[雙語翻譯]汽車保險外文翻譯--汽車保險的市場信息不對稱來自德國的證據(jù)（英文）

1、DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2013.12006.xAsymmetric Information in the Market for Automobile Insurance: Evidence From GermanyMartin Spindler Joachim Winter Steffen HagmayerAbstractAsymmetric information is an important pheno

2、menon in insurance markets, but the empirical evidence on the extent of adverse selection and moral haz- ard is mixed. Because of its implications for pricing, contract design, and regulation, it is crucial to test for a

3、symmetric information in specific insur- ance markets. In this article, we analyze a recent data set on automobile insurance in Germany, the largest such market in Europe. We present and compare a variety of statistical

4、testing procedures. We find that the extent of asymmetric information depends on coverage levels and on the specific risks covered, which enhances the previous literature. Within the framework of Chiappori et al. (2006),

5、 we also test whether drivers have realistic expecta- tions concerning their loss distribution, and we analyze the market structure.IntroductionSince Akerlof (1970), the consequences of asymmetric information, in particu

6、lar, ad- verse selection and moral hazard, have been explored in a vast body of research. The initial gap between the theoretical developments and empirical studies of asymmetric information has recently become narrower.

7、 In particular, insurance markets have proved a fruitful and productive field for empirical studies, for two reasons. First, theMartin Spindler is at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy, Munich, Ger

8、- many. Joachim Winter is at the University of Munich, Economics Department, Munich, Ger- many. Steffen Hagmayer, is at the HUK Coburg Insurance Group, Coburg, Germany. The authors can be contacted via e-mail: spindler@m

9、ea.mpisoc.mpg.de, joachim.winter@lrz.uni- muenchen.de,andsteffen.hagmayer@huk-coburg.de.MartinSpindlergratefullyacknowledges financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through GRK 801 and in partic- ular

10、from The Geneva Association through a research grant. We thank Bernard Salani´ e and Andreas Richter for valuable comments and discussions, and Thomas Yee for assistance in ap- plying the R package VGAM. We are grat

11、eful to participants of the EEA/ESEM annual meeting 2011 in Oslo, of the annual conference of the German Economic Association (VfS) 2011 in Frank- furt am Main and of the annual seminar of the EGRIE 2011 in Vienna. Parts

12、 of this paper were written while Martin Spindler was visiting Columbia University, which he thanks for its hos- pitality. We thank Editors Georges Dionne and Keith Crocker and an anonymous reviewer for valuable comments

13、 that helped to improve the paper.781© The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2013, Vol. 81, No. 4, 781–801Asymmetric Information in the Market for Automobile Insurance 783the underlying question of whether there is asy

14、mmetric information in a particular market. The tests we use are based on different statistical strategies; that is, they translate the formal definition of asymmetric information differently into a statistical framework

15、. Our finding that these tests deliver robust results suggests that the choice ofaparticularparametricmethodisonlyofsecondaryimportance;themoreimportant aspect is whether the institutional arrangements are taken into acc

16、ount when the tests are interpreted (as argued above).Finally, by applying the framework of Chiappori et al. (2006) we can also test (1) whether consumers know their loss distribution; (2) whether in this market the non-

17、 increasing profit assumption holds, that is, whether contracts with higher coverage earn not higher profits; and, most importantly, (3) whether some form of generalized positive correlation property holds (which is also

18、 valid when there are differences in risk preferences). The first two statements are interesting in their own right (al- though they serve as assumptions for the last one). Specifically, test (1) addresses an important p

19、ractical question in insurance economics: can the insureds correctly estimate their loss distribution or do they overestimate or underestimate their risk? Test (2) provides empirical evidence on the structure of the Germ

20、an car insurance market: our results show that the nonincreasing profit condition holds, which in- dicates that there was strong competition among insurance firms in the period for which we observe our data. This finding

21、 is in line with informal descriptions of this particular market that we discuss in the “Automobile Insurance in Germany” section.The rest of the article is structured as follows. The “Asymmetric Information in In- suran

22、ce Markets: Theory and Evidence” section outlines the theory of asymmetric information and summarizes the empirical literature relevant for our article. The “Au- tomobile Insurance in Germany” section describes the insti

23、tutional arrangements that govern car insurance in Germany and the structure of this specific insurance market. In “The Data Set” section, we describe the data set. In the “Testing for Asymmetric Information” section, we

24、 review briefly the parametric tests used in this field and present the results for our data set. In “The Generalized Positive Correlation Prop- erty” section, we introduce the generalized positive correlation property a

25、nd some related tests and present the results. Final remarks and conclusions are contained in the “Discussion and Concluding Remarks” section.Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: Theory and EvidenceIn their semin

26、al article Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) introduce the notion of adverse selection in insurance markets, which has since then been extended in many direc- tions.2 In the basic model, the insureds have private informatio

27、n about the expected claim, exactly speaking about the probability that a claim with fixed level occurs, while the insurers do not have this information. Thus, there are two groups with different2For a detailed survey on