在發(fā)展中國家經常是當地的合作努力取代外部制度。通過這一事實,比較并了解在提高水平的面對面的交流合作的一般類型的實驗。大部分關于這個主題的文獻總結是由加德納和沃克(1994),并Ledyard (1995)總結?？傊?研究結果

54、表明,提高個人交流的可能性將是由利己主義決定。</p><p>　　在第3部分,我們報告了我們的結果。相關文獻關于公共貨物的捐贈和公共財產的利用的實驗結果相一致的, [理查德 (1995),奧斯曼(1997,p.7)],我們發(fā)現當實驗對象不會面臨外部約束,不能互相交流,他們的決策往往是有效的策略，不存在純粹的“納什”的選擇,但存在于這兩個極端之間的某個地方。缺席的規(guī)定,簡單的溝通能力允許個人做更有效率的選擇。然而

55、,我們的研究結果的影響是外部監(jiān)管主體。平均來看,做出選擇,更接近他們的單純的納什的策略。因此,個人參與遠低于規(guī)定利潤的水平的情況下,只是允許那些實驗對象,互相交流,盡管事實是監(jiān)管機構設計誘使更有效率的選擇。</p><p>　　制度上的擠出效應表明政府控制當地的環(huán)境質量和自然資源的利用是出于好意,尤其是可以與不和諧的履行相比,非正式的本地的管理顯的更為有效。在第四節(jié)我們討論擠出效應的含義, 建議如何擴大這條線并加