金融專業(yè)外文翻譯---資本結(jié)構(gòu)的影響因素

1、<p>　　本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）</p><p>　　外 文 翻 譯</p><p><b>　　原文：</b></p><p>　　The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice</p><p>　　I. Determinants of Capital Stru

2、cture</p><p>　　In this section, we present a brief discussion of the attributes that different theories of capital structure suggest may affect the firm's debt-equity choice. These attributes are denoted

3、 asset structure, non-debt tax shields, growth, uniqueness, industry classification, size, earnings volatility, and profitability. The attributes, their relation to the optimal capital structure choice, and their observa

4、ble indicators are discussed below.</p><p>　　A. Collateral Value of Assets</p><p>　　Most capital structure theories argue that the type of assets owned by a firm in some way affects its capital

5、structure choice. Scott suggests that, by selling secured debt, firms increase the value of their equity by expropriating wealth from their existing unsecured creditors.Arguments put forth by Myers and Majluf also sugges

6、t that firms may find it advantageous to sell secured debt. Their model demonstrates that there may be costs associated with issuing securities about which the firm's man</p><p>　　Work by Galai and Masul

7、is , Jensen and Meckling , and Myers suggests that stockholders of leveraged firms have an incentive to invest yet to expropriate wealth from the firm's bondholders. This incentive may also induce a positive relation

8、 between debt ratios and the capacity of firms to collateralize their debt. If the debt can be collateralized, the borrower is restricted to use the funds for a specified project. Since no such guarantee can be used for

9、projects that cannot be collateralized, c</p><p>　　The tendency of managers to consume more than the optimal level of perquisites may produce the opposite relation between collateralized capital and debt lev

10、els. Grossman and Hart suggest that higher debt levels diminish this tendency because of the increased threat of bankruptcy. Managers of highly levered firms will also be less able to consume excessive perquisites since

11、bondholders (or bankers) are inclined to closely monitor such firms. The costs associated with this agency relation may be h</p><p>　　The estimated model incorporates two indicators for the collateral value

12、attribute. They include the ratio of intangible assets to total assets (INT/TA) and the ratio of inventory plus gross plant and equipment to total assets (IGP/TA). The first indicator is negatively related to the collate

13、ral value attribute, while the second is positively related to collateral value.</p><p>　　B. Non-Debt Tax Shields</p><p>　　DeAngelo and Masulis present a model of optimal capital structure that

14、incorporates the impact of corporate taxes, personal taxes, and non-debt-related corporate tax shields. They argue that tax deductions for depreciation and investment tax credits are substitutes for the tax benefits of d

15、ebt financing. As a result, firms with large non-debt tax shields relative to their expected cash flow include less debt in their capital structures.</p><p>　　Indicators of non-debt tax shields include the r

16、atios of investment tax credits over total assets (ITC/TA), depreciation over total assets (DITA), and a direct estimate of non-debt tax shields over total assets (NDT/TA). The latter measure is calculated from observed

17、federal income tax payments (T), operating income (OI), interest payments (i), and the corporate tax rate during our sample period (48%), using the following equation:</p><p>　　NDT = OI-i-T/0.48</p>&

18、lt;p>　　which follows from the equality</p><p>　　T= 0.48(0I- i-NDT)</p><p>　　These indicators measure the current tax deductions associated with capital equipment and, hence, only partially ca

19、pture the non-debt tax shield variable suggested by DeAngelo and Masulis. First, this attribute excludes tax deductions that are not associated with capital equipment, such as research and development and selling expense

20、s. (These variables, used as indicators of another attribute, are discussed later.) More important, our non-debt tax shield attribute represents tax deductions rathe</p><p><b>　　C. Growth</b><

21、/p><p>　　As we mentioned previously, equity-controlled firms have a tendency to invest suboptimally to expropriate wealth from the firm's bondholders. The cost associated with this agency relationship is li

22、kely to be higher for firms in growing industries, which have more flexibility in their choice of future investments. Expected future growth should thus be negatively related to long-term debt levels. Myers, however, not

23、ed that this agency problem is mitigated if the firm issues short-term rather than </p><p>　　It should also be noted that growth opportunities are capital assets that add value to a firm but cannot be collat

24、eralized and do not generate current taxable income. For this reason, the arguments put forth in the previous subsections also suggest a negative relation between debt and growth opportunities.</p><p>　　Indi

25、cators of growth include capital expenditures over total assets (CE/TA) and the growth of total assets measured by the percentage change in total assets (GTA). Since firms generally engage in research and development to

26、generate future investments, research and development over sales (RD/S) also serves as an indicator of the growth attribute.</p><p>　　D. Uniqueness</p><p>　　Titman presents a model in which a fi

27、rm's liquidation decision is causally linked to its bankruptcy status. As a result, the costs that firms can potentially impose on their customers, suppliers, and workers by liquidating are relevant to their capital

28、structure decisions. Customers, workers, and suppliers of firms that produce unique or specialized products probably suffer relatively high costs in the event that they liquidate. Their workers and suppliers probably hav

29、e job specific skills and c</p><p>　　Indictors of uniqueness include expenditures on research and development over sales (RD/S), selling expenses over sales (SEIS), and quit rates (QR), the percentage of the

30、 industry's total work force that voluntarily left their jobs in the sample years. It is postulated that RD/S measures uniqueness because firms that sell products with close substitutes ar'e likely to do less res

31、earch and development since their innovations can be more easily duplicated. In addition, successful research and deve</p><p>　　It is apparent from two of the indicators of uniqueness, RD/S and SEIS, that th

32、is attribute may also be related to non-debt tax shields and collateral value. Research and development and some selling expenses (such as advertising) can be considered capital goods that are immediately expensed and ca

33、nnot be used as collateral. Given that our estimation technique can only imperfectly control for these other attributes, the uniqueness attribute may be negatively related to the observed debt ratio be</p><p&g

34、t;　　E. Industry Classification</p><p>　　Titman suggests that firms that make products requiring the availability of specialized servicing and spare parts will find liquidation especially costly. This indicat

35、es that firms manufacturing machines and equipment should be financed with relatively less debt. To measure this, we include a dummy variable equal to one for firms with SIC codes between 3400 and 4000 (firms producing m

36、achines and equipment) and zero otherwise as a separate attribute affecting the debt ratios.</p><p><b>　　F. Size</b></p><p>　　A number of authors have suggested that leverage ratios

37、may be related to firm size. Warner and Ang, Chua, and McConnell provide evidence that suggests that direct bankruptcy costs appear to constitute a larger proportion of a firm's value as that value decreases. It is a

38、lso the case that relatively large firms tend to be more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy. These arguments suggest that large firms should be more highly leveraged.</p><p>　　The cost of issuing debt

39、and equity securities is also related to firm size. In particular, small firms pay much more than large firms to issue new equity (see Smith) and also somewhat more to issue long-term debt. This suggests that small firms

40、 may be more leveraged than large firms and may prefer to borrow short term (through bank loans) rather than issue long-term debt because of the lower fixed costs associated with this alternative.</p><p>　　W

41、e use the natural logarithm of sales (LnS) and quit rates (QR) as indicators of size. The logarithmic transformation of sales reflects our view that a size effect, if it exists, affects mainly the very small firms. The i

42、nclusion of quit rates, as an indicator of size, reflects the phenomenon that large firms, which often offer wider career opportunities to their employees, have lower quit rates.</p><p>　　G. Volatility</p

43、><p>　　Many authors have also suggested that a firm's optimal debt level is a decreasing function of the volatility of earnings. We were only able to include one indicator of volatility that cannot be direc

44、tly affected by the firm's debt level. It is the standard deviation of the percentage change in operating income (SIGOI). Since it is the only indicator of volatility, we must assume that it measures this attribute w

45、ithout error.</p><p>　　H. Profitability</p><p>　　Myers cites evidence from Donaldson and Brealey and Myers that suggests that firms prefer raising capital, first from retained earnings, second f

46、rom debt, and third from issuing new equity. He suggests that this behavior may be due to the costs of issuing new equity. These can be the costs discussed in Myers and Majluf that arise because of asymmetric information

47、, or they can be transaction costs. In either case, the past profitability of a firm, and hence the amount of earnings available to be </p><p>　　II. Measures of Capital Structure</p><p>　　Six me

48、asures of financial leverage are used in this study. They are long-term, short-term, and convertible debt divided by market and by book values of equity.8 Although these variables could have been combined to extract a co

49、mmon "debt ratio" attribute, which could in turn be regressed against the independent attributes, there is good reason for not doing this. Some of the theories of capital structure have different implications f

50、or the different types of debt, and, for the reasons discussed b</p><p>　　Data limitations force us to measure debt in terms of book values rather than market values. It would, perhaps, have been better if m

51、arket value data were available for debt. However, Bowman demonstrated that the cross-sectional correlation between the book value and market value of debt is very large, so the misspecification due to using book value m

52、easures is probably fairly small. Furthermore, we have no reason to suspect that the cross-sectional differences between market values and book val</p><p>　　Source: Sheridan Titman; Roberto Wessels,1988.“The

53、 Determinants of Capital Structure Choice”. The Journal of Finance. Vol.43, No.1, march.pp.1-19.</p><p><b>　　譯文：</b></p><p><b>　　資本結(jié)構(gòu)的影響因素</b></p><p>　　I、資本結(jié)

54、構(gòu)的決定因素</p><p>　　在本節(jié)中，我們提出了一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)短討論資本結(jié)構(gòu)的不同理論認(rèn)為可能會(huì)影響公司的債務(wù)權(quán)益選擇的屬性。這些屬性表示的資產(chǎn)結(jié)構(gòu)，非債務(wù)稅盾，成長(zhǎng)性，獨(dú)特性，行業(yè)分類，規(guī)模，盈利波動(dòng)性和盈利能力。它們之間的關(guān)系以最優(yōu)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇，他們的觀察指標(biāo)在下面討論。</p><p>　　A、資產(chǎn)抵押品的價(jià)值</p><p>　　大部分資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論認(rèn)為，由

55、一個(gè)以某種方式公司國(guó)有資產(chǎn)的類型會(huì)影響其資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇。斯科特認(rèn)為，通過出售抵押債務(wù)，公司增加了其現(xiàn)有的無抵押債權(quán)人的財(cái)富，他們的股票價(jià)值。邁爾斯和麥吉羅夫提出的理論也表明，企業(yè)可能會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)它有利的出售抵押債務(wù)。他們的模型表明，有可能與證券發(fā)行的有關(guān)該公司的內(nèi)部人員比外部股東的享有更多的信息。發(fā)行債務(wù)與已知價(jià)值財(cái)產(chǎn)擔(dān)保避免這些費(fèi)用。出于這個(gè)原因，那些能用作抵押的資產(chǎn)的公司將利用這個(gè)機(jī)會(huì)可能會(huì)發(fā)行更多的債務(wù)預(yù)計(jì)。</p>&l

56、t;p>　　伽來和馬蘇利斯，詹森和麥克林，邁爾斯工作表明，杠桿企業(yè)的股東有動(dòng)力投資還從該公司的債券持有人劫富濟(jì)貧。這個(gè)激勵(lì)可能也會(huì)引起一個(gè)積極的關(guān)系,有能力公司的債務(wù)比例主要負(fù)責(zé)評(píng)估其債券。如果債務(wù)抵押證券, 借款人僅限于使用特定項(xiàng)目的資金。因?yàn)闆]有這樣的保證抵押證券，債權(quán)人可能需要更多的有利條件,從而可能導(dǎo)致這些公司使用股權(quán)而不能債務(wù)融資。</p><p>　　管理人員消耗比額外津貼最佳水平之間可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生

57、抵押債券資本和債務(wù)水平相對(duì)關(guān)系更多。格羅斯曼和哈特表明，因?yàn)槠飘a(chǎn)的威脅增加了較高的債務(wù)水平降低這一趨勢(shì)。因?yàn)閭钟腥耍ɑ蜚y行）傾向于過度的特殊待遇，可能使用較少高杠桿密切監(jiān)察這類公司。與此相關(guān)的代理關(guān)系可能對(duì)資產(chǎn)較少，因?yàn)檫@類公司的監(jiān)管資本支出債券資本更高的成本是企業(yè)可能更加困難。出于這個(gè)原因，債券資本資產(chǎn)的公司可以選擇較高的債務(wù)水平，以限制其經(jīng)理人的額外補(bǔ)貼消費(fèi)。</p><p>　　模型采用了兩個(gè)估計(jì)為抵押

58、物的價(jià)值屬性指標(biāo)。它們包括以（INT/TA）的總資產(chǎn)的比率無形資產(chǎn)和存貨加上機(jī)器及設(shè)備總值的比例（IGP/TA）的總資產(chǎn)。第一個(gè)指標(biāo)是負(fù)相關(guān)抵押品的價(jià)值屬性，而第二個(gè)是正相關(guān)的抵押品價(jià)值。</p><p><b>　　B、非債務(wù)稅盾</b></p><p>　　迪安杰洛和馬修利斯提出了優(yōu)化資本結(jié)構(gòu)模型，結(jié)合了公司稅，個(gè)人所得稅，非債務(wù)稅盾對(duì)相關(guān)企業(yè)的影響。他們認(rèn)為，折

59、舊和投資稅收抵免稅收減免是債務(wù)融資的稅收優(yōu)惠替代品。因此，非債務(wù)稅盾公司在其資本結(jié)構(gòu)債務(wù)較少相對(duì)其預(yù)期的現(xiàn)金流。</p><p>　　非債務(wù)稅盾的指標(biāo)包括總資產(chǎn)超過（ITC/TA），折舊超過（DITA）總資產(chǎn)投資稅收抵免比例，以及非債務(wù)稅盾以上（NDT/TA）的總資產(chǎn)的直接估計(jì)。后者的措施是從觀察到的聯(lián)邦收入計(jì)算納稅（T）的營(yíng)業(yè)收入（OI），利息支付（i），而且整個(gè)樣本期內(nèi)（48％）使用下列公式，企業(yè)所得稅率：&

60、lt;/p><p>　　NDT=OI-i-T/0.48</p><p><b>　　它遵循的平等轉(zhuǎn)換：</b></p><p>　　T=0.48(0I-i-NDT)</p><p>　　這些指標(biāo)衡量現(xiàn)行的稅收減免與資本設(shè)備相關(guān)，因此，迪安杰洛和馬修利斯的建議只有部分捕獲的非債務(wù)稅盾變量。首先，這個(gè)屬性不包括資本設(shè)備等的研發(fā)和

61、銷售費(fèi)用扣除的稅。（這些變量，作為其他屬性的指標(biāo)，在后面討論。）更重要的是，我們的非債務(wù)稅盾的屬性表示減稅再減稅，而不是真正的經(jīng)濟(jì)折舊和建議變動(dòng)費(fèi)用。不幸的是，這最好的屬性很難衡量。</p><p><b>　　C、增長(zhǎng)</b></p><p>　　正如我們前面提到的，股權(quán)控制的企業(yè)有一種傾向，不是最優(yōu)的投資從該公司的債券持有人獲取資金彌補(bǔ)。與此相關(guān)的代理關(guān)系的成本很

62、可能是在增長(zhǎng)的行業(yè)，這對(duì)他們更對(duì)企業(yè)未來投資選擇的靈活性更高。因此，預(yù)計(jì)未來的增長(zhǎng)長(zhǎng)期的債務(wù)水平應(yīng)該是負(fù)相關(guān)。但是，邁爾斯指出代理問題，如果公司發(fā)行短期而不是長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)。這表明，短期債務(wù)比率可能實(shí)際上是對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率正相關(guān)，如果越來越多的企業(yè)以短期長(zhǎng)期融資。詹森和麥克林，史密斯和華納，和格林認(rèn)為，該機(jī)構(gòu)將降低成本，如果公司發(fā)行可轉(zhuǎn)換債券。這表明，可轉(zhuǎn)換債券的比例可能是正相關(guān)的發(fā)展機(jī)遇。</p><p>　　還應(yīng)該指出

63、，發(fā)展機(jī)會(huì)是資本增值的資產(chǎn)，一個(gè)確定的，但不能抵押，不產(chǎn)生應(yīng)納稅所得額。由于這個(gè)原因，在以前的論據(jù)小節(jié)也提出債務(wù)和發(fā)展機(jī)會(huì)的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。</p><p>　　成長(zhǎng)指標(biāo)包括資本支出超過的總資產(chǎn)和由在總資產(chǎn)變動(dòng)率測(cè)得的總資產(chǎn)增長(zhǎng)。由于企業(yè)普遍從事研究和開發(fā)，以創(chuàng)造未來的投資，研究和超過銷售的發(fā)展，也可作為屬性指標(biāo)的增長(zhǎng)。</p><p><b>　　D、唯一性</b>&l

64、t;/p><p>　　蒂特漫指出了一種在一個(gè)公司的清算決策有因果聯(lián)系的破產(chǎn)狀態(tài)模式。因此，企業(yè)有可能給其客戶，供應(yīng)商，工人和清算有關(guān)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)決策。顧客，工人和生產(chǎn)公司，具有獨(dú)特性或?qū)I(yè)化的產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商在事件可能遭受成本相對(duì)較高。他們的工人和供應(yīng)商可能會(huì)有職業(yè)技能訓(xùn)練和資本,以及他們客戶會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)很難找到替代服務(wù)對(duì)于他們相當(dāng)特別的產(chǎn)品。由于這些原因,唯一性和負(fù)債比率負(fù)相關(guān)。</p><p>　　其獨(dú)

65、特見解包括研究和銷售的支出，銷售費(fèi)用超過銷售費(fèi)用，以及退出率，該行業(yè)的總勞動(dòng)人口的百分比自愿留在樣本幾年的工作。我們假定RD/S措施,因?yàn)楣境鍪郛a(chǎn)品獨(dú)特性以接近的替代品少可能去做研究和開發(fā)創(chuàng)新,因?yàn)樗麄兛梢愿菀椎膹?fù)制。此外，成功的研究和發(fā)展項(xiàng)目導(dǎo)致從市場(chǎng)上現(xiàn)有的這些不同的新產(chǎn)品。相對(duì)獨(dú)特的產(chǎn)品的企業(yè)，預(yù)計(jì)更多的宣傳，并在一般情況下，花費(fèi)在推廣和銷售自己的產(chǎn)品信息。因此，SE/S是預(yù)計(jì)正相關(guān)的獨(dú)特性。不過，預(yù)計(jì)在較高退出率的行業(yè)的公司

66、可能是唯一的，因?yàn)楣鞠鄬?duì)較少，產(chǎn)生相對(duì)獨(dú)特的產(chǎn)品往往采用與特定工作的高層次，因此有了它昂貴，給他們的工作人員人力資本。</p><p>　　很明顯的獨(dú)特性，從兩個(gè)指標(biāo)，RD/S的和SE/S，這個(gè)屬性也可能與非負(fù)債稅盾和抵押品價(jià)值。研究和開發(fā)以及一些銷售費(fèi)用（如廣告）可以認(rèn)為是資本支出，不能立即被用作抵押的貨物。由于我們估計(jì)技術(shù)只能不完全控制這些其他屬性，屬性的唯一性，可負(fù)相關(guān)，因?yàn)樗恼嚓P(guān)與非負(fù)債稅盾和抵押品

67、價(jià)值與負(fù)債比率呈負(fù)相關(guān)觀察。</p><p><b>　　E、產(chǎn)業(yè)分類</b></p><p>　　泰特曼指出，企業(yè)要求使產(chǎn)品的專業(yè)化服務(wù)和零配件供應(yīng)將發(fā)現(xiàn)特別昂貴的清算。這表明，公司生產(chǎn)的機(jī)器和設(shè)備應(yīng)以相對(duì)較少的債務(wù)融資。來衡量，我們包含了一個(gè)虛擬變量等于SIC代碼為3400和4000之間的企業(yè)（公司生產(chǎn)的機(jī)器和設(shè)備），否則看成是一個(gè)獨(dú)立的屬性影響的債務(wù)比例。<

68、;/p><p><b>　　F、標(biāo)準(zhǔn)</b></p><p>　　一些作者建議，杠桿比率可能與企業(yè)規(guī)模有關(guān)。華納和卬，蔡和康納提供證據(jù)表明，直接破產(chǎn)成本似乎構(gòu)成了一個(gè)公司的價(jià)值作為該值跌幅較大的比例。這也是比較大的情況是，企業(yè)往往更多樣化，更不容易破產(chǎn)。這些參數(shù)表明，大企業(yè)應(yīng)該更加高度杠桿。</p><p>　　對(duì)發(fā)行債券和股票證券的成本也與企業(yè)規(guī)

69、模有關(guān)。特別是，小企業(yè)比大企業(yè)支付更多的費(fèi)用發(fā)行新股票，也較為發(fā)行長(zhǎng)期債務(wù)。這表明，小企業(yè)可能比大公司可能更愿意使用杠桿和短期借款（通過銀行貸款），而不是發(fā)行長(zhǎng)期貸款，因?yàn)榕c此相關(guān)的債務(wù)降低固定成本。</p><p>　　我們使用的銷售自然對(duì)數(shù)和大小的指標(biāo)率。銷售數(shù)變換反映一個(gè)規(guī)模效應(yīng)，我們認(rèn)為，如果存在，主要影響非常小企業(yè)。將退出利率,例如大小的一個(gè)指標(biāo),反映出現(xiàn)象,并經(jīng)常大公司提供了更廣泛的職業(yè)發(fā)展機(jī)會(huì),對(duì)他

70、們的員工有較低的退出率。</p><p><b>　　G、波動(dòng)</b></p><p>　　許多作者還建議，公司的債務(wù)水平是一個(gè)最佳的盈利波動(dòng)的減函數(shù)。我們只能包含一個(gè)波動(dòng)性的指標(biāo)，不能直接由該公司的債務(wù)水平的影響。它是對(duì)營(yíng)業(yè)收入的百分比變化的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)差。因?yàn)樗俏ㄒ恢笜?biāo)的波動(dòng)，我們必須假設(shè)它沒有錯(cuò)誤這個(gè)屬性措施。</p><p><b>

71、;　　H、盈利能力</b></p><p>　　引用唐納森、布來雷和梅爾斯的見解指出，表明公司募集資金方式,首先從留存收益,第二從債務(wù)中,第三發(fā)放新的股權(quán)。他認(rèn)為這種行為可能是由于發(fā)行新股的費(fèi)用。梅爾斯和梅吉拉夫討論這些可變成本是由于信息不對(duì)稱的出現(xiàn)或者交易成本。在這兩種情況下,公司的總利潤(rùn)可保留,是重要的決定了其當(dāng)前的資本結(jié)構(gòu)。我們使用比例是營(yíng)業(yè)收入銷售和運(yùn)營(yíng)收入超過總資產(chǎn)的指標(biāo)的盈利能力。<

72、/p><p>　　II、資本結(jié)構(gòu)的措施</p><p>　　六組財(cái)務(wù)杠桿應(yīng)用研究中。他們長(zhǎng)期、短期與可轉(zhuǎn)換債券除以市場(chǎng)股權(quán)的賬面價(jià)值雖然這些變量可以被結(jié)合提取一個(gè)通用的“負(fù)債比率”屬性,反過來是獨(dú)立的屬性與回歸,有很好的原因,沒有這樣做。一些資本結(jié)構(gòu)的有關(guān)理論會(huì)產(chǎn)生不同的影響對(duì)不同類型的債券,探討了這些問題產(chǎn)生的原因下,預(yù)測(cè)系數(shù)在結(jié)構(gòu)模型根據(jù)是否可能與測(cè)量的債務(wù)比例從書或的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值。此外,測(cè)量

73、誤差是非獨(dú)立變量的干擾歸入期限和偏置回歸系數(shù)。</p><p>　　測(cè)量數(shù)據(jù)的限制迫使我們債務(wù)而不是賬面價(jià)值方面的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值。也許,如果市場(chǎng)得到更好的值是可行的債務(wù)。然而,鮑曼表明橫斷式相關(guān)性的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值的賬面價(jià)值和債務(wù)很大,由于使用賬面價(jià)值誤差的措施可能是相當(dāng)少。此外,我們沒有理由懷疑橫向差異賬面價(jià)值和市場(chǎng)價(jià)值的債務(wù)應(yīng)與相關(guān)建議某些行業(yè)企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論,因此沒有明顯的偏見,因?yàn)檫@將導(dǎo)致誤差。</p>

74、<p>　　然而,一些其他的重要來源的虛假的相關(guān)性。非獨(dú)立變量的可能應(yīng)用于該研究解釋變量與即使債務(wù)水平是隨機(jī)的。先考慮這樣的情形,管理者樹立他們的債務(wù)水平根據(jù)一些隨機(jī)選定目標(biāo)測(cè)量比賬面價(jià)值。這不會(huì)非理性事實(shí)上如果資本結(jié)構(gòu)無關(guān)緊要。如果管理者樹立債務(wù)水平從賬面價(jià)值,而不是市場(chǎng)價(jià)值的比例,然后差異在公司的市場(chǎng)價(jià)值差異以外的原因出現(xiàn)在他們的書中數(shù)值(如不同生長(zhǎng)的機(jī)會(huì))不一定會(huì)影響總數(shù)量的債務(wù)問題。由于這些分歧,當(dāng)然,影響它們的股票