績效評價外文翻譯---公共部門中的績效悖論

1、<p>　　公共部門中的績效悖論</p><p><b>　　一、引 言</b></p><p>　　現(xiàn)在，國家投入了比以往任何時候都要多的注意力、時間和金錢在公共部門的績效衡量和評價上（經(jīng)濟合作與發(fā)展組織［OECD］，1996；Pollitt & Bouckaert，2000；p.87；Power，1997）。基于結(jié)果的管理是各級公共部門一整天的

2、話題，從地方、區(qū)域、國家，甚至前國家。學校和大學，地方政府，其他行政組織，發(fā)展援助機構(gòu)（非政府組織和國際非政府組織），和組織，世界銀行都參與績效結(jié)果上的數(shù)據(jù)和信息制造，如果可能的話，也包括對績效結(jié)果的影響。Power（1994，1997，2000）甚至提到“審計爆炸”或“審計的社會”。新公共管理領域的信徒將一個高度優(yōu)先事項歸于計量產(chǎn)出和成果。他們旨在根據(jù)這種理想信息基礎上的新政策和管理活動，使得政策的執(zhí)行更有效率和效力。但是，評價研究表

3、明，很多試圖引進基于結(jié)果的管理方式最后仍然不成功（例如Leeuw & Van Gils, 1999, 荷蘭研究述評）。不過，衡量產(chǎn)出、成果、和評價活動的需要在政治家和行政人員發(fā)表的改善政府工作表現(xiàn)的聲明中仍然是一個重要的組成部分。</p><p>　　下面，我們將表明以下觀點：公共部門產(chǎn)出計量的增加會導致某些意想不到的后果，不僅可能會廢止公共部門績效的結(jié)論，也會消極地影響這個績效。我們將通過一些不同的例子

4、表明，公共部門的一些特征在發(fā)展和使用績效指標之后還會適得其反。最后，我們將就如何處理公共部門中運用績效評估造成的問題提出一些建議。我們認為，這個問題非常重要。因為，盡管存在問題，績效衡量仍對公共部門的日常運作，特別是公共支出，存在不菲的價值。</p><p>　　二、公共部門中的績效考核</p><p>　　隨著行政改革的崛起，公共部門中的績效考核得到了愈來愈多的關(guān)注（cf.power,2

5、000）。在上世紀80年代，大多數(shù)西方國家由于經(jīng)濟衰退和國際競爭加劇，逐漸引發(fā)了這種改革。而這場改革的口號便是“新公共管理”。它的目標是雙重的：削減預算，并提高政府官僚機構(gòu)的效力和效率。為了實現(xiàn)后一個目標，市場型的機制，如私有化，和競爭性的招標，都被引進了公共部門。另外，單位和部門被賣出進入準自治非政府組織。這種例子比比皆是（對10個OECD國家的評論，Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000）。</p>

6、<p>　　處于這些變化之下的實踐理論是，政治家應該堅持自己的核心業(yè)務，即制定新的政策來實現(xiàn)（政治）的目標。奧斯本和蓋布勒（1992）的格言是“指導而不是爭吵”。根據(jù)這些新公共管理大師，政策的執(zhí)行應留給市場，或者，如果這是不可能的，給（半）自治組織運作中的準市場環(huán)境（例如，競爭的學?；蜥t(yī)院）。這種分離的政策和管理是通過政府與實施政策的組織之間擬定的合同來提供便利的。該合同明確什么任務將被執(zhí)行，哪些代理人將會受到“獎勵”。代理

7、人的業(yè)績表現(xiàn)在績效指標方面，如產(chǎn)品的數(shù)量或提供的服務?！巴度搿惫芾硪蚨脖粌A向于注重結(jié)果的“產(chǎn)出”管理所取代。類似的變化同樣發(fā)生在政府官僚機構(gòu)，在那里，自我管理和合同管理引入（部分）取代了分層指導。</p><p>　　上述變化導致公共部門采用大量私人機構(gòu)技術(shù)以衡量和改善績效，如績效指標。指標不僅使政治家來衡量和評價公共及私人政策執(zhí)行組織的業(yè)績，它們也增加了認定業(yè)績的機會——行政改革的另一目標。顯然，所有這些變化

8、都基于一個強有力的信念，即公共部門的績效是可衡量的。但是，正如我們下面要討論的那樣，信仰可能過于簡單化（cf. Fountain, 2001）。</p><p><b>　　三、績效悖論</b></p><p>　　績效悖論指的是績效指標和績效本身之間的薄弱聯(lián)系（Meyer & Gupta, 1994; Meyer & O'Shaughness

9、y, 1993）。這種現(xiàn)象是被績效指標減少一段運行時間的趨勢所引起的。它們失去了作為績效衡量的價值，并且不能夠區(qū)分好和差的業(yè)績。因此，實際和報告出來的業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系便下滑了。</p><p>　　績效指標的惡化是由四個過程引起的（Meyer & Gupta, 1994, pp. 330-342）。第一個過程被稱為積極的學習，也就是說，業(yè)績的改善時，指標失去了其檢測不良業(yè)績的靈敏度。事實上，當指標過時時，每

10、個人都會做得很好。第二個進程是所謂的有害學習。當組織或個人了解到哪些方面的業(yè)績被衡量（哪些不被衡量）的時候，他們可以利用這些信息來操縱他們的評估。例如，當他們把所有的努力都用到要衡量的方面時，績效水平就上去了。但是，總體上可能沒有實際的改進，甚至可能是另一方面績效的惡化（cf. tunnel vision）（Smith, 1995）。第三個進程，選擇，指的是以績效高的更換績效低下者，從而降低績效差異。第四，當績效中差異被忽略時，抑制就出

11、現(xiàn)了。</p><p>　　重要的是要認識到，矛盾的是不是業(yè)績本身，而是有關(guān)的業(yè)績報告。與期望相反，指標并沒有準確地報告業(yè)績。這可能意味著績效比所報告的要差，但也有認為比報告要好的情況。在后一種情況下，績效悖論可能被認為沒有壞處。然而，在績效評估結(jié)果是用來評價組織或個人時，出現(xiàn)這些不公正的制裁的情況可能會上升。破案率下降，表明警方的績效在不斷惡化。但是，在研究期間內(nèi)，之前相比，更多的肇事者已被逮捕，起訴和懲罰，這

12、又表明，績效水平改進了。Wiebrens和Essers （ 1999 ）表明，在荷蘭，犯罪模式走向了廢止（國際公認的）指標。例如，犯罪已經(jīng)越來越暴力，但是指標卻沒有區(qū)分像重罪和輕罪這類的差別。此外，更多的犯罪團伙由于一起犯罪被逮捕，比如破壞，這降低了刑事罪行的平均數(shù)目。Wiebrens和Essers得出結(jié)論，這不是警方的效果不好，而是指標不好。因此它應該被取代。</p><p>　　另一個績效悖論的例子存在于關(guān)于

13、超過代表性的事件中，它來自smith（1995）。在英國國民健康服務中心，與會者一致認為，患者為做手術(shù)而等待的時間不得超過2年。這些項措施似乎取得成功，因為輪候的平均時間減少了。然而，進一步檢查發(fā)現(xiàn)，減少是因為等待時間只有在第一次醫(yī)院協(xié)商之后才開始計算，而協(xié)商被推遲，以減少等待時間。事實上，等待時間并沒有減少，只是轉(zhuǎn)移了而已。該指標沒有準確地反映業(yè)績；它報告了一個本不存在的改善。</p><p>　　四、公共部門

14、中績效悖論的發(fā)現(xiàn)和預防</p><p>　　盡管大多數(shù)的讀者都承認迄今為止我們已經(jīng)給的例子，但是在績效中跟蹤績效悖論仍然不容易。它不僅可以采取許多不同的形式，也可以無意間導致一些變數(shù)，如政府的要求，需要執(zhí)行的任務的要求，含糊不清或相互矛盾性質(zhì)的政策目標，以及執(zhí)行機構(gòu)的能力。此外，一個人往往不知道績效悖論的存在，直到為時已晚。因為，只要一切順利，或看似順利，沒有必要進行干預（cf. Leeuw, 1995）。一個爆

15、竹廠爆炸的例子中發(fā)現(xiàn)，調(diào)查原因，這場災難揭示了一系列“小”的問題，這些問題本身并不被視為是災難性的。例如，這個事件中明顯缺乏地方和中央政府，監(jiān)察局，消防部門的監(jiān)督。缺乏適當?shù)谋O(jiān)督，就會阻止對非法活動發(fā)生的發(fā)現(xiàn)。因此，在住宅區(qū)經(jīng)營的授權(quán)被不公正地無條件延長了。當火災在工廠的地面上發(fā)生時，社區(qū)被摧毀，人喪生。小問題的積累變成了大問題，但顯然沒有任何機制或制度，以檢測和避免這樣的小錯誤的積累。當然，當?shù)卣捅蛔肪控熑危荒苁鞘潞?。這留給我們

16、一個問題，即我們怎樣才能檢測和預防公共部門中績效悖論的發(fā)生。</p><p>　　一些策略用來跟蹤績效悖論是可行的。理想的情況下，比較實際的執(zhí)行情況和報告，是最好的方式。然而，這種比較一般很難，因為缺乏比較資料。替代方法是：（1）使用外部來源獲得的信息，如國家監(jiān)察員，基層組織，和客戶端小組的工作；（2）從現(xiàn)有的指標制定新的業(yè)績指標，例如，一個百分比評分替代總支出或總產(chǎn)出；或（3）分析的考核體系。</p>

17、;<p>　　績效考核體系的分析將不得不把重點放到一些特征上。首先，指標的數(shù)量是重要的，所有需要執(zhí)行的任務都要求制定相應的指標。由于很少為總績效的有限部分制定相應指標，這便促進了績效悖論的發(fā)生。當指標過時卻仍不改變時，這種效果就會加強。接下來，應注意指標的制定者。制定自己績效指標的組織有更多的機會來操縱信息以實現(xiàn)自己的利益，從而引起了績效悖論（凡泰爾，2001年）。第三，它需要建立問責制以確定是否所有的要求都得到了滿足。如

18、果沒有，就需要知道代理人沒報告的業(yè)績及其原因?？冃蟾嬷械牟罹嗫梢灾赶蚋哂诨虻陀诳冃Х矫娴谋憩F(xiàn)然后指出績效方面的矛盾。最后，應該對行政和組織基礎的考核體系進行調(diào)查。</p><p>　　公共部門績效評估不得不將公共服務的性質(zhì)用記事的方式來表現(xiàn)。專業(yè)服務的方式被生產(chǎn)和消費，并且公共服務的方式被具有影響績效檢測的社會所重視。在公共部門，消費者參與服務提供過程；影響產(chǎn)出和結(jié)果（cf. Fountain, 2001, p

19、.58）。此外，大部分產(chǎn)品是無形的。因此，績效指標應力求反映質(zhì)量和可靠性，而不是“硬性”的產(chǎn)品屬性。公共服務不僅有關(guān)效率和效益，更是關(guān)于正義，公平，平等和問責制。Fountain （2001）警告說，私人部門技術(shù)的應用，如績效指標，不能取代，甚至可能掩蓋如公共服務所提供的政治或民主成果。</p><p>　　McGuire（2001）探討了一個績效監(jiān)測框架的例子，似乎考慮到了之前討論過的一些經(jīng)驗。這個框架是由生產(chǎn)

20、力委員會為澳大利亞政府理事會制定的，以此為基準，來衡量教育、衛(wèi)生、住房和社區(qū)服務方面的績效（可以在www.pc.gov.au/gsp上查到）。該框架是澳大利亞所有政府合作制定的，它詳細討論了績效指標的局限性，以及人類服務提供的復雜性。它包括程序和業(yè)務指標，衡量效率（輸出）和有效性（成果）以及一些不同的層面。定量措施與服務系統(tǒng)的內(nèi)容分析相結(jié)合。</p><p>　　這個COAG績效信息被政府機構(gòu)用來評估業(yè)績，并確定

21、需求和資源。該框架的透明度，改善了業(yè)績和問責制。然而，這透明度“增加，而不是解決了公共服務分配結(jié)果方面的政治沖突”（ McGuire, 2001, p. 17）。因為政治沖突增加了問責制的機會，而這不應視為績效評估的一種消極后果。</p><p><b>　　五、結(jié)論</b></p><p>　　隨著上世紀八十年代和九十年代行政改革的進行，公共部門中績效評估的增加已經(jīng)

22、產(chǎn)生了幾個意想不到的后果，且威脅到了看不到的績效和績效本身。為了對付這些后果，績效評估體系應該將公共部門的特殊性質(zhì)考慮進去。有爭議性的績效指標需要使用多個指標，即政策執(zhí)行的不同方面（有形和無形的）和反映各方（政治家，管理人員，供資者，供應商，采購商和消費者）的利益。此外，必須在太多和沒有足夠措施的壓力兩者之間尋求平衡點。</p><p>　　一些新的監(jiān)督機制的增加，可能有助于打擊意想不到的后果，如績效悖論（cf.

23、 also Power, 1997）。例如，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)使得公共部門績效信息可為每個人所知，這增加了作弊的代理人被抓的風險。第二，公民憲章，開放的政府行為守則的實踐和新的申訴程序，增加了不滿意的客戶投訴處理表現(xiàn)不好的組織的機會。這些新的，更加橫向化的績效評估將補充公共部門中的績效評估體系。最后，學者應該制定和測試能夠解釋績效悖論發(fā)生和其他不良后果的理論（Scott, 2001）。更多關(guān)于組織行為的理論、機構(gòu)和公共部門使用績效指標的影響等方面的

24、知識，可以幫助政府真正實現(xiàn)績效指標在公共領域的預期優(yōu)點。</p><p>　　THE PERFORMANCE PARADOX IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR</p><p>　　Introduction</p><p>　　Nowadays, states spend more attention, time, and money on performan

25、ce measurement and evaluation in the public sector than ever before (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 1996; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000, p. 87; Power, 1997). Results-based management i

26、s the talk of the day at all levels of the public sector: local, regional, national, and even supra national. Schools and universities, local governments, other administrative agencies, developmental aid organizations<

27、;/p><p>　　Below, we will argue that this increase of output measurement in the public sector can lead to several unintended consequences that may not only invalidate conclusions on public sector performance but

28、 can also negatively influence that performance .We will show that a number of characteristics of the public sector can be counterproductive to developing and using performance indicators, illustrated by different exampl

29、es. Finally, we will conclude with some suggestions on how to deal with the prob</p><p>　　Performance Assessment in the Public Sector</p><p>　　The increased attention to performance assessment i

30、n the public sector coincides with the rise of administrative reform (cf. Power, 2000). In the 1980s, economic decline and increased international competition triggered such reform in most western states. New Public Mana

31、gement was the catchword (Hood, 1994). The objective was twofold: to cut budgets and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government bureaucracy. To achieve the latter objective, market-type mechanisms such as

32、privatiza</p><p>　　The practitioner theory underlying these changes is that politicians should stick to their core business that is, developing new policies to realize (political) goals. Osborne and Gaebler&

33、#39;s (1992) adage was "steering not rowing." According to these NPM gurus, policy implementation should be left to the market or, if that is not possible, to (semi)-autonomous organizations operating in a quas

34、i-market environment (e.g., competition between schools or hospitals).This separation of policy and admini</p><p>　　The aforementioned changes in the public sector led to the adoption of a large number of pr

35、ivate sector techniques to measure and improve performance, such as performance indicators. Not only do indicators enable politicians to measure and evaluate the performance of public and private policy-implementing orga

36、nizations, they also increase the opportunities to account for performance—another important goal of administrative reform (Jenkins, Leeuw, & Van Thiel, in press). Obviously, all these chan</p><p>　　The

37、Performance Paradox</p><p>　　The performance paradox refers to a weak correlation between performance indicators and performance itself (Meyer & Gupta, 1994; Meyer & O'Shaughnessy, 1993). This ph

38、enomenon is caused by the tendency of performance indicators to run down over time. They lose their value as measurements of performance and can no longer discriminate between good and bad performers. As a result, the re

39、lationship between actual and reported performance declines.</p><p>　　Deterioration of performance indicators is caused by four processes (Meyer & Gupta, 1994, pp. 330-342). The first process is called p

40、ositive learning; that is, as performance improves, indicators lose their sensitivity in detecting bad performance. In fact, everybody has become so good at what they do that the indicator becomes obsolete. The second pr

41、ocess is called perverse learning. When organizations or individuals have learned which aspects of performance are measured (and which are not), th</p><p>　　It is important to understand that the paradox is

42、not about performance itself but about the reports on performance. Contrary to the expectation, indicators do not give an accurate report of performance. This could mean that performance is worse than reported (overrepre

43、sentation) but also that it is better than reported (under-representation). In the latter case, the performance paradox might be considered harm-less. However, when the results of performance assessment are used to evalu

44、ate organi</p><p>　　The percentage of crimes solved is decreasing, indicating that the police's performance is deteriorating. However, during the time period studied, more perpetrators have been arrested

45、, prosecuted, and penalized than before, which would indicate an improvement of performance. Wiebrens and Essers (1999) show that crime patterns in the Netherlands have developed in a way that invalidates the (internatio

46、nally well-established) indicator. For one, crime has become more violent, but the indicator does</p><p>　　An example of a performance paradox in a case of over representation is taken from Smith (1995). In

47、the British National Health Service, it was agreed that patients should be on a waiting list for an operation no longer than 2 years. This measure appeared successful, as the average waiting time decreased. However, on f

48、urther inspection it was found that because the waiting time only began to be counted after the first hospital consultation, consultation was postponed to decrease the waiting time</p><p>　　Detection and Pre

49、vention of a Performance Paradox</p><p>　　Although most readers will have recognized the examples we have given so far, it is not easy to trace a performance paradox in progress. Not only can it take on many

50、 different forms, it can also be the unintended result of a number of variables, such as government demands, the type of task to be carried out, the vagueness or contradictory nature of policy objectives, and the capabil

51、ities of the policy-implementing organization. Moreover, one is often not aware of the existence of a performance p</p><p>　　Several strategies are available to try to trace a performance paradox. Ideally, a

52、 comparison of reported and actual performance is the best way. However, such a comparison is generally very difficult to make because of the lack of comparative information. Alternative methods are (a) to use external s

53、ources to obtain information such as the national ombudsman, grassroots organizations, and client panels; (b) to develop new performance indicators from the existing indicators, for example, a perce</p><p>　

54、　An analysis of the performance assessment system would have to focus on a number of characteristics. First, the number of indicators is important, as well as whether indicators have been developed for all tasks that hav

55、e to be carried out. Few indicators for a limited part of total performance facilitate the occurrence of a performance paradox. This effect is reinforced when indicators do not change overtime. Next, attention should be

56、paid to the question of who develops the indicators. Organiza</p><p>　　Performance assessment in the public sector has to take the nature of public services into account (McGuire, 2001). The way professional

57、 services are produced and consumed (delivered) and the way public services are valued by the community have implications for performance monitoring (McGuire, 2001, p.8). In the public sector, consumers participate in th

58、e service delivery process; affecting output and outcome (cf. Fountain, 2001, p.58). Moreover, most products are intangible. Performance indicat</p><p>　　McGuire (2001) discusses an example of a performance-

59、monitoring framework that seems to take into account some of the lessons discussed before. This framework was developed for the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) by the Productivity Commission to benchmark the per

60、formance in the education, health, housing, and community services (available on the Internet at www.pc.gov.au/gsp).The framework is developed in cooperation with all governments in Australia. It discusses the limitation

61、s of pe</p><p>　　The COAG performance information is used by government agencies to assess performance and determine needs and resources. The framework improves the transparency of performance and accountabi

62、lity. However, this transparency also "increases rather than resolves political conflict over the distributional consequences of providing public services" (McGuire, 2001, p. 17). Because political conflict inc

63、reases the opportunities for accountability, it should not necessarily be considered to be a negativ</p><p>　　Conclusion</p><p>　　The increase in performance assessment in the public sector foll

64、owing the administrative reforms of the 1980s and 1990s has had several unintended consequences, threatening in sight into performance and performance itself. To counteract these consequences, performance assessment syst

65、ems should take the special characteristics of the public sector into account. The contested nature of performance indicators requires the use of multiple indicators, referring to different aspects of policy implemen<

66、/p><p>　　The rise of a number of new monitoring mechanisms could prove helpful in the fight against unintended consequences like the performance paradox (cf. also Power, 1997). For instance, the Internet makes

67、information on public sector performance accessible for everybody, increasing the risk for cheating executive agents to get caught. Second, Citizen Charters, the open government code of practice and new complaint procedu